MANUSMRITHI Verse 2.6 [Sources of Knowledge of Dharma] वेदोऽखिलो धर्ममूलं स्मृतिशीले च तद्विदाम् ।
आचारश्चैव साधूनामात्मनस्तुष्टिरेव च ॥ ६ ॥ vedo'khilo dharmamūlaṃ smṛtiśīle ca tadvidām | ācāraścaiva sādhūnāmātmanastuṣṭireva ca || 6 || The entire Veda is the root-source of Dharma; also the Conscientious Recollection of righteous persons versed in the Veda, the Practice of Good (and learned) Men, and their self-satisfaction.—(6) Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya): [The opponent raises an initial objection]— “What is the relevanoy of what is stated in this verse? It is Dharma that has been declared as the subject to be described; and Dharma can be described only by means of Injunctions and Prohibitions. Now as regards the fact of the Veda being the source of Dharma, this cannot form the subject of any injunction such as ‘the Veda should be known as the source of Dharma, as the authoritative means of ascertaining Dharma because this fact can be known without its being enjoined in so many words; certainly the fact of the Veda being the source of Dharma does not stand in need of being notified by any injunctions of such writers as Manu and others; in fact the authoritativeness of the Veda regarding matters relating, to Dharma is as self-evident as that of Direct Perception,—being based upon the facts that (1) it brings about cognitions that are never sublated, (2) that it is not the work of any person, and as such it is entirely free of any suspicion of falsity that might be due to the defects of such authors, and (3) that the words of the Veda itself are free from all defects. “It might be argued that—‘what the text does is to refer to the well-established fact of the Veda being authoritative, with a view to indicate that the Smṛtis of Manu and others are based upon the Veda.’ “But this explanation cannot be accepted. For this fact also does not need to be stated; as (l) every Smṛti, by its very nature, must, be dependent upon a previous cognition, (2) the chances of mistake in the Smṛtis are precluded by the fact of their being accepted by great men, (3) the super-sensuous things spoken of in the Smṛtis could not be known to M anu and others (by any ordinary means of knowledge), and (4) every man knows it from his own experience that there is “recollection” of things taught in the Veda; so that the only possible view that could be entertained regarding the Smṛtis is that they are based upon the Veda [which, therefore, need not have been re-iterated in the Text]. Further, persons who know the Veda cannot stand in need of any Smṛti for learning what they should do; and lastly, when the Veda itself is the source of Dharma, there can be no need for postulating any other sources (in the shape of Smṛti, etc.). “Nor is it right to assert that ‘the conscientious recollection of persons versed in the Veda is also merely referred to for the purpose of pointing out the unauthoritative character of the heterodox Smṛtis’; because the unauthoritative character of these latter is already well established by reasoning. For such heterodox people as the Śākya, the Bhojaka, the Kṣapaṇaka and the rest, there is no possibility of any knowledge of the Veda, by virtue of which they might be regarded as authoritative on matters treated of in their Smṛtis; because in the first place they do not admit any connection with the Veda; secondly, they openly declare that the Veda is hot authoritative; thirdly, they contain teachings directly opposed to the Veda; and lastly, these Smṛtis clearly prohibit the study of the Veda. If Buddha and others had been students of the Veda, then alone could there be any question as to whether or not their Smṛtis are based upon the Veda. When however, as a matter of fact, any connection with the Veda is not even remotely possible, how could there be any possibility of these being based upon the Veda? On the contrary, these writers themselves put forward an entirely different basis for their codes,—in the form of tradition (handed down through a series of several Buddhas); as for example, in the following words: ‘with my divine eyes I perceive the good and bad conditions of Bhikṣus.’ Exactly in the same manner, all such heterodox people as the Bhojaka, the Pañcarātra, the Nirgrantha, the Anarthavāda, the Pāśupata and the rest hold that their scriptures are the works of gifted personalities, particular deities, capable of directly perceiving the subjects dealt with by them; and they do not admit that Dharma has its source in the Veda; in fact their scriptures contain teachings directly opposed to the Veda; e.g., some of these people, holding that death frees the living being from the troubles of living, hold all Killing to be meritorious; and this (reckless) killing is distinctly prohibited in the Veda; similarly, others hold Bathing at sacred places to be sinful, while the Veda directly enjoins daily bathing and living at sacred places; so again, according to some people, the killing of animals at the Agniṣṭoma sacrifice is sinful; and this is against the Vedic injunction laying down the performing of that sacrifice;—lastly, some people hold that all such acts as the offering of libations and sacrifices are entirely selfish, while according to the Veda, which prescribes various deities in connection with the said acts, they are performed for the sake of these several deities. So that there is distinct disagreement between the Veda and the said heterodox scriptures. “Some people have argued as follows:— In the Veda also we find contradictory assertions e.g., one passage lays down the holding (of the Śodaśī-vessel, at the Atirātra sacrifice), while another says it should not be held; similarly one passage prescribes the time after Sunrise as best suited to the pouring of libations, while another lays down the time before Sunrise; so that it is quite possible that in the Veda itself—either in its lost Rescensions or even in such Rescensions as are not completely lost—there may be found injunctions contrary to a certain Vedic injunction [and these contrary Vedic passages would form the basis for the non-Vedic teachings of the heterodox Smṛtis ]. The number of Vedic Rescensions is endless; how could all of them be known to any one person? And it is quite possible that some of them might have become lost. So that it is quite possible that there may be some such Vedic Rescensional text as contains direct injunctions of such acts as Eating in a vessel made of human bones, remaining naked-skinned and so forth (which have been prescribed in some heterodox scriptures).’ “Our answer to the above is as follows:—We do not deny the possibility of mutually contradictory teachings being found in the Veda; what we mean is that in all such cases (where both the injunctions are equally directly perceived), both injunctions stand upon the same footing, and consequently the two acts are regarded as optional alternatives. In the case in question however (i.e., when the teaching of a heterodox scripture is found to contradict the direct teaching of the Veda), the Vedic text (in support of the heterodox teaching) could only be assumed; but there can be no occasion for the assumption of a text directly contradictory to one that is directly perceived. The mere possibility of a Vedic text (in support of the heterodox teaching) cannot lead to any certainty regarding its actual existence; while the Vedic injunction to the contrary is directly perceptible and certain; and certainly a certain text can never be sublated by an uncertain one. As for the theory of ‘lost Rescensions,’ we shall deal with it in detail later on, in our comments on this same verse. As regards the (orthodox) Smṛtis of Manu and others, their relationship to directly perceptible Vedic texts is quite patent; in some cases they are related to the Vedic mantras, in others to the Vedic deities, and in others again with substances and other details. No such relationship is possible in the case of the heterodox Smṛtis; hence no authority can ever belong to them (for the purpose of re-iterating which fact there could be a reference to the ‘Recollection of persons versed in the Veda.’) “As regards Practice,—that which consists in what is actually done, with a view to invisible results, by persons learned iu the Veda,—its authoritative character is exactly like that of Recollection (Smṛti); because that also has its basis in the Veda. On the other hand, wrong Practice is generally based upon visible causes (of greed, &c.), and unlearned persons are apt to commit mistakes; hence it can not have any authority at all. “Similarly with Self-satisfaction. “If again the authority of the Veda, of Recollection and of Practice were dependent upon the teachings of Manu and others (in the shape of the present verse), on what would the authority of these latter rest? If on other teachings—such as ‘the Smārta Dharma has been expounded by Manu,’—then, whence the authority of these latter? In fact, the ultimate criterion as to what is authoritative and what is not authoritative, would be a purely logical one, and it would not consist in any teaching at all. So that the present verse is absolutely useless; and so also other similar verses that follow.” Our answer to the above objection is as follows:— The authors of treatises on Dharma proceed to compose their works for the expounding of their subject for the benefit of such persons as are not learned (in the Vedas). Hence it is that having themselves learnt from the Veda that the Aṣṭakā and such other acts should be performed, they incorporate in their own work the injunctions of these acts, for the purpose of conveying the same knowledge to others similarly in the case of such matters as the authoritative character of the Veda [which are known by the Smṛti- writers themselves from the Veda, and yet they proceed to include that information in their work for the edification of persons not equally learned]. As a matter of fact, there are many enquirers who are incapable of ascertaining truth by means of independent reasoning,—not being endowed with an intellect capable of ratiocination; and for the benefit of these persons even a logically established fact is stated by the writers in a friendly spirit. Hence what is herein stated regarding Veda being the source of Dharma is a well-established fact. What the statement ‘Veda is the source of Dharma’ means is that ‘the fact of Veda being the source of Dharma has been ascertained after due consideration, and one should never doubt its authoritative character.’ Even in ordinary experience we find people teaching others facts ascertained by other means of knowledge; e.g. [when the physician teaches]—‘you should not eat before the food already taken has been digested, for indigestion is the source of disease.’ It cannot be rightly urged that “those who are unable to comprehend, by reasoning, the fact of Veda being the source of Dharma, can not comprehend it through teaching either”; for as a matter of fact we find that when certain persons are known to be ‘trustworthy,’ people accept their word as true, without any further consideration. The whole of the present section therefore is based on purely logical facts, and not on the Veda, in other cases also,—e.g., in the case of Smṛtis dealing with law-suits, &c.—what is propounded is based upon logic, as we shall show later on, as occasion arises. How the performance of the Aṣṭakā, etc., is based upon the Veda we shall show in the present context itself. The word ‘Veda’ here stands for the Ṛg, Yajuṣ and Sāman, along with their respective Brāhmaṇas; all these are fully distinguished, by students, from all other sentences (and compositions). Learners who have their intellect duly cultured through series of teachings, understand, as soon as a Vedic passage is uttered, that it is Veda,—their recognising of the Veda being as easy as the recognition of a man as a Brāhmaṇa. This word ‘Veda’ is applied to the whole collection of sentences,—beginning with ‘Agnimīle purohitam,’ ‘Agnirvai devānāmvarua,’ and ending with ‘atha mahāvāratam’ (Ṛgveda); as also to the several individual sentences forming part of the said collection; and this application of the word is not direct in the one case and indirect in the other,—as is the case with the word ‘village’ as applied (directly) to the entire group of habitations, and (indirectly) to each individual habitation. In the case of the word ‘village’ the twofold usage is based upon the principle that words denoting the composites are also applicable to the components; the word ‘village’ is known to be used generally in the sense of ‘a group of houses,’ and yet in the case of such expressions as ‘the village is burnt,’ it ìb used in the sense of a few individual houses in the village; as it is when people say ‘the village has been burnt,’ when in reality only a few houses have be in burnt. Or, in this ease also the word ‘village’ may be regarded as used in the sense of the group only; and what happens is that it is the burning, which, though really pertaining to only a portion of that group, is spoken of as pertaining to the entire group as related to the said portion; specially as it is only through its components that a composite can have any connection with an act; in fact the composite’s connection with acts can be none other than that of the components; apart from the components, the composite cannot be either seen or touched. K Rajaram IRS 8724 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Thatha_Patty" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/thatha_patty/CAL5XZorYSKbw0vi%3DJFqdkYoD0rZbx5JHgpSjqGYAcPX3kye5fA%40mail.gmail.com.
