Il 12/06/2014 20:57, Frank leTanque ha scritto: > OnionMail sounds interesting; I have a couple of questions that maybe > someone could answer: > > 1) SSL on top of Tor, for an end to end encryption mail service. Is that > really necessary? Maybe I misunderstand how onion routing works and/or how > the encryption for OnionMail works? SSL is used for these reasons: * Verification of the server: If an attacker get the root privileges on the server, it can read quickly the tor private key. An attacker can't read the server's private key. (If server don't use -ndk option and use the F(X) start "boot" method).
* Cryptography (on Internet and Tor): Don't forget the NTU project: NTU is a fixed proxy to rebound the connection between internet and tor. This is another future project to protect the exit/enter identity of onionmail servers. > 2) Though messages are all stored on the server in an ambiguous manner, a > correlation attack could still be leveraged against users, correct? > Especially since the network of people using this service is very small. > Correlation attack based on size of message retrieved and the fact that it > needs to be retrieved. An early video on Tor vulnerabilities: > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DFY615-q6Ls > There are more recent studies. Basically, my takeaway has been that > pluggable transports through a trusted entry node is the most secure method > available. To protect against data stream correlation we are working to NTU project. For example you can activate 2 or 3 tor process and rebound connections via NTU. Example: Alice ---> NTU ---> NTU ---> Bob@OnionMail ---> /dev/random ---> poisoned bait! The dafault configuration of onionmail limits the size of the messages to 2MB. (it can changed). Other is all working progress... > 3) How does this compare to Bitmessage? Security enthusiasts should really > look into bitmessage because they will find themselves very interested in > the concept and even the early execution. Bitmessage would have better > metadata obfuscation, correct? I don't use bitmessage. I'm using InterNOS, (similar to torchat + voice). It my very old project for Android platform. But this is another history.... OnionMail is a mail server not a p2p protocol. It is a mail server like exim4 or postfix, but it use tor and is encrypted. > *---* > TANQUE > wickr: letanque | tanque.pro | [email protected] > > > *PGPKey: * > http://pool.sks-keyservers.net:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x929D2552A998B662 > > *CONFIDENTIALITY STATEMENT: This email message, together with all > attachments, is intended only for the individual or entity to which it is > addressed and may contain legally privileged or confidential information. > Any dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication by persons > or entities other than the intended recipient, is strictly prohibited, and > may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error please > contact the sender immediately and delete the transmitted material and all > copies from your system, or if received in hard copy format, return the > material to us via the United States Postal Service. Thank you. * > > > On Thu, Jun 12, 2014 at 6:58 AM, OnionMail <[email protected]> wrote: > >> We are writing and translate the documentation of protocol... >> (This is a work in progress...) >> >> (I am attaching in this mail the "rulez" help file). >> >> Sorry for ver long reply! >> >> OnionMail use standard SMTP and POP3 protocols. >> OnionMail is an SMTP/POP3 mail server compatible with all mail clients. >> >> Main informations to know about OnionMail: >> Inhibition of store any message in relay server. >> Only direct connection is allowed without multiple connections- >> Mail messages are saved only in the recipient's server and encrypted >> with multiple asymmetric keys. >> >> All messages are saved into an encrypted format: >> 7 KEYS AES 256 + 2 RSA 2048 keys + SALT. + 1 AES 256 key + SALT for each >> message line. >> >> There is an RSA 2048 asymmetric key for each inbox. >> The RSA key are encrypted by the use password. >> There are two user's password: >> SMTP send password. (Decrypt via HASH 7 AES256 + RSA2048 user inbox to >> write). >> POP3 read password. (Decrypt via HASH 7 AES256 + RSA2048 inbox to read). >> The public key sores the message into the inbox. >> The private key reads the messages. >> >> An attacker can't read your message with server key. >> All data is stored via HASH algorithm. >> An attacker can't read metadata with server key. >> >> All files are name into alphanumeric hash name. >> An attacker can't associate a single file to any user. >> >> The server's master key can't used to decrypt the users account and read >> the messages (without username, and all passwords). >> >> All server are forced to use SSL (in tor network). >> >> The server's master key is not on the server. >> When an OnionMail server start it do the "boot" process: >> The server negotiates a function F(X) to another server (for each server). >> All F(X) have a counter (OTP counter) controlled by the KCTL >> autodestruciton certificate. >> The administrator of an OnionMail server, can enable or disable the key >> without connect to the