“Animal Liberation” may sound more like a parody of other liberation movements than a serious objective. The idea of “The Rights of Animals” actually was once used to parody the case for women’s rights. Equality is a moral Idea, not an assertion of fact. There is no logically compelling reason for assuming that a factual difference in ability between two people justifies any difference in the amount of consideration we give to their needs and interests. It is a defense which, if true, would allow us to do anything at all to nonhumans for the slightest reason, or for no reason at, all, without incurring any justifiable reproach. This defense claims that we are never guilty of neglecting the interests of other animals for one breathtakingly simple reason: they have *no *interests. Nonhuman animals have no interests, according to this view, because they are not capable of suffering. By this is not meant merely that they are not capable of suffering in all the ways that human beings are-for instance, that a calf is not capable of suffering from the knowledge that it will be killed in six months’ time. That modest claim is, no doubt, true; but it does not clear humans of the charge of spiesism, since it allows that animals may suffer in other ways-for instance, by being given electric shocks, or being kept in small, cramped cages that animals are incapable of suffering in any way at all; that th y are, in fact, unconscious automata, possessing neither thoughts nor feelings nor a mental life of any kind. Although, the view that animals are automata was proposed by the seventeenth-century French philosopher Renie Descartes, to most people, then and now, it is obvious that if, for example, we stick a sharp knife into the stomach of an unanaesthetised dog, the dog will feel pain. That this is so is assumed by the laws in most civilized countries that prohibit wanton cruelty to animals.
Do animals other than humans feel pain? How do we know? Well, how do we know if anyone, human or nonhuman, feels pain? We know that we ourselves can feel pain. We know this from the direct experience of pain that we have when, for instance, somebody presses a lighted cigarette against the back of our hand. But how do we know that anyone else feels pain? We cannot directly experience anyone else’s pain, whether that “anyone “is our best friend or a stray dog. Pain is a state of consciousness, a “mental event,” and as such it can never be observed. Behavior like writhing, screaming, or drawing one’s hand away from the lighted cigarette is not pain itself; nor are the recordings a neurologist might make of activity within the brain observations of pain itself. Pain is something that we feel, and we can only infer that others *are *feeling it from various external indications. If it is justifiable to assume that other human beings feel pain as we do, is there any reason why a similar inference should be unjustifiable in the case of other animals? Nearly all the external signs that lead us to infer pain in other humans can be seen in other species, especially the species most closely related to us-the species of mammals and birds. The behavioral signs include writhing, facial contortions, moaning, yelping or other forms of calling, attempts to avoid the source of pain, appearance of fear at the prospect of its repetition, and so on. In addition, we know that these animals have nervous systems very like ours, which respond physiologically as ours do when the animal is in circumstances in which we would feel pain: an initial rise of blood pressure, dilated pupils, perspiration, an increased pulse rate, and, if the stimulus continues, a fall in blood pressure. Although human beings have a more developed cerebral cortex than other animals, this part of the brain is concerned with thinking functions rather than with basic impulses, emotions, an@ feelings. These impulses, emotions, and feelings are located in the diencephalon, which is well developed in many other species of animals, especially mammals and birds. We also know that the nervous systems of other animals were not artificially constructed-as a robot might be artificially constructed- to mimic the pain behavior of humans. The nervous systems of animals evolved as our own did, and in fact the evolutionary history of human beings and. other animals, especially mammals, did not diverge until the central features of our nervous systems were already in existence. A capacity to feel pain obviously enhances a species’ prospects of survival, since it causes members of the species to avoid sources of injury. It is surely unreasonable to suppose that nervous systems that are virtually identical physiologically, have a common origin and a common evolutionary function, and result in similar forms of behavior in similar circumstances should actually operate in an entirely different manner on the level of subjective feelings. It has long been accepted as sound policy in science to search for the simplest possible explanation of whatever it is we are trying to explain. Occasionally it has been claimed that it is for this reason “unscientific” to explain the behavior of animals by theories that refer to the animal’s conscious feelings, desires, and so on-the idea being that if the behavior in question can be explained without invoking consciousness or feelings, that will be the simpler theory. The overwhelming majority of scientists who have addressed themselves to this question agree. Lord Brain, one of the most eminent neurologists of our time, has said: I personally can see no reason for conceding mind to my fellow men and denying it to animals. . I at least cannot doubt that the interests and activities of animals are correlated with awareness and feeling in the same way as my own, and which may be, for aught I know, just as vivid. Finally, within the last decade, the publication of scientific studies with titles such as Animal Thought, Animal Thinking, and Animal Suffering: The Science of Animals are have made it plain that conscious awareness in nonhuman animals is now generally accepted as a serious subject for investigation. Some philosophers, including Descartes, have thought it important that while humans can tell each other about their experience of pain in great detail, other animals cannot. (Interestingly, this once neat dividing *line *between humans and other species has now been threatened by the discovery that chimpanzees can be taught a languagei2) But as Bentham pointed out long ago, the ability to use language is not relevant to the question of how a being ought to be treated-unless that ability can be linked to the capacity to suffer, so that the absence of a language Animals can feel pain As we saw earlier, there can be no moral justification for re3gardmg the pain for pleasure) that animals feel as less important than the same amount of pain (or pleasure) felt by humans. But what practical consequences follow from this conclusion? To prevent misunderstanding I shall spell out what I mean a little more fully. If I give a horse a hard slap across its rump with *my *open hand, the horse may start, but it presumably feels little pain. Its skin is thick enough to protect it