Hello,

I've been working on adding PECOFF/kernel signature verification to
tboot and now that I have a rough working prototype I wanted to bring
it to the list to see if this is something the tboot community would
be interested in eventually merging (once the work is more complete
and polished).

The patchset is quite large, mostly due to the inclusion of
libtomcrypt and libtomfastmath to the tboot repository, so I'm going
to refrain from spamming the list with the full patchset at this early
stage.  The current patchset can be found on GitHub at the URL below
(look in the "working-txtsig" branch):

* https://github.com/pcmoore/misc-tboot/tree/working-txtsig

The prototype doesn't actually enforce any policy or change the PCR
measurements based on the kernel signatures (both are planned work
items), but it does demonstrate the ability to parse and verify a
signed PECOFF image.  The individual patch descriptions provide some
additional information on some of the planned work to take this from
a prototype to a proper implementation.

My motivation for this work is to create a mechanism that is capable
of generating a stable set of PCR values across multiple kernels that
can be used to seal TPM NVRAM secrets on both legacy BIOS and UEFI
systems.  Imagine being able to store a storage encryption key in the
TPM, and restricting access to that key to only authorized kernels in
such a way that didn't require changing the tboot policy when booting
different kernels.  I imagine I'm not along in thinking this would
be a nice capability to have, especially on systems that don't support
UEFI Secure Boot.

For those who are interested, I gave a presentation on this work at
the Linux Security Summit last month, the video and sldies are
available at the links below:

* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qbjz_5jUE9o
* 
https://www.paul-moore.com/docs/lss-securing_tpm_with_txt-pmoore-201909-r2.pdf

Thoughts?  Is this capability something the TXT/tboot community would
be interested in merging into the main tboot repository once it is
more complete?

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