On Monday 21 January 2008 10:09, Michael Rogers wrote: > > Secondly, there > > are government installations in the UK (for instance a new MI6 building > > on the London enbankment, which has the national internet traffic > > channeled through it) which carry out surveillance of communications > > including internet communications. This surveillance includes not just > > keyword profiling but also several other different kinds of intelligent > > and statistical analysis of the traffic itself, even where encrypted > > files are involved, and an significant intelligence perspective can be > > obtained in this way. > > Yes, traffic analysis is a very important issue. Freenet does its best to > frustrate traffic analysis by using a transport protocol with no > unencrypted header fields, delaying and coalescing small packets to > disguise timing patterns, and padding packets to disguise the size of the > payload. Nevertheless I'm sure it's possible to design a rule for a deep > packet inspection engine that will identify Freenet traffic.
Depends on what you mean by "deep packet inspection". It would have to be stateful; traffic flow analysis would do it nicely, whatever we wrap it in, or perhaps some rules on not matching other things and size profiles. > > A possible direction for future research would be hiding Freenet traffic > inside other application-layer protocols (HTTP, BitTorrent, RTP etc). > > Cheers, > Michael -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 189 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://emu.freenetproject.org/pipermail/tech/attachments/20080122/0907a667/attachment.pgp>
