On 14 Oct 2005, at 19:17, jrandom at i2p.net wrote: > I'm not saying this in the "omg you, like, suck, man" way, but in > the "you have no idea what you're talking about, yet you keep > talking about it" way.
So, remind me how it is I that don't have any idea what I am talking about, while it is you that are advocating that we abandon a messaging layer that by your own admission you haven't even looked at? Maybe you should look at our messaging layer before arrogantly proclaiming that we should replace it with yours? > Now, whether Freenet uses Tor or I2P is of no matter, but there > should at least be an informed reason why not. You don't seem to > be well informed about either, yet quite aware of both. If you want to explain exactly what part of my reasoning is false, then that might be a useful contribution to the discussion, but simply making ad hominem remarks about how little I do or don't know about Tor or I2P illuminates nothing other than your poor rhetorical skills. >> I2P requires a DHT, and DHTs don't meet our requirements, because >> they invariably rely on choosing which peers are connected, and >> that precludes trusted links. > > This gets back to what I said above - you're not paying attention > to the work in the DHT field either. Or to the posts in this thread > so far, or the numerous links I've posted describing why your > conclusion is false. As I have better things to do than trawl through this already tedious discussion, why not indulge my short attention span and explain exactly how a DHT can work where the links between peers are not under the control of the DHT algorithm. If you can't, then whatever its limitations, my understanding of DHTs has served me quite well in this discussion. >> You should be wary of forming opinions based on the last thing you >> happened to hear. The problem with Tor was its decentralisation, but >> the more fundamental problem with Tor that is the same problem that >> I2P has, namely that both are trivial to harvest. >> > > Are we talking about the same Tor? You realize that only a small > portion of the Tor userbase runs ORs, right? And that ORs are the > ones publishing their server descriptors in the directory, right? > And that work continues on allowing OPs to route for clients? That > OPs are essentially peers behind restricted routes? > > Really, you should stick to what you know. Actually I am well aware of that, and have been aware of that since I watched Dingledine's presentation on the subject at DEFCON several years ago, and discussed it extensively with him afterwards. Really, your ad hominem questioning of expertise knowledge isn't helping your argument, its a bit pathetic. Back to the point: Are you denying that Tor ORs are trivially easy to harvest? >> I am still waiting for a single credible critique of the 0.7 design, >> or a single credible advantage that I2P, as a messaging layer, has >> over what we have built for 0.7. > > To repeat myself, here are a few. > > * Economics. Developer hours are scarce, and Toad (et al) have a lot > of work head of them, writing, debugging, and maintaining. Reusing > code that someone else takes care of is economically sound. That is an equally valid reason why I2P should switch to use our messaging layer, maybe if you had looked at our messaging layer you would decide that its a good idea. > * Risk. Working code in the wild is a known quantity, while code > planned is not. There are a lot of 'ifs' in 0.7's algorithms, where > the degenerate case turns into what 0.5 offers. There are 'ifs' in 0.7, as there are in any application that has not yet been deployed. One thing that isn't an 'if' about I2P is that its harvestable, which makes it unsuitable for our purposes. > * Anonymity. Running on top of I2P would allow Freenet users to blend > in with other I2P users. A less segmented anonymous user base > offers a greater anonymity set. That is a great argument for I2P to adopt our messaging layer, doesn't really help your argument though. > * Software engineering. The fact that Freenet is *again* building a > monolithic system for anonymous communication and censorship > resistance seems, unsound. If Freenet truly were better suited than > I2P as a comm layer, it would be sound software engineering to > build, deploy, and refine a comm layer and then, on top, build a > censorship resistant data store, rather than doing them all at once > in one big go. Ah, we should do it because of "software engineering". Great argument. Freenet 0.7's messaging layer was developed and tested for another project, Dijjer - and imported into Freenet's code base. If you knew as much about Freenet 0.7 as you seem to think I should know about I2P, then you would probably have known that. > As for 0.7's messaging layer, I haven't looked at it So you are advocating that we abandon something you haven't even looked at, while admonishing me for not being sufficiently familiar with I2P - what hypocrisy. > , as I2P's seems to work fine. As does Freenet 0.7's. > I did browse through dijjer in the spring > when I was designing I2P's though, but didn't seem relevent, > as the interfaces were too tightly coupled to the algorithm. I don't see how. Care to provide any specific examples of this? Ian.
