-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 intrigeri:[...]
I'll see to the rest of your reply later. >>> Confusing message (actual behavior looks good, though): > >> Confirmed. Fixed. Changed to 'echo "uwt: localhost detected. Not >> using torsocks."' and open for suggestions. I change it to >> anything you suggest. > > "not using torsocks" vs. "exec torsocks ..." is still > self-contradicting and confusing. Sorry if I was not clear from the > beginning. > >>> (and probably fragile) parsing of wrapped command -- I find >>> this to be a bit scary, as it silently assumes every occurrence >>> of these strings in a wrapped command line means that the user >>> wants to connect to localhost, which might not be the case: >>> >>> case "$*" in *127.0.0.1*) *localhost*) > >> Confirmed. No idea how this could be done better. > >> A -l for localhost option wouldn't make sense as uwt's main >> purpose is to be used by wrappers. The magic "add stream >> isolation for non socks aware applications with uwt hack while >> not breaking localhost connections and while the user does not >> have to care about" does not work so well. Open for suggestions. > > If you're happy to see semi-random commands (try to?) connect to > the Internet directly, that is without going through Tor, then I > suggest configuring torsocks to accept connections to localhost, > and not try to guess (by fuzzy parsing command-line) if it should > go through Tor or not. Depends on your threat model and system-wide > design, mostly, and I admit I don't know the AOS' one enough to say > anything about it. > > However, even if the current state of uwt fits AOS, I have to say I > find it a bit scary to suggest [0] random users to use uwt in the > current state of things: reading that page, they might think uwt > will torify every command they wrap that connects to the Internet, > and not randomly let it go through in the clear if it happens to > contain this or that hardcoded string. Sorry if I missed something > here. > > [0] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/torsocks#uwt Ok, thanks very much! This was a serious issue. Now it fails for non-aos users, so they stay safe. For aos users it's safe, nothing can leak so or so. Worst thing that can happen is, that it runs without stream isolation through Tor's TransPort. For a real fix.... I don't think we can create a magic wrapper for - - apt-get - - wget - - ssh - - everything else, all in one (Wrapper defined as: user just types apt-get and it runs through it's own SocksPort.) The magic wrapper: - - stream isolates without the user being aware of it - - the same wrapper also works for things like ssh 127.0.0.1. Forcing through a SocksPort per applications will work by using wrappers, but localhost connections on purpose will always remain an issue. Using /usr/bin/git directly instant of git (uwt wrapper) will be required for tests like "wget 127.0.0.1", i.e. "/usr/bin/wget 127.0.0.1". -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJQRjAJAAoJEJwTGtNxOq7v6XMQAJb1Lm5S27AtQSSCnE3d6gBw bnyqWo8vTbFCF9JEK2j7Z69WvacrMJh+r5NgStZtUkHdXCXwy2AUG1cEBGVpR4cR bk/Mo2TiCrCu4rE7qQlYTvkvhVw+IPmHrQjBe+x+5406AHb2P4stcUe3xuw6hcTk jAEMJKtT9fbq20++Ap2a6UlIxgoNiji49b4nxg4oyM4RGrifZRLqaBLsNKl5ee/l Q0egHwmhmcBrSvgkDEFz+9vI1zp/rSyn3Lcfni4f4yXNL6fQ7lRZMW7yViOcvm8z EXh0dnm7KD6oHcfFliSdRs97f92OLwkqYQZkXoDbVSq74ToGVa9NgesBBo72zkQm B3MYJdiAlXOsVbDTZ2sK0DrX8cUwh3wBZDnB0Mto0CFEsfeSEQpfLrszXOIKlZdQ t6uUO/psH24579AxhE6jJZx6NyD7QDXD2Pvsmrv6NEze2MiJE+vlE/VgVGpJ0buG 8u6Vzfdqz89o/RonGb3ZOtcS6zeDMLSnPJzKfOG6KLURRXkuhGfXCVDTz+ylPT0a 0R5W5IkAA6hgDhVjy7dF1A+mD5v4oNZvUwh3vl9RzkthFeQpN/hyMHgcg8wrgH+B XMRMRHR37gwpXVQyTW2hZ1RqG4J4RKsnYJzmVkuC9P2txWa8V5Yww7GC2UUMCOPe zujkqR/IJJEPVM6IGsL4 =KKlN -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ tails-dev mailing list [email protected] https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev
