Part 3 10724
(A) First, as regards Arthavādas, these are not meant to be
construed apart from the *injunctive *passages; it is only if they were so
construed that they would fail to help in the knowledge of dharma. As a
matter of fact, we find that if the Arthavāda is taken apart by itself, it
remains syntactically defective; and this leads us to conclude that they
subserve the purposes of the corresponding injunctive passages; being so
subservient to these latter, they come to be construed along with them; and
hence they have got to be explained in such a manner as to make them fit in
with the corresponding injunction. Thus the mention of Prajāpati having cut
his fat cannot be taken by itself; it has to be taken as supplementing an
injunction; in view of the fact however that the Arthavādas do not denote a
substance, a sacrificial accessory, or any such thing as generally forms
the direct object of injunction, they are construed differently, as
eulogising what is directly enjoined, and thus come to be recognised as
supplementing the injunction. This praise of the enjoined thing is also
expressed by the Arthavāda; for instance, the sense of the passage in
question is this—‘it is so necessary to perform animal-sacrifices that, at
a time when no animals were available, and there was no other remedy,
Prajāpati constituted himself into the animal and cut out his own fat.’
That such is the construction to be put upon the Arthavāda is shown by the
fact that whenever we have Arthavādas, they always accompany injunctive
passages. Thus even though the sense of the injunction is comprehended even
without the accompanying Arthavāda,—e.g., in the case of the injunction
‘one should offer the Kapiñjala birds to Vasanta,’ we comprehend the
injunction from the sentence itself,—yet the Arthavādas are not absolutely
useless; for when the Arthavāda is there, it is not right to deduce the
injunction from the injunctive sentence only.
The Veda is not the work of any author; we cannot argue (from the
analogy of human speeches) that ‘since in one case the injunction has no
Arthavāda to help it, it need not have it in another case also’;—the
Arthavādas are there, we have to construe them; and what we have shown
above is the only right way in which the particular Arthavāda can be
construed. Nor is there anything very extraordinary in this; in ordinary
practice also, we find eulogistic words accompanying injunctions; for
instance, at the time that the master is paying -wages to his servants,
some servant says affectionately (in regard to another)—‘This Devadatta is
a good servant, he is always present, knows the occasions of service and is
always careful about it.’ Thus we find that Arthavādas also serve the
purpose of enjoining, through the eulogising of what is enjoined by the
injunction. In fact, in certain cases, details of what is enforced by the
injunction are got at from the Arthavāda only; for instance, when the
injunction says, ‘wet pebbles are to be put in,’ this injunction stands in
need of some wetting substance, such as butter oil, etc.; so that when it
is followed by the Arthavāda ‘Butter is glory,’ this praise of Butter leads
us to conclude that Butter is the welting substance to be used. Similarly
the Arthavāda ‘those who have recourse to these Rātris become
respected’serves to point out the qualifying conditions for the performers
of the Rātri-satra sacrifice. From all this it is clear that Arthavādas
also are ‘the root of Dharma.’
(B) Next as regards Mantras, some of them are directly
*injunctive*; e.g., the Mantra ‘Vasantāya kapiñjalān ālabhate’ (‘offers the
Kapiñjala birds to Vasanta’);—in connection with the Āghāra-offering, the
deity to whom the offering is to be made is pointed out by the mantra ‘Ita
Indra urdhvo’ dhvaraḥ, etc.’ In this case the Deity is not mentioned in the
passage that enjoins the offering, nor is it mentioned in any other purely
injunctive passage; the particular mantra to be used however is directly
enjoined as being the one that begins with ‘Ita Indra’; hence it is from
the words of this mantra that we learn the name of the requisite Deity.
There are thousand, of such instances where the Deity is indicated by the
words of the mantra. Then, there are certain mantras that are only
descriptive of what is being done; and these also serve the purpose of
making known Dharma by reminding (the persons engaged in the act, of what
is to be done); and thus these also become ‘root of Dharma’ by indicating
what should be done.
