Apologies for being unclear here: we have an experimental tarsnap-archive-keyring package, but no new tarsnap packages.
If tarsnap-archive-keyring 2021.09.29 installs without any errors or warnings, then all is well and there is nothing further to test. Cheers, - Graham On Wed, Oct 13, 2021 at 11:45:38AM -0700, Graham Percival wrote: > We have experimental packages and instructions for .deb packages which support > "signed-by" repositories. This is relevant for people using Debian, Ubuntu, > Mint, ElementaryOS, Pop!_OS, etc. > > The old method (using apt-key) is marked as deprecated, and is planned to be > removed from new distributions in mid-2022. As far as I'm aware, any existing > installation should be fine in the future -- this isn't something that they > would change in the middle of a stable release's lifetime. (For example, if > you're running Ubuntu 18.04, don't worry.) > > We're currently testing: > - a new tarsnap-archive-keyring package. > - installation instructions which depend on the user's version of apt. > https://www.tarsnap.com/pkg-deb.html#experimental > > If there's no reports of problems, we'll migrate them to the real packages in > a > week. > > > History > - before apt 1.1~exp9 2015-08-18, gpg keys for third-party > repositories had to either be added to /etc/apt/trusted.gpg directly, > or added to /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/ as a separate file. These keys > are completely trusted by the system. > > Hypothetically, if a third-party repository includes a package called > "passwd" which has a higher version number than the normal "passwd" > package, the distro would happily install the third-party package. > I leave the security implications of this as an exercise for the reader. > > - after apt 1.1~exp9 (related stable release: apt 1.1 2015-11-26), > repositories entries in sources.list could be marked as "signed-by". > For example, > deb http://pkg.tarsnap.com/deb/stretch ./ > turns into: > deb [signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/tarsnap-archive-keyring.gpg] > http://pkg.tarsnap.com/deb/stretch ./ > (all on one line) > > As a result, the system no longer needs to completely trust > third-party keys; a malicious third-party "passwd" package would not > be viewed as an upgrade to the base system "passwd" package. > > - apt 2.1.8 2020-08-04 marked "apt-key" (which manages > /etc/apt/trusted.g) as deprecated; scheduled for removal in Q2/2022. > > > What does that mean for us? > > - people using old (2015 or earlier) distros still need the > tarsnap-archive-keyring package to write the keyring to > /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/ > - people using the most recent (2021 or later) distros should use the > "signed-by" method for new installations. > - people using distros between 2016 and 2021 could use either method for > new installations. (We will tell them to use the newer method.) > - if at all possible, people with existing tarsnap installations should > not need to know about any changes. > (i.e. `apt-get update && apt-get upgrade` should just work.) > > Our solution for the tarsnap-archive-keyring packate is: > - if the system already has a > /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/tarsnap-archive-keyring.gpg > then copy the new archive keyring over that existing file. > - otherwise, don't write to /etc/apt/trusted.gpg/ > > This requires the use of postinst / postrm scripts, which is discouraged by > the > Debian New Maintainer's Guide, but I can't see an alternate solution which > would work for new installations and existing installations at the same time > (without requiring existing users to manually edit files in /etc/). > > > For more details, here's the initial discussion: > https://github.com/Tarsnap/tarsnap/issues/475 > and here's the commit in the tarsnap-public-keys repository: > https://github.com/Tarsnap/tarsnap-public-keys/commit/cc32d2b5fc2c3e955efe651dbeb65a6c708b8fab > > Cheers, > - Graham Percival
