On Tue, Jul 9, 2019 at 3:09 PM D. Hugh Redelmeier via talk <[email protected]> wrote: > > | From: Christopher Browne via talk <[email protected]> > > | This sure seems to point at rdrand being a scary feature to consider using. > > I put the blame squarely on AMD. They've botched rdrand a couple of > times. It's not really our job to wonder if instructions aren't > implemented correctly. Imagine if FDIV didn't work? Whose problem would > that be? > > | I imagine that it would be better to access /dev/urandom or /dev/random, > | and have those facilities mix rdrand in somewhat, if possible. > > In this case, not really. Read the comments in the code (not the commit): > > <https://github.com/systemd/systemd/blob/master/src/basic/random-util.c> > > rdrand is suspect for another reason. We have no way knowing if > rdrand has hidden structure. Such a compromise would amount to a > backdoor into most crypto. But systemd folks say that their > application of the output of rdrand doesn't need strong random numbers.
Using logic alone, not being at all knowledgeable re: this level of programming, I will state that that opinion is absolutely pathetic! Using poor tools gives a greater surface for hacker attacks and not trying to minimize that - - - - well I consider that a Microsoft trait but then I don't benefit from the billions spent upon computer security like Microsoft does so maybe I'm wrong! Regards --- Talk Mailing List [email protected] https://gtalug.org/mailman/listinfo/talk
