Michael Rogers wrote:

> Not quite, because a CHK would also include a decryption key, which you
> don't need in this case.
> 
> Your suggestion seems like a great idea to me, but how about this
> modification: instead of HSH at sha1/blahblah, just use KSK at sha1/blahblah.
> That way no modifications to the node are necessary - apps can start
> using your scheme immediately, with the app being responsible for
> checking that the received content hashes to the expected value, then
> resubmitting it to the node as a key.

Agreed, the HSH is purely a convenience in the sense that the done would do 
the checking for the client.

Alex.

> 
> Cheers,
> Michael
> 
> alex wrote:
>> Call me stoopid but I have just described a CHK, right?
>> 
>> alex wrote:
>> 
>>> I was pondering the hideous length of freenet keys. I know they have to
>>> be like that since they're the necessary crypto to decrypt the contents.
>>> However, I got this idea for shorter alternate keys. It's maybe not
>>> readily practical but perhaps you think of something better derived from
>>> this.
>>>
>>> Let's say we have a new key type (HSH from hash). This key is just a
>>> renamed KSK. However, the gist is that the content hash must match the
>>> key itself. The content, in turn, is a proper key to redirect to.
>>>
>>> These keys are as long as the hash used (e.g. for sha1 they would be 28
>>> chars, pity it's broken) and the content is sane, as long as collisions
>>> aren't practical to generate. And now you can paste keys that don't wrap
>>> at 80 chars, for example.
>>>
>>> Certainly, being KSKs, they can be spammed, but they're a convenience,
>>> and the node can check that the content is legit and discard it if
>>> spoofed.
>>>
>>> Example:
>>>
>>> HSH at 1d229271928d3f9e2bb0375bd6ce5db6c6d348d9
>>>
>>> or may be
>>>
>>> HSH at sha1/1d229271928d3f9e2bb0375bd6ce5db6c6d348d9
>>>
>> 
HSH at sha256/66a045b452102c59d840ec097d59d9467e13a3f34f6494e539ffd32c1bb35f18
>>> to make it generic on the hash used.
>>>
>>> Dunno if attacks to short hashes are able to provide colliding content
>>> of the same length as the original. Otherwise, even if flawed, short
>>> hashes could be still usable as long as the expected content has to be a
>>> valid CHK.
>> 
>> 
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