The Nyaya Model Aksa pada defined a method of philosophical argumentation, called the nyaya method or the nyaya model. This was the standard for an
ideally-organized philosophical disputation. Seven categories are identified as constituting the "prior" stage of a nyaya. A nyaya starts with an initial doubt, as to whether p or not-p is the case, and ends with a decision, that p (or not-p, as the case may be). The seven categories, including Doubt, are: Purpose, Example, Basic Tenets, the "Limbs" of the formulated reasoning, Supportive Argument (tarka), and Decision. Purpose is self-explanatory. The example is needed to ensure that the arguments would not be just empty talk. Some of the Basic Tenets supply the ground rules for the argumentation. The "Limbs" were the most important formulation of the structure of a logical reasoning; these are a landmark in the history of Indian logic. According to the Nyayasutras, there are five "Limbs" or "steps" in a structured reasoning. They should all be articulated linguistically. The first step is the statement of the thesis, the second the statement of reason or evidence, the third citation of an example (a particular case, well-recognized and acceptable to both sides) that illustrates the underlying (general) principle and thereby supports the reason or evidence. The fourth is the showing of the present thesis as a case that belongs to the general case, for reason or evidence is essentially similar to the example cited. The fifth is the assertion of the thesis again, as proven or established. Here is the time-honoured illustration: Step 1. There is fire on the hill. Step 2. For there is smoke. Step 3. (Wherever there is smoke, there if fire), as in the kitchen. Step 4. This is such a case (smoke on the hill). Step 5. Therefore, it is so, i.e., there is fire on the hill. The Buddhists and others argued that this was too elaborate for capturing the essential structure. All we need would be the first two or the first three. The rest would be redundant. But the Nyaya school asserted all along that this nyaya method is used by the arguer to convince others, and to completely satisfy the "expectation" of another, you need all the five "Limbs" or steps. This is in fact a full-fledged articulation of an inference schema. Returning to the nyaya method itself, the supportive argument (tarka) is needed when doubts are raised about the implication of the middle part of the above inference schema. Is this an example, right? Does Does it support the evidence? Is this the general principle, right? Is it adequate? The "supportive arguments" would examine in the alternative possibilities, and try to resolve all these questions. After that a supportive argument comes from the decision, one way or another. Another seven categories were identified as constituting the "Posterior stage" of the nyaya method. They consist of three types of debate (already mentioned), the group of tricks, false rejoinders, and clinchers or defeat situations, and another important logical category, that of pseudo-reason or pseudo-evidence. Pseudo-evidence is similar to evidence or reason, but it lacks adequacy or the logical force to prove the thesis adduced. It is in fact an "impostor." The Nyayasutra notes five such varieties. Although these five varieties were mentioned throughout the history of the nyaya tradition (with occasional disagreement, for example, Bhasarvajna, who had six), they were constantly redefined to fit the developing logical theories of individual authors. The five types of pseudo evidence were: the deviating, the contradictory, the unestablished or unproven, the counter-balanced and the untimely. Since there can be fire without smoke (as in a red-hot iron ring), if Somebody wants to infer presence of smoke in the kitchen on the basis of the presence of fire there, his evidence would be pseudo-evidence called the "deviating." Where the evidence (say a pool of water) is Usually, the sign for the absence of fire, rather than its presence, is called contradictory. An evidence-reason must itself be established or proven to exist, if it has to establish something else. Hence, an "unestablished" evidence-reason is pseudo-evidence or a pseudo sign. A purported evidence-reason may be countered by purported counter-evidences having the opposite possibility. This will be a case of the "counter-balanced". An "untimely" is one where the thesis itself precludes the possibility of adducing some sign as being the evidence-reason by virtue of its incompatibility with the thesis in question. The "untimely" is so-called because as soon as the thesis is stated, the evidence will no longer be evidence. (For further elaboration, see Matilal, 1985, ยบ1.5). The Sign and the Signified All this implicitly spells out a theory of what constitutes an adequate sign. What we have been calling "evidence," "reason," and sometimes "evidence-reason" may just be taken to be an adequate or "logical" sign. The Sanskrit word for it is Linga, a sign or a mark, and what it is a sign for is called linga in, the signified, the "marked" entity. This is finally tied to their theory of sound inference, that is, inference of the signified from the observation of the logical sign. This is the pre-theoretic annotation of the "sign-signified" connection, as explained here. Note that this notion of "sign-signified" relation is different from the "signifier-signified" relation that is mentioned in some modern linguistics, especially Saussure. A sign is adequate or "logical" if it is not a pseudo-evidence t, at is, a pseudo-sign. And the five types of pseudo-sign have already been identified. We have here a negative formulation of the adequacy of the sign. A little later on in the tradition the positive formulation was found. The fully-articulated formulation is found in the writings of thewell-known Buddhist logician, Diimaga (circa 400-480 AD), in his theory of the "triple-character" reason. We will discuss his contribution briefly below, and in more detail in chapter4. In fact, an adequate sign is what should be non-deviating, that is, it should not be present in any location when the signified is absent. If it is, it would be "deviating." Thus, the identification of the first pseudo-sign captured this intuition, although it took a long time to get this fully articulated in the tradition. A sign which is adequate in this sense may be called "logical" for it Ensures the correctness of the resulting inference. Thus, we have to ask: if the sign is there, can the sign be far behind? The Triple Nature of the Sign Diimaga formulated the following three conditions, which, he claimed, a logical sign must fulfil: 1. It should be present in the case (object) under consideration. 2. It should be present in a similar case or a homologue. 3. It should not be present in any dissimilar case, any heterologous. KR IRS dated 18 2 23 part 2 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Thatha_Patty" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/thatha_patty/CAL5XZooU57-haw0t8jT1CaZd5JaigCaeGWbPvtVSy0%3Dob%2Bm3Lg%40mail.gmail.com.
