Le 08 Dec 2011 12:47, Zooko O'Whielacronx a écrit: > One concern I have about Live CDs, and indeed about *all* packages of > Tahoe-LAFS, is if the end user would be able to verify exactly what > software they were running and if there was a backdoor or security > flaw in it.
You _need_ to trust the provider of the package, either binary or source. Even if repositories or archives are hosted by the project itself (I mean, on tahoe-lafs.org), each user need to trust the sysadmin, all people with write access on the server, the patch review process, etc. Since I need already need to trust Debian (put here your distribution of choice) for providing me a secure kernel, a secure python interpreter and nearly everything on my computer, it seems to be ok to trust it for the tahoe package. Moreover, I already have to trust my OS for all the private data I would want to put on the tahoe grid, so... Sure, a pirate may compromise the repository but signed packages are designed to overcome this risk: I do not see any signature on the tahoe download page (actually, it is quite frightening, but maybe I am wrong). Best, Olivier _______________________________________________ tahoe-dev mailing list [email protected] http://tahoe-lafs.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tahoe-dev
