Eric Rescorla <e...@rtfm.com> writes: > To be honest, I think this document is working too hard in both cases to > try to legislate that people don't do things that we think are bad. The > bottom > line is that in both cases the boundaries around what we think is OK and > what we think is not are kind of fuzzy (as you illustrate above with > Curve25519). Rather than try to write RFC 2919 language about this, > it would be better to simply describe the consequences of bad choices, > and say that the function must be collision resistant, and stop.
I don't understand the RFC2919 reference. Did you mean a different RFC, or is there some IETF lore about this being an overly-specified RFC? The thing is, there is definitely historical precedent for intentionally choosing weak crypto algorithms. And while I hope the truly bad old days are behind us, I still think it's important that we abstract some base level of security out of TCP-ENO so that most applications don't need to whitelist TEP identifiers. David _______________________________________________ Tcpinc mailing list Tcpinc@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tcpinc
