On Fri, 4 Feb 2011 00:47:59 -0700, "Zooko O'Whielacronx"
<[email protected]> wrote:
http://citp.princeton.edu/pub/coldboot.pdf
Very interesting; thanks for this link.
P.S. Once we've nailed this one then we can move on to the "cold boot
attack" world in which RAM is also untrusted! (Tahoe-LAFS contributor
Jacob Appelbaum was one of the authors of that attack.) It turns out
to be theoretically possible to do useful work in that threat model,
relying on the confidentiality of your registers but not your RAM.
I'm skeptical. Your registers could go to RAM at the first hardware
interrupt, outside of your control. You'd need private registers
exclusively for your application that aren't part of the OS context
switch image.
--
Kyle Markley
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