against a mere slap. If I slap a baby in the same way, however, the baby will cry and presumably feel pain, for its skin is *more *sensitive. So it is worse to slap a baby than a horse, if both slaps are administered with equal force. But there must be some kind of blow-1 don’t know exactly what it would be, but perhaps a blow with a heavy stick-that would cause the horse as much pain as we cause a baby by slapping it with our hand. That is what I mean by “the same amountof pain,” and if we consider it wrong to inflict that much pain on a baby for no good reason then we must, unless we are speciesists, consider it equally wrong to inflict the same amount of pain on a horse for no good reason. Just as most human beings are speciesists in their readiness to cause pain to animals when they would not cause a similar pain to humans for the same reason, so most human beings are speciesists in their readiness to kill other animals when they would not kill human beings. We need to proceed more cautiously here, however, because people hold widely differing views about when it is legitimate to kill humans, as the continuing debates over abortion and euthanasia attest. Nor have moral philosophers been able to agree on exactly what it is that makes it wrong to kill human beings, and under what circumstances killing a human being may be justifiable. Let us consider first the view that it is always wrong to take an innocent human life. We may call this the “sanctity of life” view. People who take this view oppose abortion and euthanasia. They do not usually, however, oppose the killing of nonhuman animals- so perhaps it would be more accurate to describe this view as the “sanctity of *humnn *life” view. The belief that human life, and only human life, is sacrosanct is a form of speciesism. A chimpanzee, dog, or pig, for instance, will have a higher degree of seIf-awareness and a greater capacity for meaningful relations with others than a severely retarded infant or someone in a state of advanced senility. So if we base the right to life on these characteristics we must grant these animals a right to life as good as, or better than, such retarded or senile humans. This argument cuts both ways. It could be taken as showing that chimpanzees, dogs, and pigs, along with some other species, have a right to life and we commit a grave moral offense whenever we kill them, even when they are old and suffering and our intention is to put them out of their misery. Alternatively, one could take the argument as showing that the severely retarded and hopelessly senile have no right to life and may be killed for quite trivial reasons, as we now kill animals. In general, though, the question of when it is wrong to kill (painlessly) an animal is one to which we need give no precise answer. As long as we remember that we should give the same respect to the lives of animals as we give to the lives of those humans at a similar mental level, we shall not go far wrong. The idea that it is also wrong to kill animals painlessly gives some of these conclusions additional support that is welcome but strictly unnecessary. Interestingly enough, this is true even of the conclusion that we ought to become vegetarians, a conclusion that in the popular mind is generally based on some kind of absolute prohibition on killing. We do not take seriously the interests of other animals-practices like hunting, whether for sport or for furs; farming minks, foxes, and other animals for their fur; capturing wild animals (often after shooting their mothers) and imprisoning them in small cages for humans to stare at; tormenting animals to make them learn tricks for circuses and tormenting them to make them entertain the audiences at rodeos; slaughtering whales with explosive harpoons, under the guise of scientific research; drowning over 100,000 dolphins annually in nets set by hlna fishing boats; shooting three million kangaroos every year in the Australian outback to turn them into skins and pet food; and generally ignoring the interests of wild animals as we extend our empire of concrete and pollution over the surface of the globe. ( animal protection symposium I remember long ago) KR IRS 11223 On Sat, 11 Feb 2023 at 17:52, Markendeya Yeddanapudi < [email protected]> wrote: > > > -- > *Mar*Happiness, Symbiosis, Healing, Cure and Health from Animals > > > > We humans are the diseased part of the organism, the Biosphere. No other > organism, tries to live or un-live by surrendering totally to technology, > making the Robot and the logic of the machine without feelings and the > natural connection to internal hormonal communication, like the human. The > human now is trying to substitute the Bio-logic of Biology, with the > Techno-logic of Technology. > > The basis of our living is the emotional symbiosis based on hormonal > communications among the cells in us. We constitute as the grand Biosphere > of cells as us. This society of cells, you, needs the emotional connect to > every other organism of the biosphere. In the grand emotional symbiosis of > all organisms of the Biosphere, ill health is impossible. The grand ocean > of emotional symbiosis, the ocean of rapture and health, simply is not > capable of creating sickness in any organism. > > The basis of health is the healthy cell. When it’s living and functioning > is continuously enabled by the coordinating symbiotic hormones, the cell > becomes the micro bit of rapture. > > The Biosphere as a whole is the grand macro mind, where there is the flow > of trust and emotional connect among the organisms. The troposphere is the > medium of the hormonal messages of the organisms. > > Even today, you can get the benefit of the grand emotional symbiosis of > the Biosphere, by just establishing emotional connection to an organism. We > call it pet. > > Even today, despite the monstrous mechanization, one gets relief from a > pet animal. Every animal can be a pet.It need not be a cat or dog. Even > Lions, Tigers, Rhinos, Hippos, elephants, crocodiles…can be pets, provided > one musters courage and attempts to contact. The basic feature of nature is > the potential for trust and love in every life form, and the relationship > with any organism, will trigger the positive emotional hormone > communication among the cells. In fact friendships create happy internal > hormonal communication among the cells. > > Thick, lush and free forest with happy life forms in the forest can be a > wonderful hospital. The waves of rapture which the air carries in a forest, > engulfs every organism with health. No disease can survive. > > Nature has the fundamental right to create emotional symbiosis among the > organisms. Unfortunately the rhetoric about fundamental rights in our > political discourses, translates into the right to subject nature to one’s > economic needs in our economic society. > > The very concept of fundamental rights to the Biosphere as a whole has > become weird to us, the anthropocentric idiots. > > YM > > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Thatha_Patty" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/thatha_patty/CAL5XZorh28q3u2ZDRKGa8Z4z1j6EFK_B%2BmcjOT7B3m_GXioGdw%40mail.gmail.com.
