The following diff switches fsck_msdos to opendev() so that it works with
disklabel UIDs (DUIDs). The output is also changed to follow fsck_ffs(8)
(i.e. print the realname then the DUID in brackets).
ok?
Index: Makefile
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/src/sbin/fsck_msdos/Makefile,v
retrieving revision 1.4
diff -u -p -r1.4 Makefile
--- Makefile 21 Sep 1997 11:36:40 -0000 1.4
+++ Makefile 13 Nov 2010 16:30:36 -0000
@@ -3,7 +3,9 @@
PROG= fsck_msdos
MAN= fsck_msdos.8
SRCS= main.c check.c boot.c fat.c dir.c fsutil.c
-CFLAGS+= -I${.CURDIR}/../fsck
.PATH: ${.CURDIR}/../fsck
+CFLAGS+= -I${.CURDIR}/../fsck
+DPADD+= ${LIBUTIL}
+LDADD+= -lutil
.include <bsd.prog.mk>
Index: check.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/src/sbin/fsck_msdos/check.c,v
retrieving revision 1.12
diff -u -p -r1.12 check.c
--- check.c 27 Oct 2009 23:59:33 -0000 1.12
+++ check.c 13 Nov 2010 16:30:36 -0000
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
+#include <sys/param.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <ctype.h>
@@ -48,29 +49,31 @@ checkfilesys(const char *fname)
int dosfs;
struct bootblock boot;
struct fatEntry *fat = NULL;
+ char *realdev;
int i;
int mod = 0;
rdonly = alwaysno;
- if (!preen)
- printf("** %s", fname);
- dosfs = open(fname, rdonly ? O_RDONLY : O_RDWR, 0);
+ dosfs = opendev(fname, rdonly ? O_RDONLY : O_RDWR, 0, &realdev);
if (dosfs < 0 && !rdonly) {
- dosfs = open(fname, O_RDONLY, 0);
- if (dosfs >= 0)
- pwarn(" (NO WRITE)\n");
- else if (!preen)
- printf("\n");
+ dosfs = opendev(fname, O_RDONLY, 0, &realdev);
rdonly = 1;
- } else if (!preen)
- printf("\n");
-
+ }
if (dosfs < 0) {
xperror("Can't open");
return (8);
}
+ if (!preen) {
+ printf("** %s", realdev);
+ if (strncmp(fname, realdev, PATH_MAX) != 0)
+ printf(" (%s)", fname);
+ if (rdonly)
+ printf(" (NO WRITE)");
+ printf("\n");
+ }
+
if (readboot(dosfs, &boot) != FSOK) {
(void)close(dosfs);
return (8);
--
"Stop assuming that systems are secure unless demonstrated insecure;
start assuming that systems are insecure unless designed securely."
- Bruce Schneier
