On Friday 12 December 2008 14:14, freenetwork at web.de wrote: > I'm sorry if this appeared rude, it really was not intended to be. I > better add that emoticon next time ;) > > Then again, I also had the idea to combine OFFSystem and Freenet. > OFF's chunk size is uniformly 128 KiB and these chunks can be reused > across different contents, so the datastore would boil down into to a > flat heap of simple fragments that become reassembled - rather than > encrypted files it is currently. Using fragment cache for local actions > and fragment store for specialization is also alot like freenet's store > approach. > I think Freenet as network transportation layer, OFF-fragments as > not-inculpatory-ing storage items, FEC for redundancy and CHK/SSK/USK as > metadata that controls filename, mimetype and fragment recombination is > a really nice idea, not?
As sdiz pointed out, it's unlikely that this would buy very much additional protection. On basic freenet, the chunks are encrypted and you can't reasonably be expected to know what encrypted data corresponds to what actual data. Except if they try to show that you have *all* the chunks of a specific file and therefore have probably downloaded it, which is possible even with XORing. Oh and btw, the last chunk DOES carry data derived from the original - a chunk of the original XORed with two randomly picked chunks. And then there's the question of finding the chunks in a way that doesn't give away your location, which is not insoluble, but would be a potential source of attacks. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 827 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://emu.freenetproject.org/pipermail/tech/attachments/20081212/03463853/attachment.pgp>
