I waited lest someone will write but that is the efficacy of corruption. But it is in blood Artha sastra says so :*ARTHASASTRA*
*Corruption in India* is has been a problem ever since the country had been having a multilayered administration by officers, ministers and other administrative chiefs. The corruption problem in ancient India, coupled with bribery, kept infesting the society more and more in an increasing rate. This is quite clear from the way the contemporary writers like Ksemendra and Kalhana have condemned the government officials, as well as other employees of different levels, in their celebrated works. Ksemendra in his *Dasavataracaritam* has advised the king to remove all the officials, ministers, generals and priests from office with immediate effect, who were either taking bribes themselves or have been indulging in corruption in some other way. Yet another work by Ksemendra, called *Narmamala*, depicts corruption bribery spreading fast like rampant maladies. He also found an answer to the much discussed question *how to stop corruption in India* of his time; he has explicitly addressed the contemporary intelligentsia to step forward and shoulder the responsibility of purging their folks. Kalhana too was merciless in his condemnation of the *corrupt government officers in India* of his own time. He damned the officials outright and asked the king to stay alert from their evil entente. Kalhana has also cited some examples of *top incidents of corruption in India* of his days. He said that Bijja became even richer than the kind as he sought to unfair means of getting money, while Ananda managed to achieve a high post in the office by bribing his higher officials. Embezzlements and Black Money in Ancient India *Embezzlements in India* was just the same problem in the yesteryears as they are now, mostly among the police and administrative officers.1 In fact, Kautilya has given a detailed list, referring to not less than forty ways of embezzlement that the treasury officers in his time were used to practice. The most common of them were *pratibandha* or obstruction, *prayoga* or loan, *vyavahara* or trading, *avastara* or fabrication of accounts, *pariahapana* or causing less revenue and thereby affecting the treasury, *upabhoga* or embezzling funds for self enjoyment, and *apahara* or defalcation. And he uses a nice metaphor too – just like one cannot resist tasting the drop of honey or poison on the tip of the tongue, a government servant can never resist devouring even a bit of the government revenue. Again, we cannot confirm if a fish under water is drinking water or not; similarly, ascertaining the bribery, corruption and embezzlement on the part of government officials and policemen were equally impossible. And no wonder, this huge amount of embezzlement in different spheres of the administration and in varied degrees led to the piling up of a huge amount of *black money in Indian market* in the age of the *Arthasastra*; nevertheless, we would not enquire into that in detail and make this article unnecessarily long. In brief, that caused all the similar problems we find today, including sudden and unpredictable hikes in the prices of essential goods. It would have been quite interesting to address the issue under the present economic circumstances of the present day India, but the scope of this article would ask to better leave that out. Legal Punishments for Corruptions in Ancient India There were a wide range of legal *punishments for corruptions in ancient India* for the depletion of treasury – monetary, corporal, and even sentences to death.2 Sometimes corrupt police officers would let the prisoners break away after taking a healthy amount of bribe. However, if they were caught, both the escaping prisoner and the corrupt police official were sentenced to death at the same time. Considering the present day situation of law and order in a number of agitated places in India, as well as the general corruption on the part of some police officers, we may quite confidently conclude that the system of the age of the *Arthasastra* was quite good enough as it succeeded to reduce the number of such cases by a significant degree. The accountants of all sections, departments and tiers needed to submit their accounts and audit reports to their respective higher officials on a regular basis. The work officers or the *Karmikas* needed to report the details to the Officer in Charge of Accounts, or the *Karanika*, every year. In *Police Administration in Ancient India*, K. K. Mishra has explicitly shown how they were punished for lack in their parts in audits and related jobs – "If they did not turn up for this purpose and came without the account books or balance sheets properly arranged, they were to be fined ten times of the amount involved. Again, if the work-officer presented himself with the records for being audited but the accounts-officer was not ready for audit, he (accounts-officer) was to be imposed the fine of the first amercement."3 Passing counterfeit coins as genuine ones was also widely practiced, and less often met with punishment, just as we find the circumstances today. There were several other severe punishments for the plethora of *corruptions in ancient India* which we simply cannot exhaust within the scope of this article. Well, it looks like the mentality of the country has not changed much even in millenniums, and *anti corruption measures by Govt of India 2011* do not seem do anything real good, very much like the state policies of the Maurya empire that were also only partially successful. Kautilya provides a comprehensive list of 40 kinds of embezzlement. In all these cases, the concerned functionaries such as the treasurer *(nidhayaka)*, the prescriber *(nibandhaka)*, the receiver *(pratigrahaka)*, the payer *(dayak)*, the person who caused the payment *(dapaka)* and the ministerial servants *(mantri-vaiyavrityakara)* were to be separately interrogated. In case any of these officials were to lie, their punishment was to be enhanced to the level meted out to the chief officer *(yukta)* mainly responsible for the crime. After the enquiry, a public proclamation *(prachara)* was to be made asking the common people to claim compensation in case they were aggrieved and suffered from the embezzlement. 13 <https://idsa.in/issuebrief/CorruptioninAdministrationEvaluatingtheKautilyanAntecedents_TarunKumar_121012#footnote13_lt4f94n> Thus, Kautilya was concerned about carrying the cases of fraud to their logical conclusion. The Arthashastra states that an increase in expenditure and lower revenue collection *(parihapan)* was an indication of embezzlement of funds by corrupt officials. 