Ajai Khattri wrote:
I think a lot of prominent geeks already said the machines were not secure without some kind of hardcopy audit trail. But this government has a habit of ignoring experts in anything (e.g. can you say "DMCA"? ).
I'm on a political list with a bunch of technogeeks. After the 2004 election, we developed an idea for a hybrid compromise of computer + paper trail.
Your vote is recorded electronically with a UUID on a paper punched receipt. The voter can see who he just voted for. He then passes 1-n read-only stations on his way out where his vote is read, recorded and archived redundantly by each of the political parties and by any watchdog groups like LOWV. Each station would be built by a different manufacturer. It displays the vote to the voter where he confirms it. If all detectors agree on the vote, it's locked in. If the vote is invalidated by any of them then the voter casts a standard paper ballot for hand counting. Otherwise, he drops his receipt in a box on the way out. At the end of the day, the data from all machines is read and compared for accuracy. If there are any discrepancies, the ID-encoded receipt is retrieved for manual counting.
Or something like that. _______________________________________________ New York PHP Community Talk Mailing List http://lists.nyphp.org/mailman/listinfo/talk NYPHPCon 2006 Presentations Online http://www.nyphpcon.com Show Your Participation in New York PHP http://www.nyphp.org/show_participation.php
