On Fri, Jun 10, 2011 at 03:52:17PM +0000, Emmanuel Dreyfus wrote: > On Fri, Jun 10, 2011 at 09:30:40AM -0500, Eric Haszlakiewicz wrote: > > eh? Don't corrupted filesystems cause a panic anyway? What is it about > > extended attributes that makes this more likely? > > You rarely write to the executable files that you need in order to boot > to single user, but modifying attribute backing stores is a common > operation. This makes the later more susceptible to being corrupted at > the time the filesystem is mounted.
I don't really understand. Modifying the attribute backing stores is subject to the same constraints as any other metadata write -- isn't it? Is there somehow less protection against corruption here than there would be when, for example, modifying the _inode_ for a given executable? Shouldn't that operation be considerably _more_ common than modifying the attributes for a given executable? Thor
