* 3BUIb3S50i 3BUIb3S50i <3buib3s50i at gmail.com> [2009-01-20 11:57:35]:

> SomeDude wrote:
> 
> > What version(s) of fms were these fixed in?
> >
> 
> Captcha validation was introduced in 0.2.23, but there was code to limit
> the mime type to 50 characters back in 0.1.10.
> 
> As far as the format strings, I suppose he's talking about the old log
> file class. It was removed in 0.3.0.
> 
> > How was this used to collect IP addresses? Can someone explain the
> > mechanism in more detail? What does it mean by "redirects" - Freenet
> > redirects? Or HTTP redirects?
> 
> HTTP redirect. Each response from the HTTP server has header info in
> it. The headers specify things like content type and data length. Each
> header is separated by a newline, and from the actual data by 2
> newlines. FMS wasn't validating the MIME type, so nextgens was able to
> put a newline in the mime type and add a location header that would
> cause the browser to request that location.
> 
> Content-Type: image/bmp
> Location: http://www.nextgensevilsite.com
> 
> My bad for not realizing it at the time. Nextgens bad for actively
> exploiting it without disclosing it to me first.
> 

How was I supposed to disclose it?
That's one of the critics formulated on
http://archives.freenetproject.org/message/20090119.194225.d034194b.en.html

> On 1/20/09, Daniel Cheng <j16sdiz+freenet at gmail.com> wrote:
> > 2009/1/20 Matthew Toseland <toad at amphibian.dyndns.org>:
> >> On Monday 19 January 2009 19:42, Florent Daigni?re wrote:
> >>> * Matthew Toseland <toad at amphibian.dyndns.org> [2009-01-19 13:02:31]:
> >>>
> >>> > There were at least:
> >>> > - A lack of validation on the captchas page which enabled collecting
> >>> > users
> >> IP
> >>> > addresses. This involved putting newlines into the headers in order to
> >> send
> >>> > extra headers and in particular redirects, and was actively exploited
> >>> > by
> >>> > nextgens to collect IP addresses.
> >>>
> >>> Unless you can prove it that's defamation ;)
> >>
> >> Then I retract it ... but I'm fairly sure this bug is exploitable, that's
> >> the
> >> point. :)
> >
> > Not sure if you are seeing the same problem.
> > The only leak I am aware of is related to HTML injection, which is
> > fixable with a few lines of code.
> >
> > (Which I have never tell SomeDude....  If you know any off-the-freenet
> > way to send SomeDude
> >  message, please tell me........... for example: gpg-encrypted message
> > posted on pastebin? )
> >
> > Or do you means something  HTTP Request Smuggling-like?
> >
> > --
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> > Tech at freenetproject.org
> > http://emu.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tech
> >
> 
> 
> -- 
> 3buib3s50i at gmail.com | dimonqmfcb at gmx.com
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