Hi Joseph,
Thanks so much for your detailed reply. I have indeed gotten things
to work. For the aid of others, here are some of the useful bits. I
may post some more complete code in a week or two.
> First, you need to adjust your calculation per the comment about
> 'SHA-256(SINIT) | EDX'. Second, the SHA-256 of SINIT is not performed on the
> entire binary. Appendix A.1 "alludes" to how the hash is calculated (since
> it is the same as what is used in the signature):
Indeed, the actual value of PCR 17 after the "first extend" turns out to be:
SHA1(0x00^20 | SHA1(SHA256(SINIT**) | EdxSenterFlags))
SINIT** denotes only part of the sinit module, as Joseph suggested. More below.
> RSASig
> The PKCS #1.5 RSA Signature of the module. The RSA Signature signs an area
> that includes the some of the module header and the USER AREA data field
> (which represents the body of the module). Parts of the module header not
> included are: the RSA Signature, public key, and scratch field.
Not including the RSA Signature, Public Key, or Scratch field still
leaves a little wiggle room with respect to whether any metadata
(e.g., size information) pertaining to those areas is included. Here
is what is working for me:
I'm using the definition of acm_hdr_t from acmod.h from tboot-1.6, and
I created a big binary version of the SINIT of interest in a C array
using:
'xxd -i /boot/i5_i7_DUAL_SINIT_18.BIN > i5_i7_DUAL_SINIT_18.h'
(As an aside, xxd may be the greatest program you've never heard of ;-).
Here is a function that recomputes the PCR-17 value from the "first
extend" which should (and does for my tests) match
SinitMleData.SinitHash:
int validate_pcr17_sinit_hash_version7(sinit_mle_data_t *smd) {
SHA_CTX c;
unsigned char pcr17[20], inner[20];
EVP_MD_CTX mdctx;
const EVP_MD *md;
unsigned char md_value[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
int md_len;
acm_hdr_t *s = (acm_hdr_t*)i5_i7_DUAL_SINIT_18_BIN;
OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
if(!(md = EVP_get_digestbyname("sha256"))) return -1;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mdctx);
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&mdctx, md, NULL);
#define HASHIN(foo) EVP_DigestUpdate(&mdctx, &foo, sizeof(foo)); \
printf(" size %d\n", sizeof(foo));
HASHIN(s->module_type);
HASHIN(s->module_subtype);
HASHIN(s->header_len);
HASHIN(s->header_ver);
HASHIN(s->chipset_id);
HASHIN(s->flags);
HASHIN(s->module_vendor);
HASHIN(s->date);
HASHIN(s->size);
HASHIN(s->reserved1);
HASHIN(s->code_control);
HASHIN(s->error_entry_point);
HASHIN(s->gdt_limit);
HASHIN(s->gdt_base);
HASHIN(s->seg_sel);
HASHIN(s->entry_point);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&mdctx, s->reserved2, sizeof(s->reserved2));
printf(" size reserved2 %d\n", sizeof(s->reserved2));
HASHIN(s->key_size);
HASHIN(s->scratch_size);
uint32_t user_area_len = i5_i7_DUAL_SINIT_18_BIN_len -
((uint32_t)s->user_area - (uint32_t)s);
printf(" user_area_len %d\n", user_area_len);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&mdctx, s->user_area, user_area_len);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&mdctx, md_value, &md_len);
dump_bytes1("sha256(): ", md_value, md_len);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mdctx);
printf(" md_len %d\n", md_len);
memset(pcr17, 0, sizeof(sha1_hash_t)); // PCR-17 reset to zero by
GETSEC[SENTER]
// First compute "inner" SHA-1 (data sent in TPM_HASH_DATA sequence)
SHA1_Init(&c);
SHA1_Update(&c, md_value, md_len);
SHA1_Update(&c, &smd->edx_senter_flags, sizeof(uint32_t));
SHA1_Final(inner, &c);
// Second compute Extend(inner)
SHA1_Init(&c);
SHA1_Update(&c, pcr17, sizeof(sha1_hash_t)); // First part of
payload existing 20 zeros
SHA1_Update(&c, inner, sizeof(sha1_hash_t)); // Second part is
"inner" SHA-1 computed above
SHA1_Final(pcr17, &c); // Compute final digest
dump_bytes1("pcr17 (1st ext)", pcr17, sizeof(sha1_hash_t));
if(!memcmp(pcr17, smd->sinit_hash, sizeof(sha1_hash_t))) {
return 0; /* success */
}
return -1; /* failure */
}
So once again, thanks Joseph and JP for your responses. JP, hopefully
this helps you to no longer take PCR-17 on faith.
Best,
-Jon
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