Holding The Enemy Close: Why We Need A Subtle   Shift In Our China Policy

by R Jagannathan - Feb 14, 2023 A cross section of the view ONE ANGLE

India should adopt a softer line against China for now. The Union
government’s move to allow more Chinese suppliers to set up shop in India
is the right strategy for now. We must strategise quietly, and talk softly
over the next decade, often using Chinese strengths to build our own muscle.

It contrasts with its earlier policy of taking a harder line on Chinese
investments in India in the context of the Dragon country’s refusal to
settle the border issue and continue to play an antagonistic role vis-a-vis
India in global forums. In many ways, I now want greater nuance in how we
deal with China, in contrast to my earlier stand that we should start
denying China opportunities in India and allow our trade deficit to shrink.
Yes, I have changed my mind, even though at a personal level I avoid
purchasing any Chinese brand if I can avoid it.

But often I cannot avoid it, given the pervasiveness of Chinese products
and components in all manufactured products, especially electronics
hardware. According to a Bloomberg report, India has given initial
conditional clearance for some of Apple’s Chinese suppliers to manufacture
in India if they find an Indian partner. Of the 17 names submitted by
Apple, some were turned down, including at least one with close ties to the
Chinese government, says the report. This marks a shift in the earlier
Indian policy of avoiding Chinese investments at all costs. Now,
apparently, the costs to us are becoming clearer as we try to become a
manufacturing hub ourselves. In the past, many free trade economists,
including Arvind Panagariya and Swaminathan A Aiyar, have been arguing
against putting up more barriers to imports from China. (You can read their
arguments here and here).

Security experts like Brahma Chellaney, on the other hand, have argued in
favour of India reducing trade ties with China in order to avoid
incentivising more aggression against us. China’s trade surpluses with
India top $100 billion now). Despite Chellaney’s views, which I completely
agree with on security issues, I believe that this is not the time to make
China pay for its aggression by sharply reducing our trade ties. What we
need to do is to reduce the China weight in our trade ties over the next
five to 10 years, mostly by opening up trade with other blocs, which will
automatically reduce the China weightage. Currently, we have more to lose
by trying to punish China before we are in a position to actually do so. It
would be like cutting off your nose to spite your face.

Here’s why:

First, in order to become a manufacturing destination in our own right, we
will need at least five years of successful implementation of the
production linked incentive scheme to build global scales. This needs to be
accompanied by an improvement in our logistics costs, which is what project
Gati Shakti is all about. Till these two things happen, our manufacturing
will not be globally competitive. Our medium- to long-term strategy should
not be reliant on China+1, where the plus one could be any number of
countries in Asia, but India++, where the advantages of locating
manufacturing in India are obvious to everyone, China or no China.

Second, and it pains me to say this, competitive scales cannot be achieved
without creating a vibrant middle sector, like the German Mittel stand. The
middle sector is not about size and scale alone, but about the ability to
innovate and generate its own IPR (intellectual property rights),
accompanied by an ability to access both equity and debt capital. The first
enabling condition for the creation of this middle sector was the creative
destruction we indulged in in 2016-17, when demonetisation and the goods
and services tax eliminated many zombie small and medium sector companies.

These informal sector companies stayed alive only by evading taxes and
staying under the radar on labour laws. The creation of new fintech
companies and other enabling digital conditions include the account
aggregators initiative, and the ONDC (Online Network for Digital Commerce).
We are just a hop, step and jump from making formal finance available to
millions of micro, small, medium enterprises. Some of them will grow to
become the new and competitive middle sector.

We have a reasonably strong middle sector in some industries (automobiles,
for example), but not in electronics and other scale-oriented manufacturing
sectors. China is one country that has mastered both scale and size in
manufacturing, and it has created a successful middle sector of suppliers
who are part of global supply chains. In short, in the medium term, we have
much to gain from allowing the Chinese middle sector to invest in India. It
will create the conditions for the rise of our own middle sector.

Third, the rise in our trade deficit with China should be seen as a
feature, and not a failure, of our China policy. If, for example, we are
becoming a bigger player in mobile phone exports, our imports of components
will rise at a faster pace for the same reason. In fiscal 2022-23, we
expect our exports to rise to $9 billion, but with 15 per cent value
addition, the import content will be 85 per cent, or $7.65 billion. It is
only when the middle sector of components moves to manufacture in India
that this content will reduce. We need Chinese manufacturing expertise at
least for the next five years.

The nuance we thus need in our China policy is to develop the middle
sector, often in partnership with Chinese firms, but while simultaneously
keeping our defence preparedness at very high levels. We must also make our
displeasure with Chinese postures clear repeatedly with smaller counter
actions and pushbacks. The ban on certain Chinese apps, and disallowing
Huawei from bidding for any 5G project in India were a good start. We can
also quietly bring Tibet into play, not by backing Tibetan freedom, but by
doing two related things: one is to insist that India will not recognise
the next Dalai Lama if he does not have the concurrence of the Tibetan
refugees in India and does not follow the selection process prescribed by
the current Dalai Lama.

Second, we should insist that China, as an upper riparian state, should
conclude a treaty with India on the lines of the Indus Water Treaty with
Prole Pakistan, so that the rivers originating in Tibet can be monitored,
and obstructions and dams on these rivers are overseen by neutral agencies.
Of course, China won’t agree, but we can consider taking our case to the
international courts, and bring Tibetan rivers — almost all our major
northern rivers originate from the Tibetan plateau — into international
focus. This is our way to bring Tibet back into the picture without
actually raising the issue of its independence or autonomy. On Xinjiang, or
China’s persecution of Uyghurs, we should say nothing. Tibetans share close
civilisational ties with us, not the Uyghurs. But we need to do this
quietly, without making it sound like an aggressive move and making loud
noises in public fora. We must strategise quietly, and talk softly over the
next decade, often using Chinese strengths to build our own muscle.

KR  IRS  14223

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