PART 6 13724 [Having discussed the idea expressed by the expression ‘Smṛtiśīle ca tadvidām,’ the Author next proceeds to explain the words themselves]—‘Smṛtiśīle tadvidām’ ‘the conscientious re-collection of those versed in the Veda,’—The compound ‘smṛtiśīle’ stands for ‘Smṛti and śīla.’—‘Śīla’ has been explained as the abandoning of love and hate; and this is a ‘root of a Dharma,’—not like the Veda and Smṛti, which are ‘root of Dharma’ in the sense of being the source of knowledge of Dharma,—but in the sense that it is a means of accomplishing Dharma; for by abandoning love and hate one acquires merit (Dharma).
Question:—“Dharma has been described as what leads to welfare; and certainly the abandoning of love and hate is itself of that character (of Dharma); so that there being no difference between the two (i .e., between Dharma and the abandoning of love and hate), how can it be said that the said abandoning accomplishes Dharma?” Answer:—We have already pointed out that the authors of Smṛtis use the term ‘dharma s,’ sometimes in the sense of acts which form the subjects of Injunctions and Prohibitions (i.e., meritorious and unmeritorious deeds), and also sometimes in the sense of that peculiar thing (force, i.e., merit) which proceeds from the performance of acts and continues to exist until it has brought its reward (to the doer). That there is such a thing as this latter can be believed only on the authority of the scriptures. If the sacrificial performance were to disappear without bringing about any such force, then, bow could its results appear at some remote period of time? It is this peculiar something that is meant by the term ‘dharma’ here [when it is said that ‘the abandoning of love and hate accomplishes Dharma.’] And certainly the said ‘Śīla’ is the ‘root’ of ‘Dharma’ in this sense; so that there is nothing incongruous in this. The use of the word ‘Dharma’ in this sense is common; e.g., in the verse—‘Dharma is the only friend that accompanies one even on death’ (Manu, 8.17). Since the act disappears immediately after it has been done, bow could it continue to exist at any other time (as mentioned in this verse)? Some people bring forward the following objection:— “As a matter of fact, everything that is enjoined in the Veda and in the Smṛtis is the source of Dharma; and since ‘Śīla’ also is included among the acts thus enjoined, there is no point in mentioning it separately. In fact Manu himself is going to enjoin it in the following verse—‘Day and night one should take care to subdue the senses’ (7.41),—and again—‘When the mind has been subdued, the two groups of five become subdued.’ And it is this ‘subjugation of the mind’ which constitutes the ‘abandoning of love and hate,’ as we shall explain later on.” Some writers answer this by saying that ‘Śīla’ has been separately mentioned with a view to indicate its superior importance; it is something that comes useful in the performance of all acts; and is important also by itself; being just like the Agnihotra and such other acts; and further, it is a ‘Dharma’ for all castes and conditions. It is for these reasons that it has been specifically mentioned in the present verse, which sets forth the most general conception of Dharma. Our explanation however is as follows:— ‘Śīla’ stands for Samādhi, ‘composure of the mind;’ the root ‘Śīl’ signifies ‘composing,’ and ‘composure’ is a property of the mind; so that ‘Śīla’ here stands for the withdrawing of the mind from other things and concentrating it upon what is enjoined in the scriptures. The copulative compound (‘Smṛtiśīle’) connotes interdependence; hence what is meant to be the ‘source of Dharma’ is ‘Smṛti’ (Recollection) and ‘śīla’ (composed mind, Conscience) as interdependent; and ‘śīla’ does not stand for being the means of accomplishing Dharma (as explained by some people, above). The sense therefore comes to be that what is the ‘source of Dharma’ is Conscientious Recollection, and not mere Recollection. Hence, even though some persons may be ‘versed in the Veda,’ yet any recollection that they may have at a time when they are not duly attentive to the subject cannot be regarded as a valid source of knowledge of Dharma; and this for the simple reason that unless people have fixed their attention upon what is prescribed in the scriptures, they are liable to fall into error. As regards the particle ‘ca’ found in the verse, this ‘should be construed after the term ‘tadvidām,’ ‘of people versed in the Veda’; and it is due to the exigencies of metre that it has been placed before that term. This particle has a copulative force; and since nothing that has gone before can be copulated, it serves to bring in here the epithet ‘sādhūnām’ (good, righteous) that comes next. So that there are three qualifications intended here: the ‘Recollection’ that is authoritative is of such persons as (1) are learned, having learnt the soiences from a qualified teacher (), (2) are attentive to what is prescribed in the scriptures (śīla) and (3) are in the habit of acting up to the injunctions of the scriptures (sādhu, good, righteous). It has been declared that all these qualifications existed in Manu and other writers (of Smṛtis). If it were not so, then it would never have been possible for their words to have been accepted by the wise. “If this is what is meant, it should be stated dearly, in the form ‘the words of Manu and others, are the sources of Dharma’; what is the use of setting forth the characteristics (of the writers)?” True; but there might be persons who may not agree to the words of Manu and others being authoritative; and it is with reference to such persons that the text has set forth the well-established grounds for regarding them as trustworthy. Even, at the present day, a man who is possessed of the qualifications mentioned in the text, has his words accepted with the same amount of trust and confidence as the words of Manu and others; as we find in cases where learned men pronounce their opinion upon the precise character of the expiatory rite to be performed by one who has committed a certain sin. In fact a person possessed of the said qualifications has ever been recognised as constituting the ‘pariṣad’ ‘court,’ by himself alone: ‘The Brāhmaṇa should act up to that Dharma which even a single person learned in the Vedas should declare to be Dharma’—says Manu (12.113). For these reasons, there can be no reasonable ground for enumerating the names of ‘Recollectors,’ as ‘Manu, Viṣṇu, Yama, Aṅgiras’ and so forth. For we find that many such persons as Paiṭhīnasi, Baudhāyana, Pracetas and the rest are recognised by the wise and learned as reliable ‘Recollectors,’ and yet these names are not found in any of the lists (supplied by various Smṛtis). What thus the words ‘Smṛtiśīle ca tadvidām’ mean is that ‘when a person is found to be recognised and spoken of by all wise and learned persons as endowed with the said qualifications, and they also accept a certain work as really by that person,—the word of such a person (and of the work composed by him), even though proceeding from a human source, should be recognised as an authoritative source of the knowledge of Dharma. So that even at the present day if there were a person possessed of the said qualifications, and he were to compose a work by reason of just those qualifications, then for later generations they would be accepted to be just as authoritative as the words of Manu and others. People of the present generation—who would be contemporaries of the said writer—would not derive their knowledge of Dharma from the words of such a writer, because the sources of information available to him would be all available to them also. Hence it is that until a teacher of the present day clearly indicates the source from which he has derived a certain information, learned people do not accept his word as reliable. When however he has pointed out his source and his work has been accepted as authoritative, then at some future time if the case of his work be found to be analogous to that of the Smṛti rules regarding Aṣṭakā and other acts (whose basis in the Veda we of the present day cannot find), it would be only right to infer its authoritative character from the fact of its being accepted by the wise and the learned (which fact could not be explained except on the basis of its being duly authoritative). 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