Paracha
The writer is a journalist and social critic based in Pakistan. This column
was written for Dawn Suffering from a minority complex
Why do many in Pakistan identify with the Islamic history of regions outside
India and show more concern for their brethren in Iraq, Afghanistan and
Kashmir?
Nadeem F Paracha
The Mughals and the Muslim population of the subcontinent weren’t all
that bothered by the whole concept of the caliphate. As rulers they did not,
or only superficially, recognised the Ottoman caliph. The Mughals, though
Central Asian by decent, were deeply entrenched in the political and social
traditions of the subcontinent and so was their Muslim polity.
Also, till even the reign of the last great Mughal ruler, Aurangzeb,
there are only a handful of documented episodes involving any serious
physical clashes between the Hindu majority and their Muslim counterparts.
Compared to the communal violence between the two groups in India, and the
drummed-up anti-Hindu sentiment in Pakistan in the 20th century, relations
between the two communities were largely harmonious — especially during the
reigns of Akbar and Shahjehan.
Thus, the roots of the modernday Hindu-Muslim antipathy lie not in the
distant past, but a mere 150 years back in history; or soon after the
failure of the 1857 rebellion started jointly by disgruntled Hindu and
Muslim soldiers against their British masters.
As the British became more imposing after the failed rebellion, they
began introducing a greater number of modern ideas and technology, some of
which, like democracy, suddenly awakened the Muslims to a stark reality
which they had simply not been aware of. The idea of majority rule suddenly
made the Muslims realise that they were actually in a minority.
As the region’s Muslims finally resigned to the fact that the age of
Muslim kings was as good as over, a number of scholars and reformers
attempted to exploit the Muslims’ minority status. Both conservative as well
as liberal reformists agreed that to supplement their community’s sudden
minority status, the Muslims of the region must now start identifying
themselves as citizens of the worldwide Muslim ummah.
Soon, as India entered the 20th century, conservative Muslim scholars
also started reshaping Muslim history of the region. To them Mughal kings in
general, and Akbar in particular, became arch villains, mainly for their
‘liberal views’ and detachment from the Turkish caliphate, which, according
to these scholars, led to the downfall of Islam in India.
The rewriting of the history of Muslim India by such scholars soon saw
the Muslims of India talking more about ancient Muslim conquerors (mainly
Arab), and gleefully celebrating plunderers like Mehmood Ghaznavi and
Muhammad Ghori, all the while downplaying those who played a leading role in
uniting the region as a distinct and diverse empire.
As the British began introducing limited democratic reforms, a section
of Hindu extremists too, excited by their majority status rose to glorify
their own new heroes. And even though the Indian National Congress remained
above such extremism, the Muslim League, at the behest of Muhammad Iqbal
(and not Jinnah), gave a more intellectual context to what the conservative
Muslim thinkers were propagating.
To Iqbal, Indian nationalism propagating a joint Hindu-Muslim struggle
against the British (and of which Jinnah too was once an advocate), was
contrary to the concept of a united Muslim ummah.
The legacy of communalism in India and anti-Hindu sentiments in Pakistan
are a product of two main historical events: The suddenly-discovered
majority fascism amongst the extremist Hindu fringe, and the Utopian
intellectualisation of the Muslims’ minority complex, asked to somewhat
ignore the legacy of (the supposed Hindu-friendly) Muslim rulers of the
region. Ironically, the Congress, too, fell for this Utopian interpretation
by supporting the Khilafat Movement, which the Muslim League did not back.
But today in Pakistan, Muslims comprise a huge majority. So why do many
Pakistanis spend more time celebrating Islamic history of regions outside
India (especially Arabian), the ummah, and seem to show more concern in what
is happening to their brethren in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan and Kashmir,
while drowning out the havoc being perpetrated by fellow Muslims inside
their own country?
If we study the recent trend of reactionary thinking and of denials
doing the rounds, we will notice it is largely the vocation of the urban
middle-class. In an era of populist democracy, the middleclass feels itself
to be a minority.
Thus, it can be suggested that this class too seems to be suffering from
the kind of minority complex of the early 20th century. Perhaps that’s why,
comparatively speaking, they are today enthusiastically responding to all
the retro-Islamic discourse, anti-democracy sentiment and empty, rhetorical
muscle-flexing based on glorified fables and myths of “Muslim power” doing
the rounds in drawing rooms — the popular media and cyber space today.
