Hi, This is an on-going investigation. Indeed, applications using the Tor socks port for name resolution are not vulnerable for this attack.
An automated test was ran trying to determine (using the public proof of concept) whether any application was vulnerable, so far, we're on the safe side but were investigating a couple of applications which returned an error. Even if there was an evil exit node, it should be fine since getaddrinfo() in torsocks resolves it through Tor on the SocksPort. In addition, applications which are configured to use socks don't use getaddrinfo() in this case since the resolving will go through Tor's DNSPort. We'll keep the mailinglist up-to-date on any progress regarding this matter. Best, Jurre On 02/18/2016 11:34 AM, intrigeri wrote: > Hi, > > my understanding is that clients that use Tor SOCKS port for name > resolution are fine. > > For clients who use the DNSPort, it's not clear to me if an > attacker-controlled payload can make it's way from the exit node being > used for the name resolution to the client. Has anyone looked > into this? > > Cheers, _______________________________________________ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.