Jurre van Bergen: > I'm not an UX person but I see the following solution(s) living next to > each other if needed. Coming from a security point of view, I believe > it's better to enable things than to disable things. Most of our users > might not understand the risks associated to attacks described in vpwned > and dma capable devices. We therefor, shouldn't make them vulnerable by > default but rather by choice and document in a clear way what the risks > associated to it are. > > I'd also rather not advocate for a way to enable through out a session, > it's like having intercourse and deciding, gosh, we're ready to go but > we're out of condoms, but whatever, just this one time. The implications > might be for a lifetime. > > 1) When I boot Tails, i'm presented with an option to allow local > traffic or not. > 2) When I boot Tails, i'm presented with an option to allow certain > local traffic like SSH and printing and the rest not. > 3) When I boot Tails, i'm presented with an option to be able to login > to a captive portal, only this IP is whitelisted on the firewall rules > and the rest is blocked. > > I think my aim with providing these options is that, when you boot a > computer, you often know what you're going to do with it or what you > want access to or not. The same would go for allowing devices which are > DMA capable like firewire, thunderbolt, pcmcia and others.
We started a related discussion on tails-ux these days. Please see https://mailman.boum.org/pipermail/tails-ux/2014-December/000148.html Feel free to provide technical insight on whether having printers configured in persistence might leak information on the LAN and whether people should be warned about that. -- sajolida _______________________________________________ Tails-dev mailing list [email protected] https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to [email protected].
