Folks: I've blogged about a few things that might be of interest to tahoe-lafs hackers, including All-Or-Nothing Transform, file-append in HDFS, attacking multiple discrete log public keys at once, and a possible improvement to the theory of Zooko's Triangle. My klog is stored on the Tahoe Test Grid (so it sometimes has crummy availability if there are servers attached to the Test Grid which just silently wait when you ask them for shares).
http://testgrid.allmydata.org:3567/uri/URI:DIR2-RO:j74uhg25nwdpjpacl6rkat2yhm:kav7ijeft5h7r7rxdp5bgtlt3viv32yabqajkrdykozia5544jqa/wiki.html Or http://zooko.com/klog If you want to give a friend a hyperlink to my klog, and you give them the first one, then this empowers your friend to subsequently check whether the klog entries he downloads are signed by my private key. (But it doesn't require him to do so -- he can just rely on http://testgrid.allmydata.com to do that for him.) If you give him the second form, the short form at http://zooko.com, then he has no choice but to rely on http://zooko.com , which means whoever controls that server or domain name gets to choose what file he gets when he makes that request. (That's part of what Zooko's Triangle was all about.) Regards, Zooko _______________________________________________ tahoe-dev mailing list [email protected] http://allmydata.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tahoe-dev
