I read somewhere that there are usb's with physical write-lock switches on them 
so even if you plugged it into an infected computer as long as the usb was 
locked it couldnt bypass it. I dont know what the specific feature is called 
and havent seen it on any usb's lately. 


-------- Original Message --------
From: Baffo32 <[email protected]>
Apparently from: [email protected]
To: User support for Tails <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [Tails-support] usb firmware malware,how to check for this and 
what can it do on tails?
Date: Wed, 27 Aug 2014 12:54:55 -0400

> Hi,
> 
> It is so great to see discussions like this.
> 
> Unfortunately the tails bootloader signature changes every install, and the 
> upgrade process is a little not consistent between upgrade paths, so 
> cryptographic verification can be more complex than it needs to be.
> 
> What do you think of some kind of usb sniffing to help deal with such an 
> issue?
> 
> On Aug 27, 2014 7:31 AM, "mercedes508" <[email protected]> wrote:
> > 
> > Hi,
> > 
> > > I was wondering how to tell if your usb's firmware has been modified
> > > by malicious malware/trojans and what effect would this have on
> > > tails? Could the malware phone home bypassing Tor without necessarily
> > > having to be made for tails? And if this malware was designed to
> > > infect tails, how could one integrity check tails system files to
> > > make sure nothing critical was modified?
> > 
> > Actually it is hard to tell anything about such complex and generally
> > kept-secret possibilities.
> > 
> > But unfortunately, you can do a cryptographic verification once it's
> > installed.
> > 
> > Cheers.
> > _______________________________________________
> > tails-support mailing list
> > [email protected]
> > https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-support
> > To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to 
> > [email protected].
> 
>
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