Hi,

Felix Maschek wrote on Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 08:24:19PM +0100:

> How would you prevent that something like 'doas vi /etc/fstab' (which 
> will run as root) doesn't offer the user to enter a root shell within vi 
> (by typing '.sh')?

The sudo(8) utility has become able, over the decades, to do very
complex things and supports fine granularity for assigning rights
to administrators.  As a consequence, it has also become somewhat
large and complicated.  As a consequence, Michael Lucas has become
able to write a book about it and to hold tutorials about it at BSD
conferences.

The design goal of doas(1) is not to reproduce the full range
of sudo(8) functionality, but to provide a smaller tool that
is easier to maintain, use, and audit.  When writing it, it was
intentional that tedu@ did not include doasedit(1) functionality -
because providing selective editing capabilities of certain
root-owned files to certain non-root administrators is among the
things that can be considered complex, fine-grained control.

During the Cambridge Hackathon, one OpenBSD developer actually
implemented doasedit(1) nevertheless.  But the result was indeed
complicated enough that committing it wasn't a no-brainer, several
developers doubted whether we should have it at all, and nobody
tried very hard to hammer the diff into a form that might meet
consensus for commit.

The question comes up now and again, but not all that often...

Yours,
  Ingo

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