Dear fellow Crypto-Anarchist comrades,

There is a new TAZ (Temporary Autonomous Zone) / DMZ (Demilitarized Zone) DML 
(Decentralized Mailing List) for the worldwide Crypto-Anarchist Federation 
available on BitMessage (Uncensorable, 100% P2P & decentralized, based on 
Libtorrent and Libbitcoin) where we invite all the Crypto-Anarchist to 
advertize their true Crypto-Anarchists projects.

Chan Name (Case sensitive, must be entered as written here): Crypto-Anarchist 
Federation
Chan Address : BM-2cWdaAUTrGZ21RzCpsReCk8n86ghu2oY3v

We have started a simple Open-Hardware project (Not yet implemented with fully 
Open-Core IC’s on FPGA, but it will come soon) in order to secure BitMessage 
against Keyloggers, Keyescrow, screen dumper, and enhance the anonymity of 
BitMessage when using it with TOR, solving issues with TOR that cannot be 
solved by software (All the fingerprinting identification family).

We contact you first to inform you of the existence of this channel.
Don’t be surprised by some nazi/FEDS trolls that come on it. It’s part of the 
game with uncensorable channels. Just ignore them, or blacklist them if they 
use personal addresses and not the chan address to post.

Then we have today planned to add a secure hardware RNG and of course, I have 
informed all my Crypto-Anarchist friends of your development on that matter, 
that are to me from far the best independent work I have seen worldwide.
We will add your RNG design in future versions of our « BitMessage Secure 
Station ».



Here are the goals of this Crypto-Anarchist Federation chan :
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This is the Crypto-Anarchist Federation channel were Crypto-Anarchists are 
invited wolrdwide to talk about topics that matter to them :

- Crypto-Anarchism and Crypto-Anarchist community worldwide, to share infos, 
actions and get organized better.
- Direct Crypto-Anarchist Actions.
- Crypto-Anarchist projects funding support requests.
- Crypto-Anarchist tools & projects list, annoucement.
- Support requests for Crypto-Anarchists in trouble with authorities.
- Crypto-Anarchist Federation technological roadmap and planning.
- Cyber-Security tips.
- Hacking Tools.
- Security Breaches papers & Workarounds.
- Crypto Analysis papers.
- New Crypto-Anarchist tools & projects.
- Crypto-Currency news, tools, & projects.

As there is no possible censorship on BitMessage public DML (Decentralized 
Mailing Lists) channels, we sometime face various kind of trolls, it's part of 
the game, and these last hours we had an unprecedant amount of trolling from 
FEDS and nazi, but we don't care. The goal here is to ensure Crypto-Anarchists 
can spread important informations to other.

The advantage of BitMessage is that nobody can indeed know that you are reading 
the chan : Reading a chan is really fully anonymous (We can demonstrate it).
Posting to a chan can be fully anonymous too using chan's address instead of 
personnal addresses.

As you will see in this chan, in order not to betray our fellow anarchists 
comrades' trust, we are working on the development of a simple open-hardware 
dedicated platform, the "BitMessage Secure Station", that will allow BitMessage 
users to reach military grade anonymity and privacy protection : The biggest 
mistake (We call it betrayl) of all the security/privacy free tools developpers 
is that they never want to take in consideration that their tools would work 
well on a perfect secure non backdoored and non backdoorable / compromizable 
computer, which don't exist yet.

And here I am clearly refering to the most important things Edward Snowden 
reminded us : "Encryption works. Properly implemented strong crypto systems are 
one of the few things that you can rely on. Unfortunately, endpoint security is 
so terrifically weak that NSA can frequently find ways around it." (Edward 
Snowden)



Here are our « BitMessage Secure Station » characteristics so far, for comment 
and remarks :
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Indeed, this project we are developping is aiming at solving the best as we can 
(Military grade) the issues Snowden perfectly described and reminded us about 
End-Points (Computers) weaknesses when connected to the internet, and we do it 
radicaly using the best state of the art known technics, consisting in using a 
double-computer architecture :

The draft "BitMessage Secure Station" hardware is detailed here : 
http://picpaste.com/BitMessageSecureStation-gYTXbL2l.png

As you will understand, this add-on project is not about, at least for the 
moment, doing any major change to the BitMessage software, but to create a 
dedicated hardware that solves security issues that cannot be solved with a 
"Mono-processor" architecture : In the architecture we are designing, we are 
using a 2 microprocessors + 1 microcontroller model :

• A first computer (Low cost Raspberry Pi, accessible to everybody for 30$) 
connected to the internet, that must considered compromized.
• A second computer fully air gapped from the internet, you will use this one 
to read/enter your messages securely.
• Interconnectiong both with a serial port, but for added security, this serial 
port goes through a "firewall" (Made out of a PIC microcontroller) that checks 
no side channels exist by ensuring the protocol defined for transfering data 
between the 2 computers is strictly respect, fitering at the same time 
time-based side channels on the serial port.
• The PIC Microcontroller handling two serial ports and relayings data between 
each port bidirectionnaly, with its software higly secured (coded in assembly 
language, with NO OS and NO Libraries).

