On Sun, Sep 11, 2011 at 11:42:33PM +0200, Jean-Yves Migeon wrote: > On 11.09.2011 21:07, Thor Lancelot Simon wrote: > > Similarly, I am not sure I believe the security justification, mostly > > because I don't really see why I should believe that the very complex > > memory management code involved in providing the split kernel/user > > memory-mapped device driver interface this seems to require is less > > likely to have security-critical bugs than a comparatively simple > > addition of in-kernel support for a few different virtual disk layouts > > than the ones we already have code for. > > That is true, although you could reuse this argument for pretty much > everything else, and let all userland be reimplemened in kernel.
No. "X > Y" does not imply "for all X for all Y, X > Y". Thor
