-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 > > They're not expending actual resources now, as it hasn't broken > > the threshold for them to bother. Once it does, depending upon > > what they do, users will be *less secure* than they are with > > techniques that have not yet broken that threshold.
> So what's your point? That there are things the Chinese government > can do to counter Freenet? We don't disagree. The point is that > there are things the Chinese government can do to counter the > primitive tools being used *today* by Chinese dissidents, giving them > a better, if imperfect, option is a very worthwhile endeavour. No, my point is that the anonymity offered by an attacked Freenet is less than the anonymity offered by small scale "primitive" tools. Am I right to say that Freenet isn't worthwhile if only a few people use it? Or is Freenet's anonymity goals dependent entirely upon steganographic transports[1]? If so, that means that if Freenet is useful, it needs to have lots of users, and as such, is very likely to be attacked. On the other hand, tools that don't require as many activists would have a better chance of flying under the radar (such as radios for broadcasting to non-activists, not for walkie-talkies). The relevent comparison here would be the anonymity of an unattacked (or minorly attacked) "primitive" tool and the anonymity of a highly attacked Freenet. I have yet to see any discussion of that tradeoff in Freenet's design. Any statements regarding the anonymity of Freenet when it isn't under attack are meaningless, if not misleading. =jr [1] http://dev.i2p.net/pipermail/i2p/2005-October/000984.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.1 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFDRsowWYfZ3rPnHH0RAiXBAJ4gfxAj9j403WwJz1gLc1k/qHKo7ACeKIQC lblJr0qc5ddY3ojiqlu+Aiw= =d3zZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
