On Sun, Nov 29, 2020 at 08:41:50AM +0100, Theo Buehler wrote: > On Sun, Nov 29, 2020 at 08:02:45AM +0100, Emil Engler wrote: > > It can overflow! Please check for the positivity and width of size_t before! > > What can overflow? ret is guaranteed to be non-negative before the cast. > > As for the width (which would be about truncation, not overflow): while > the standard allows for size_t to be an unsigned integer type as small > as 16 bits, we generally assume that sizeof(size_t) >= sizeof(int). > I don't think I've ever seen a width check ensuring this in our sources.
Maybe rummage arround in the openssl attic? There migth be code that checks for sizeof(size_t) changing during runtime :P -- I'm not entirely sure you are real.
