Part 4 11724 On this point, the following alternative views suggest themselves as possible: —
(a) The Recensions may be one or several; and it is inferred that from among these some contain the injunction of the Aṣṭakā and some that of others. (b) Or, it may be that all the Recensions are available even at the present day; but the details of the Dharmas are scattered about among them; so that while one Recension contains the originatively injunction of the Aṣṭakā, another contains the injunction of the substance to be used at it, a third enjoins the Deity, and yet another lays down the Mantra; and what Manu and other compilers have done is to bring together in one place all these scattered details, with a view to make them more easily understood. (c) Or, that the Dharmas in question have their origin only in the indications of Mantras and Arthavādas. (d) Or, these Dharmas, having been performed by men from time immemorial, and having been handed down by an unbroken line of tradition, must be regarded to be as eternal as the Veda itself. (e) Or, the action of Manu and others also, like that of ourselves, must have been based upon the authority of some other source, and as such their assertions must be based upon such Vedic texts as have always been assumed by inference (and never actually perceived by any one in any Veda). These and such other alternative views have been fully considered by the author of the Vivaraṇa; and the definite conclusion arrived at is as follows:—The performance of the Aṣṭakā and such other acts laid down in the Smṛtis must be regarded as sanctioned by the Veda; because they are found to be connected with purely Vedic injunctions, on perceiving which latter the performers undertake the performance. The said connexion we have already shown above;—in some cases what is prescribed in the Veda is subservient to what is laid down in the Smṛti, and sometimes it is the contrary; sometimes the Veda contains the originative Injunction of the act in question, sometimes its qualifying conditions, and sometimes it lays out a mere Arthavāda, an eulogistic description. In this manner all those acts that are prescribed in the Smṛtis are connected with Vedic injunctions. We have discussed this matter fully in the as follows:— ‘Between what is laid down in the Smṛti and what is prescribed in the Veda, there is a close connection. There is not much difference between the two, either as to the character of their performers or to the nature of the acts themselves. Those same persons who perform the acts prescribed in the Veda,—if they also do what is mentioned in the Smṛtis, it follows that these latter have their source in the Veda. The principal criterion of the authoritative character of a certain text is its acceptance by persons learned in the Veda; and the fact of the performing agents being the same in both cases has been put forward (in the Pūrvamīmānsā Sūtra 1.3.2) as a ground for inferring the existence of Vedic texts in corroboration of the Smṛtis.’ For going any further than this and for coming to particulars (as to where these corroborative Vedic texts are to be found etc., etc.), there is no reasonable ground; nor is there any necessity (it being sufficient for our present purpose that all that is contained in the Smṛti has its source in the Veda). It is quite possible that certain rescensional texts of the Veda may have been lost. Even at the present day we find several such texts as are read by very few students. And some people have held that what the authors of the Smṛtis have done is to bring together the purely injunctive passages, shorn of their accompanying arthavādas, contained in such rescensional texts as were found by them to be likely to be lost (for want of learners). Āpastamba (1.4.10) for instance, says—‘the injunctions are those laid down in the Brāhmaṇas,—their exact words have been lost—but they can be inferred from the details of the actual performance.’ But this theory involves many impossible and unheard of assumptions, such as the neglect of, and the total disappearance of all the learners of, just that Vedic text which was the most useful, being that in which were declared all those Dharmas pertaining to castes and life-stages that are set forth in the Smṛtis and the Gṛhyasūtras. The other view however is more reasonable,—that learned persons, who have formed definite conclusions of their own on all important matters, should compile a practical compendium of all such injunctions as are scattered over (in various sections of the Veda), beset with arthavādas, and difficult to determine what is conducive to the good of man and what is meant only to complete the sacrificial performance. But under this hypothesis also, there is this difficulty, that in cases where the Smṛti rule runs counter to a Vedic rule, hoth would have to be regarded as equally directly Vedic, and as such representing optional alternatives; so that the Smṛti could not be set aside by the Veda. And this certainly cannot be accepted by the learned. In fact the authors of the Smṛtis themselves admit that the basis of the Smṛti in the Veda is only inferred, and that the former is always set aside in favour of the latter. For instance, Gautama says (3.35)—‘There is only one life-stage, say the revered Teachers; since the householder’s life is the only one that is directly enjoined.’ If Manu and the other writers (who speak of four life-stages) had actually found the Vedic texts (upon which they based their division of the four stages),—then what would be the sense of the expression that ‘the house-holder’s life is the only one that is directly enjoined (by the Veda)’? For according to the hypothesis under discussion all the four stages would be equally directly enjoined. [Nor is the above-quoted Sūtra the statement of a foreign opinion.] In fact it embodies Gautama’s own opinion, which he has put forward as the opinion of ‘revered teachers.’ This is clear from the fact that he has begun the section with the statement ‘Now as regards the various views that h ave been held regarding the life-stages’ (3.1), and he has concluded with the Sūtra (3.35) quoted above. The authoritative character of Mantras and Arthavādas (as means of knowing Dharma) is not inconsistent. Though it is true that Arthavādas only serve to eulogise what has been enjoined by an Injunctive sentence, and they do not exercise the function of enjoining anything,—yet there are instances in which even the connection of the Arthavāda with an Injunctive sentence is not possible unless the former has afforded some; idea of an injunction in regard to something expressed by its words. For instance the Arthavāda passage ‘Theft of gold, drinking of wine, etc., etc.’ (Upaniṣad, 5.10.9) cannot be understood as pertaining to the Injunction of the ‘Science of the Five Fires,’ until it is known that the ‘theft of gold’ and the rest are prohibited; the sense of the whole being that ‘he who studies this science of the Five Fires does not fall, even though he commits the theft of gold, etc., or associates with persons who have committed them—otherwise he does fall’? “Who has laid down the law that in the said passage the Injunction is conveyed, not directly by the Arthavāda itself, but by the fact of its being connected with another Injunctive passage? As a matter of fact, the passage itself contains an independent finite verb of its own—‘these four fall’ [and this would serve as the direct prohibition). It might be argued that the verb does not contain the Injunctive affix: But the passage ‘they obtain a standing who per form the Rātrisatra’ also contains no verb ending with the Injunctive affix. It might he argued that—‘in the case of the Rātrisatra, the need for a qualifying condition being distinctly felt, the two sentences (they obtain a standing and they perform the Rātrisatra) come to be taken as syntactically connected, and the necessary injunction is got at by assuming the verb to contain the Let ending.’—But the same may be said in regard to the passage in question also. In fact, there are several injunctions of substances and deities that are obtained from Arthavādas. In a case where the Arthavāda is distinctly subservient to an Injunctive passage,—since this latter injunction would be in need of the mention of a substance or a deity (for the act enjoined) [that may be found mentioned in the corresponding Arthavāda], it may not be improper to take the Arthavāda as simply serving to supply the needs of the corresponding Injunction (and not as enjoining anything independently by itself). In the present instance however (of the Arthavāda passage ‘the theft of gold, etc., etc.’), if we are to seek for an injunction that has no connection with the Arthavāda (and this injunction were sought to be derived from the words of the Arthavāda itself), then this would give rise to a syntactical split; hence it cannot be taken as subservient to the main subject-matter of the context (i.e., the science of the Five Fires); and in the absence of such subserviency, the Arthavāda could not provide any idea of the Prohibition. This is the point on which the case of the Arthavāda in question is not analogous to that of the sentences—‘One should put in wet pebbles’ and ‘Butter is glory’ [where the connection between the two is quite clear].” This is not right; for even though the Arthavāda has a distinct meaning of its own, yet since its connection with the Injunction is based upon syntactical connection, there can be no room for any objection as regards syntactical split. K RAJARAM irs 11724 12724 END OF PART 4 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Thatha_Patty" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/thatha_patty/CAL5XZorjNPt4iupH-9VPyiXOtFhVgPzoA_Vbc82E7Jba2bUJbQ%40mail.gmail.com.
