Hi, sajolida wrote (20 Mar 2015 12:34:35 GMT) : > I think that our long-term objective is to have people move out of > using TrueCrypt technologies in general (be it the software, the > volumes, or the containers).
Now you make me curious: why do you think we should get rid of the TrueCrypt on-disk format? (That's *not* a rhetorical question -- seriously, I've no idea. There were issues with "hidden" volumes, but IIRC most of them either don't apply in Tails, or were implementation problems more than weaknesses in the on-disk format. I didn't look into this recently, so it's entirely possible that I'm mistaken.) > Our documentation was conceived as a migration path -- we provide people > with instructions to move their data from TrueCrypt to LUKS -- and not > as a way of going on using TrueCrypt encryption forever. Indeed. The way I see it, we're stuck between a rock and a hard place: Ideally we'd like to be able to fully replace TrueCrypt volumes (I'm assuming that I'm missing information that makes you think we should) with something else, but nothing equivalent exists yet. Sadly, I'm not aware of any plan (let alone serious effort) towards making this a reality, when one takes into account the need for: - inter-operability (which I'm tempted to disregard as a dangerous way to share data with an untrusted OS, but then if we don't support TrueCrypt volumes at all, perhaps users who won't/can't fully give up proprietary software will just be forced to either store and share the very same data in cleartext, or to use something less safe than Tails) - "hidden" volumes (which may be a false promise in TrueCrypt, but still people want that and AFAIK there's nothing even approaching it, be it in terms of peer-review of existing production-quality implementations) With this in mind, supporting the TrueCrypt on-disk format (even minimally) still makes sense for the time being IMO. I doubt we'll actively patch out the corresponding code from cryptsetup, so I take for granted that we'll keep this support in Tails as long as cryptsetup has it. We had good reasons to get rid of the TrueCrypt software itself, but no existing GUI for TrueCrypt volumes is satisfying right now, in the context of Tails. Now, of course a CLI-only interface isn't encouraging for Tails users to go on using TrueCrypt volumes. This has both advantages (as a long-term strategy, hopefully it'll encourage people to either fully replace TrueCrypt volumes with a better design), and drawbacks (until our fancy long-term plans are made real by $someone $some_day, Tails users have the choice between using something we claim we don't really support, with poor usability, and doing something even worse). So, the question I'm coming to is: assuming there *was* satisfying GUI support for the TrueCrypt on-disk format (in GNOME Disks, Nautilus, etc.), would we want to explicitly support that, or still depict it as a suboptimal feature, and call it unsupported because we think it should ideally be replaced by something else on the long term? In other words: how hard should we push for adding support for the TrueCrypt on-disk format in udisks and friends? (Until 15 minutes ago, I was convinced that it was the way to go, and prepared to go ping the right folks about it, but now you've planted some non-negligible amount of doubt in my mind, so I'm a bit lost in terms of strategy.) Cheers, -- intrigeri _______________________________________________ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.