I am not fond of the public gateway (being used for other than public content) at all, because it teaches people to use the WUI to handle sensitive data.
Now the question is: how can we put back up a public gateway so that people can see how it works *without* first downloading it, while deterring other people from using it for hosting problematic files? Suggestions welcome. * write size limit For files created or written by the public gateway, limit size to a few kilobytes, perhaps only 1 kilobyte. It seems unlikely that there are files of that size that it's both true that the copyright holder would object and that other people would try to distribute this way. * read size limit If public read were available, then someone could upload a large file via locally-installed tahoe tools, and then direct others to use the gateway to download it. So this leads to "limit read and write via the gateway to a kilobyte or so". But that makes your blog hard to publish. On top of this, the gateway could accept somehow (being told to read a file?) a pgp-signed manifest, and then allow downloading those files. That way you could publish your blog, and other known members of the community could do that. * rate limit Put a download limit of say 2.5 KB/s per IP address on the gateway. If the gateway is substantially less attractive than other means of distributing files, perhaps it won't be misued. * defer tahoe blog publishing Consider if these issues are a distraction to things like enforced reciprocal sharing/accounting/etc. I sort of see the point of blog publishing via tahoe, but it doesn't have strong anonymity, and thus I don't really. If there isn't anonymity, the same mechanisms for storage authorization could perhaps be used to tie back to the writer and provide responsibility for publishing. That's a scary property, but it forces the issue and IMHO traceable and untraceable are useful and the middle ground is much more puzzling. tahoe is definitely in the middle ground, and once you add tor it's not clear there are any residual anonymity properties in tahoe.
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