(C) Thirdly, as regards the Names, they are never found apart from
verbs, and hence, like verbs, they have their character of being the ‘root
of Dharma’ well established, Then again, as a matter of fact, the accessory
details of sacrifices are generally enjoined through these names (of
sacrifices); e.g., (a) ‘In the Śarat season one should perform the
sacrifice,’ (b) ‘one desirous of Kingdom of Heaven should perform the
Vajapeya’ [in the former we have the injunction of the time of performance,
and in the latter, of the Result, and both are mentioned along with the
name of the sacrifice ‘Vājapeya’].
Thus it is proved that the ‘entire Veda’ is the ‘root of Dharma.’
Other people have taken the word ‘entire’ as added with a view to the
possible objection that no knowledge of Dharma is provided by the Vedic
passages laying down the Shu??a (Śyena?) and such other objectionable acts,
or by the Prohibitions—such as ‘one should not eat garlic.’
The objection anticipated by these people is as follows:—
“The Śyena and other sacrifices of the kind are in the form of malevolent
spells; and partaking of the character of murder, they are distinctly of
the nature of ‘Himsā’ (Injury); and since all form of injury is cruel, and
all evil spells have been prohibited, these sacrifices must be ‘Adharma,’
the opposite of ‘Dharma’ (sinful). [And since the Veda lays down such
sacrifices] the ‘entir’ Veda cannot be the ‘root of Dharma.’ Por ‘Dharma’
has been explained as ‘what should be done,’ and certainly the killing of
the Brāhmaṇa is not ‘what should be done.’ How then can the passages laying
down such acts be the ‘root of Dharma’? Further, even the
animal-sacrifices—Agniṣomīya and the rest,—involve the killing of animals,
and as such are very far removed from the character of ‘Dharma.’ That
killing is sinful is admitted by all enquiries. To this end it has been
said ‘where the killing of living beings is Dharma, what can be Adharma?’”
Now how is this objection anticipated? It is anticipated (say these other
people) by the adding of the epithet ‘entire.’ There is no other use for
this epithet.
It might be asked why no reason has been given [by Manu, why and how the
entire Veda is the root of Dharma]; but our answer is that this is a work
in the form of Precept, and as such states well-established conclusions;
and those persons who seek after the ‘why’ and ‘wherefore’ of these
conclusions are instructed by Pūrvamīmāmsā.’We have already said that this
work is addressed to persons who are prepared to learn tilings from Precept
alone.
The author of the Vivaraṇa however puts forward a few arguments also:—It
has been argued by the opponent that the Śyena and other such sacrifices,
being prohibited, must be ‘adharma’ sinful. This is quite true. But even
though these acts are prohibited, yet in certain cases it so happens that
some people may have their animosity too strong to allow of their
submitting to the general prohibition of killing,—in such other passages
has ‘no living beings should be killed,’—and such persons derive from the
Śyena, the pleasure of killing their enemy; and to that small extent, as
conducive to this pleasure, the Śyena may be regarded as ‘dharma’; so that
the passage prescribing the Śyena does not cease to be the ‘source of
Dharma.’ Secondly, as for prohibitions, it is only a person who is moved by
passion to do the killing that is guided by the prohibition; and the acting
up to the prohibition only consists in not doing what is prohibited [and
this desisting from the prohibited act is meritorious, Dharma ] Thirdly,
the prohibition of killing does not apply to the killing that is done in
course of the and other such offerings; and what is prohibited by the
general prohibition of killing is only that killing in ordinary practice
which is done through malice. That killing, on the other hand, which is
distinctly enjoined and has scriptural sanction, can never form the subject
of prohibition; specially as the prohibition has its use in connection with
ordinary killing. Nor is it possible to deduce the sinfulness of the
scriptural killing, on the analogy of ordinary killing, from the general
proposition that ‘all killing is sinful.’ Because what makes the killing
sinful is not merely its character of ‘killing,’ but also the fact of its
being prohibited; and we have already pointed out that the prohibition does
not apply to the scriptural killing.