We are simply taking in account the best state of the art knowledge in 
defensive cyber security in order to build an "hardend end-point", that can 
resist "NSA & friends" or "competitors" grade military attacks, therefore truly 
and proovenly protecting you from :

► Keyloggers malware protection :

It is achieved architecturaly by having a double processor system, with one 
computer being compromized and connected to the internet, and another one 
air-gapped and not connected to the internet : The messages in clear text are 
being entered on the computer not connected to the internet : Assuming that 
there is no side channel or hidden channel on the serial port connecting the 
two processors (Will be discussed below), even if there is a keylogger 
installer on the air gapped computer, it will not be able to transfer its data 
if we can ensure there is no side channel or hidden channels between the two 
computers.

► Keyescrow malware protection (Protection of KEYS.DAT and MESSAGES.DAT):

Same as above. (Prevent the private keys used by BitMessage from being stolen 
by agencies/hackers)

► Hardware integrated circuits serial numbers fingerprinting identification 
technic protection when using TOR or VPNs :

This problem is solved by dedicating a new hardware for the first computer, 
connected to the internet and that will be compromized, whose serial numbers 
where never associated to the user identity before : A brand new Raspberry Pi 
bought in cash in an electronic store is the perfect way to achieve this. It 
also mean dedicating this hardware exclusively for this usage, and never 
connect to it any device : Exemple : Never connect USB Flashdisc key to it, 
whose serial number, already associated to the user's identity, to it, because 
it would allow to extrapolate the identity to associate to the Raspbery serial 
number to the identity already associated with the USB Flashdisc key. Same 
thing for LCD screen : They transmit serial number (VGA, DVI, or HDMI) to the 
graphic card, and can have the same terrible effect as a USB flashdisc key.

We will have to give the user a list I have already been working on for years, 
of all the parts or subsystems known in a computer to have serial numbers.

Let's say this issue is a matter of respecting a strict security procedure.

► Hardware characteristics (Speed of each processor analysis) fingerprinting 
identification technic protection when using TOR or VPNs :

Same as above.

► Keystroke timing fingerprinting identification technic protection when using 
TOR or VPNs :

This problem is solved architecturaly exactly like the Keylogger protection 
above.

► Phrasing and wording fingerprinting identification technic protection when 
using TOR or VPNs :

We can use a trick many hackers know, and implement a kind of wording and 
rephrasing system : Using a translator for exemple, from english to french, and 
back french to english.... But there are other programs that do exist and to 
the job, There are many ways to do it indeed.

This issue is also solved architecturaly as the Keylogger protection mecanism 
described above.

► Side channel & hidden channels protection between the first and the second 
computers, interconnected through a serial port :

This problem is solved by inserting a microcontroller having two serial ports, 
on the serial link between the two computers :
If the technic of using two microprocessor conected with a serial port that 
offers the lowest attack surface possible, it can be improved greatly inserting 
a microcontroller that will do the following :

• Check that the little protocol we will have to invent and implement (And 
design as much hidden channel proof as possible) is correctly implemented, and 
that no other unwanted data are transmitted on the serial link.
• Fight the timing side channel attack surface on the serial port : Serial 
ports offer the lowest attack surface regarding side & hidden channels, but it 
is still vulnerable to timing-between-each-byte-sent-on-the-serial-port side 
channel. The microcontroller code can "filter" these timings by buffering and 
normalizing them. Time based side channels are well known, and must be & can be 
fighted.

As you see, when we where talking about giving you true crypto-anarchist tools 
reaching military grade security, we were not laughting at you, we were very 
serious about this.
We had enough bullshit driven by FEDS worldwide. We perfectly know were most of 
the problems are : End-Point weaknesses.
And we decided to solve it for BitMessage. BitMessage being already one of the 
best Crypto-Anarchist communication tool available, but as all other "good" 
tools, if they are running on comprimized weak end-point, it's USELESS.

We fight mass surveillance.
We fuck all big brothers.
And we master our art.

Crypto-Anarchist Federation contributors.
In solidarity to our Anarchists Antifa comrades.

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