server. >> The server's master keys is calculated via some F(X) and server random >> data. >> The F(X) can't used to get the server's master key. >> The server don't know the F(X). >> >> Example: >> The server is stolen or seized. >> The administrator sends the KCTL certificate for autodestruction, all F(X) >> are destroyed and the server become unusable. >> >> All connection between user and server are via tor network using STARTTLS. >> The server use POP3 to force the user to read and delete the messages from >> server. The unreaded messages are deleted after 60 days. >> >> All files are deleted by wipe. >> >> The server supports natively mailing list. (the temp files is encrypted >> via AES256 KEY +1 KEY + SALT for each message line). >> >> There are some exit/enter server: >> These servers connect internet to tor and tor to internet. >> There is a protocol named VMAT to use normal mail address (without 16 >> characters onion address). >> >> There are some extended functions accessible via server's bot: >> Server's help. >> User configurations. >> Personal SPAM list (to block spam messages). >> VMAT Address verification. >> USER SUBSCRIBE. >> Mailing list. >> VMAT address configuration. >> Etc... >> >> The server can use GPG messages to communicate with the users. >> For example you can create a mailing list sending to the server an >> encrypted message. The you receive an encrypted message (use MYKEY command >> first). >> >> All OnionMail server are federate and servers check each other. >> When the SSL engine check the certificates: >> Check HASH. >> Check Public key (full data). >> Check Date & time. >> In the future we will implements the check via other servers. >> >> The sender is verified via TKIM (similar to DKIM but is used in tor >> network), reading MX record (via exit node, not directly or via federation >> server list), SMTP session simulation (mail from... tcpt to... rset... ). >> The VMAT address is verified by RSA signature, TORM VMAT LOOKUP SMTP >> extension. >> >> The administrator of an OnionMail server can't read your message and can't >> know what are the user on the server. >> The Administrator can creates a voucher code to use to users subscription. >> (In this way the Administrator can know the user identity). >> >> onion.py >> This script is a wizard to register a new OnionMail's account. >> It configure quickly and simply: >> Choose the hidden service. >> Create a new OnionMail user. >> Activate a new VMAT address (to use without 16 characters). >> Create a new GPG key pair up to 16384 bits. >> Configure Claws-Mail (account, SSL, inbox). >> It simply extract a skel file into the claws-mail directory (if not >> exists) ad add an inbox. Then configure account (accountrc file), and SSL >> certificates of OnionMail server (certs directory). >> The user is registered via RQUS extension of POP3. (OnionMail's extension >> to use subscription method via tablet, smartphone and PC). >> The script shows a captcha code in ASCIIart. >> >> There are some extensions of SMTP protocol used only by OnionMail. >> TORM and TKIM >> TKIM is an extension that implements a server authentication like DKIM. >> TORM is the main onionmail's extension. Here I list only some of the >> descriptions: >> TORM PUSH Negotiate a F(X) >> TORM DERK Calculate a F(X) >> TORM VMAT LOOKUP Verify VMAT address. >> TORM IAM I'AM (user by OnionMail manifest and federation list). >> TORM WHO Used to verify another SSL certificate. >> TORM VMAT TO Used to send message to VMAT user alias. >> TORM K Get the RSA public key of this server. >> TORM MX Query DNS MX record (only exit server). >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Il 12/06/2014 12:40, William Waites ha scritto: >> >> Hi Anopticon, >> >> I've looked a little bit at OnionMail -- I'm also interested in the >> general problem. But I have difficulty understanding exactly how it >> works. From an end-user perspective it is reasonably clear but the >> operation of the server software doesn't seem to be very well >> explained. For my part (I have nothing to do with the Tails project >> other than as a user) I wouldn't be comfortable using it or >> recommending it without properly understanding what it does. Do you >> have anything that is more like protocol documentation that describes >> exactly what the servers do and how they communicate amongst each other? >> My apologies if it is there and I simply haven't been able to find it. >> >> Best, >> -w >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Tails-dev mailing >> [email protected]https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev >> To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to >> [email protected]. >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Tails-dev mailing list >> [email protected] >> https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev >> To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to >> [email protected]. >> > > > _______________________________________________ > Tails-dev mailing list > [email protected] > https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev > To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to > [email protected].
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