14 <https://idsa.in/issuebrief/CorruptioninAdministrationEvaluatingtheKautilyanAntecedents_TarunKumar_121012#footnote14_ergdrdf> Kautilya was sensitive enough to acknowledge the waste of labour of the workforce involved in generating revenues. 15 <https://idsa.in/issuebrief/CorruptioninAdministrationEvaluatingtheKautilyanAntecedents_TarunKumar_121012#footnote15_fwsa3ra> He defined self enjoyment *(upbhoga)* by government functionaries as making use of or causing others to enjoy what belongs to the king. 16 <https://idsa.in/issuebrief/CorruptioninAdministrationEvaluatingtheKautilyanAntecedents_TarunKumar_121012#footnote16_3o108eb> He was perhaps alluding to the current practice of misusing government offices for selfish motives such as unduly benefitting the self, family members, friends and relatives either in monetary or non-monetary form which harms the larger public good. Kautilya was also not unaware of corruption in the judicial administration. He prescribed the imposition of varying degrees of fines on judges trying to proceed with a trial without evidence, or unjustly maintaining silence, or threatening, defaming or abusing the complainants, arbitrarily dismissing responses provided to questions raised by the judge himself, unnecessarily delaying the trial or giving unjust punishments. 17 <https://idsa.in/issuebrief/CorruptioninAdministrationEvaluatingtheKautilyanAntecedents_TarunKumar_121012#footnote17_pxfu6kx> This shows that there were incidents of judicial pronouncements being biased, favouring one party to the detriment of others. In an atmosphere of corruption prevailing in the judicial administration as well, Kautilya perhaps wanted to ensure that the litigants are encouraged and given voice to air their legitimate grievances. He expected judges to be more receptive to the complaints and be fair in delivering justice. Kautilya prescribed reliance on an elaborate espionage network for detecting financial misappropriation and judicial impropriety. Spies were recruited for their honesty and good conduct. 18 <https://idsa.in/issuebrief/CorruptioninAdministrationEvaluatingtheKautilyanAntecedents_TarunKumar_121012#footnote18_rosmgjy> They were to keep a watch even over the activities of accountants and clerks for reporting cases of fabrication of accounts (avastara). On successful detection of embezzlement cases, Kautilya advocated hefty fines to be imposed apart from the confiscation of ill-earned hordes. If a functionary was charged and proved even of a single offence, he was made answerable for all other associated offences related to the case. 19 <https://idsa.in/issuebrief/CorruptioninAdministrationEvaluatingtheKautilyanAntecedents_TarunKumar_121012#footnote19_cc54oc9> Since taxes paid by the people are utilised for their welfare, any loss of revenue affects the welfare of the society at large. This is precisely the reason why Kautilya explicitly argued that the fines imposed should be “in proportion to the value of work done, the number of days taken, the amount of capital spent and the amount of daily wages paid”. 20 <https://idsa.in/issuebrief/CorruptioninAdministrationEvaluatingtheKautilyanAntecedents_TarunKumar_121012#footnote20_qzqohl1> The threat of fines being imposed and subsequent public embarrassment do deter judicial officials, to some extent, from resorting to corrupt practices. But Kautilya was proactive in laying down traps to catch public functionaries with loose morals and inclination to resort to bribery or seek undue favour. The strategy he prescribed was for secret agents to take a judge into confidence through informal channels and ask him to pronounce judgments favouring their party in return for a payment. 21 <https://idsa.in/issuebrief/CorruptioninAdministrationEvaluatingtheKautilyanAntecedents_TarunKumar_121012#footnote21_yeul9xe> If the deal was fixed, the judge was treated as accepting the bribe and prosecuted accordingly. Interestingly, Kautilya also dealt with the concept of whistleblowers. Any informant *(suchaka)* who provided details about financial wrongdoing was entitled an award of one-sixth of the amount in question. If the informant happened to be a government servant *(bhritaka)*, he was to be given only one twelfth of the total amount. 22 <https://idsa.in/issuebrief/CorruptioninAdministrationEvaluatingtheKautilyanAntecedents_TarunKumar_121012#footnote22_2zg8x8n> The former’s share was more because exposing corruption while being outside the system was more challenging. But in the case of *bhritakas*, striving for a corruption free administration was considered more of a duty that was ideally expected of them. Kautilya also warned at the same time about providing wrong information or not being able to prove the accusations. He advocated either monetary or corporal punishment for such informants so that the tool could not be misused for settling personal scores and harassing genuine officials. If an informant himself were to backtrack on the assertions he made against the accused, Kautilya suggested the death penalty for him. 23 <https://idsa.in/issuebrief/CorruptioninAdministrationEvaluatingtheKautilyanAntecedents_TarunKumar_121012#footnote23_g9s4sd3> This provision was not only draconian, but would have effectively discouraged whistleblowers. While such provisions would certainly make people think twice before levelling accusations, the threat of capital punishment was too harsh to help people root out the corrupt. In an atmosphere of all round corruption, honesty becomes a virtue and not a desired duty. Kautilya argued for advertising the cases of increase in revenue due to the honest and dedicated efforts of the superintendents by giving rewards and promotions. 24 <https://idsa.in/issuebrief/CorruptioninAdministrationEvaluatingtheKautilyanAntecedents_TarunKumar_121012#footnote24_qin17ex> Bestowing public honour creates a sense of pride and boosts the motivation and morale of honest officials. They act as role models for ideal youngsters who wish to join the administration and serve the state. KR IRS 20 6 23 On Sun, 18 Jun 2023 at 21:37, Rangarajan T.N.C. <[email protected]> wrote: > For e-governance to be effective, plain, simple governance must be clean. > > On Sat, 17 Jun, 2023, 00:25 KS Ramakrishnan, <[email protected]> > wrote: > > > [image: Inline image] > > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Thatha_Patty" group. 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