Huck Toohey wrote: > It seems essential that all Tails users be able to assert explicit > entry, exit, and relay nodes; and to avoid ever connecting even > momentarily to an entry (or relay) which they have reason to suspect > may be monitored, lest all their future access be denied, for example > by an authoritarian regime.
Note that from an anonymity point of view, choosing yourself your
circuit can be bad because it can distinguishes you slightly from the
rest of the Tor users which use random circuits.
Still, we have plans to add a persistence option for some Tor settings:
https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/5461
It is an issue that we want to address at some point but that requires
quite some work and we are working on scarce human resources. So any bit
of help is welcome.
> So, I would express my vote for that to happen sooner than later in an
> imminent build, or for workarounds to be established in a manner that
> is rather trivial for users and well-guided both at the greeter level,
> and in the TBB screen which follows. It ought to be very clear, if one
> does use (persistent) bridge relays for example, which tor startup
> option such users ought to select.
It is already possible to configure bridges, proxy, and firewall
limitations from Tails Greeter:
https://tails.boum.org/doc/first_steps/startup_options/network_configuration/
--
sajolida
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