On Wed, Mar 15, 2006 at 03:33:33PM +0000, Michael Rogers wrote: > Matthew Toseland wrote: > >Probably. Premix routing is *hard*. 0.5 doesn't have it. 0.7 will have > >some countermeasures to the Register attack: > >- treachery/seizure tradeoff option: Always/Never cache locally > > requested or inserted data. > >- client cache. > > That's reassuring, but I was thinking of attacks based on knowing the > location of a message's sender and/or recipient, and comparing the > locations of known individuals (eg yourself) in order identify the > sender and/or recipient.
Not sure I understand... You, the attacker, are an internal node. You only know what is sent to you by your peers... so are you talking about correlation attacks? > > > - possibly some sort of displaced request start option. > > Does this refer to routing the request via a random node? Something like that. > > Cheers, > Michael -- Matthew J Toseland - toad at amphibian.dyndns.org Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 189 bytes Desc: Digital signature URL: <https://emu.freenetproject.org/pipermail/tech/attachments/20060315/0ea2eab4/attachment.pgp>