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Some people explain the word ‘mūla,’ ‘root’ to mean cause;—the meaning
being that ‘of Dharma Veda is the root,—the basis, the cause—either
directly or indirectly.’ It is the ‘direct cause of Dharma’ in such
passages as ‘one should study the Veda,’ ‘one should get up the Ṛgveda,
etc.’; and it is the ‘indirect cause’ when it points out the detailed form
of the Agnihotra and such other acts.
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‘Smṛtiśīle ca tadvidān’—‘Conscientious Recollection of persons versed in
the Veda’;—‘Smṛti,’ ‘Recollection’ is the idea that one has of what has
been apprehended before.—The pronoun. ‘tat’ (in the compound ‘tadvidām’)
stands for the Veda; and those who know the Veda are called ‘Vedavidaḥ,’
‘versed in the Veda.’ The meaning thus is that another ‘authority’ (means
of knowing) for Dharma. consists in the idea, ‘this should be done, that
should not be done,’ entertained by people learned in the Veda.
“It has been held that Recollection is not a reliable means of knowledge;
and the reason for this that is given is that Recollection only serves to
recall what has been apprehended by other means of knowledge, and does not
lead to the apprehension of anything new.”
This is true; for the persons to whom the recollection belongs, it is the
original means of knowledge—Trustworthy Assertion or Perception, etc.—that
constitutes the reliable source of knowledge; and one’s own Recollection is
not a reliable source of knowledge for himself. But for us (ordinary
mortals), it is the Recollection of Manu and such other persons that forms
a reliable source of knowledge; we have no other means, except the said
Recollection, for knowing that the Aṣṭakā and such other acts should be
done. That the Recollection of Manu, etc., was actually in a certain form,
we learn from the assertions made by themselves that have come down to us
through a long line of tradition. And from this Recollection we come to the
conclusion that the subject-matter of them was actually apprehended by
Manu, etc., by the ordinary means of knowledge; and this is indicated by
the fact of the Recollection being there, and no.Recollection being
possible without previous apprehension.
“It is quite possible that Manu and others have compiled their
‘Recollections’ from imagination, without having actually apprehended what
they speak of; in the same manner as certain poets compose a story after
having created the whole plot from imagination.”
The answer to this is as follows: —This might be so, if the works under
consideration did not contain teachings regarding what ‘should he done.’
Teachings regarding what should he done are meant to lead to the
performance of those acts; and certainly, no rational person can ever
perform what is taught on an imaginary basis.
“But people might he led to perform it by mistake.”
One man might fall into such a mistake; that the entire world has fallen
into a mistake, and this mistake has persisted ever since the beginning of
creation, —this would certainly be a most extraordinary presumption. And
when it is quite possible that the assertions of Manu, etc., are based upon
the Veda, there is no room for the assumption that in following them.
People have fallen into a mistake. We also do not admit that Manu and
others directly perceived the Dharmas; because ‘Perception’ is that
cognition which follows when the sense-organs are in contact with the
objects cognised; and certainly, no such contact with the sense-organs is
possible for Dharma, for the simple reason that it is what should be done,
and what should be done is not an accomplished entity, and it is only an
accomplished entity that comes into contact with anything. It is true that
(though perception does not apprehend non-existent things) Inference and
the other means of cognition do bring about the apprehension of things not
existent at the time,—e.g., when people see a line of ants moving along
with their eggs, they infer the coming rain; but even these latter means of
cognition do not provide any knowledge of what should be done.
All this leads, us to conclude that, in as much as the Recollection
pertains to what should be done, it must have a source that is similar to
itself; and such source can be the Veda only. The Veda that we thus infer
(to be the source of the Recollections) must have been directly perceived
by Manu and others and the Vedic texts in which the Dharmas laid down in
the Smṛtis were originally prescribed (and which we do not find in the
Vedas now) must have been contained in such Rescensions as have been lost.
KR IRS 10724 11724 end of part 3
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