PART 7 KR IRS 14724 15724
‘Ācārascaiva sādhūnām’ ‘The practice of Good Men’;—
the particle ‘ca’ connects the epithet ‘veda vidām’ (of persons versed
in the Veda) with this phrase also. These two qualifications (‘goodness’
and ‘Vedic learning’) indicate the ‘Śiṣṭa,’ ‘the cultured man.’ The
‘practice of cultured men’ also is ‘source of Dharma.’—‘Practice’ means
conduct, behaviour. When, in regard to any action, there are no Vedic or
Smṛti statements, but cultured men are found to regard it as ‘Dharma’ and
do it,—then that act also should be accepted as ‘enjoined by the Veda,’
just like the act prescribed in the Smṛti. To this category belong such
acts as the following—(a) the tying of the bracelet and such other
auspicious rites performed during marriage, etc., (b) the worshipping of
famous trees, Yakṣas, road-crossings and such things, varying in various
countries, done by the girl on her day of marriage, (c) the number of
hair-locks kept on the head, varying with different countries; (d) the
exact manner of attending on guests, teachers and other respectable
persons, consisting in the addressing of sweet and agreeable words,
saluting, rising to receive and so forth.
For instance, it is customary with some people to recite the
Pṛṣṇi-sūkta with grass in hand, when banding over the horse consecrated for
the Aśvamedha sacrifice. It is such customs that are meant by ‘Practice’
here. It is not possible to collect in any compilation all such practices,
there being endless forms of them, varying with the diversities in the
nature of men, caused by such variable circumstances as the calm or
disturbed condition of their mind and so forth. The same act that may have
been found, on several, occasions, to be pleasing (to one person), may, on
another occasion, turn out to be unpleasant (to another person). For
instance, a house-holder may be in the habit of being in constant
attendance upon his guests; —
this may be quite pleasing to one guest, who may be pleased at finding
the man attending upon him like a servant; but the same close attendance
becomes unpleasant to another guest, who may feel—‘the feeling of restraint
caused by this man’s constant presence is so galling that I do not find an
opportunity to sit at ease.’ Hence, in corroboration of such ‘Practices’ it
is not possible for us to assume Vedic texts, corroborating them either
collectively or individually. The Aṣṭakā and such other acts, on the other
band, have a fixed form; and hence we have Smṛti rules regarding their
performance. This is what constitutes the difference between ‘Recollection’
and ‘Practice’ (Smṛti and Ācāra).
-----------------------------------------------
‘Ātmana stuṣṭireva ca’,—‘Self-satisfaction also’
—‘is source of Dharma’ is to be construed here also. This
‘self-satisfaction’ also is meant to be of those only who are ‘learned in
the Veda and Good’ (‘Vedavidām sādhūnām’). The fact of this
‘Self-satisfaction’ being ‘source of Dharma’ has been held to be based upon
the trustworthy character (of the people concerned). When such persons as
are possessed of the stated qualifications (of being good and learned) have
their mind satisfied with a certain act, and they do not feel any aversion
towards it, that act is ‘Dharma.’
“But it may happen that a man’s mind is satisfied with a prohibited
(sinful) act; and this would have to be regarded as Dharma. Again, a man
may have hesitation (and doubt) regarding what is enjoined in the Veda; and
this latter would h ave to be regarded as n ot‘ Dharma.’”
(a) As a matter of fact, the ‘self-satisfaction’ of the high-souled and
extremely good men endowed with the said qualifications, is possessed of
such tremendous force that, under its influence ‘Dharma’ may become
‘Adharma’ and ‘Adharma’ become ‘Dharma’; but this cannot be so in the case
of men tainted with love and hate, etc. Whatever goes into a salt-mine,
becomes transformed into salt; similarly, everything is rendered pure by
the unpremeditated ‘self-satisfaction’ of persons learned in the Veda. [The
mere fact of an act being prohibited does dot make it Adharma ] for though
the ‘holding of the Ṣoḍaśi vessel’ has been prohibited at the Atirātra
sacrifice, yet when the holding comes to be done, in accordance With a
Vedic injunction, it is not sinful. But in the present case, there is no
question of option, as there is in the case of the ‘holding of the Ṣoḍaśi’.
What happens in this case is that the Prohibitions take effect in
regard to all cases except the one that falls within tho purview of the
said ‘self-satisfaction.’
(b) Or (the second answer to the objection is that), people like those
mentioned in the verse can never feel any self-satisfaction at what is
‘Adharma.’ The mongoose bites only that herb which is an antidote of
poison, and not any other herb; hence the notion that ‘whatever herb is
bitten by the mongoose is destructive of poison.’
(c) (Thirdly) The revered teachers have explained as follows:—What
is meant is that, in cases of optional alternatives, that alternative
should be adopted in regard to which the mind feels satisfied. It is in
accordance with this that the Author will say later on, in connection with
the purification of things and expiatory rites—‘the penance should be
performed until the mind may feel satisfied.’
(d) Or, what is said in the Text may be taken as ruling out the
unbelieving Atheist; as a matter of fact, the Atheist does not feel any
‘self-satisfaotion’ in doing even those aots that are enjoined in the Veda;
hence such acts though done by him are absolutely useless.
(e) Or, what the Text teaches is that in the performance of all
acts, one should have a tranquil mind; i.e., at the time of doing anything
one should keep his mind free from anger, stupefaction, grief and so forth,
and should remain happy. Hence like ‘Śīla’ this also is laid down as
pertaining to all acts.
Explanatory notes by Ganganath Jha
The meaning of ‘Śīla’ and ‘Ācāra’ separately has been the source of much
misunderstanding. The difficulty has been solved by Medhātithi taking the
term ‘Smṛtiśīle, as standing, not for ‘Smṛti’ and ‘Śīla,’but for ‘Smṛti’ as
qualified by ‘Śīla,’ this being ‘freedom from hatred and attachment;’
‘Smṛti—Śīla’ stands for that ‘Smṛti,’ recollection, which the learned have
when their mind is calm and collected, not perturbed by passions of any
kind. The reason suggested by Buhler is not satisfactory.
Kullūka Bhattar has explained ‘Śīla’ as standing for the virtues
enumerated by Hārīta—‘Brāhmaṇa-like behaviour, devotion to gods and Pitṛs,
gentility, kindness, freedom from jealousy, sympathy, absence of cruelty,
friendliness, agreeable speech, gratefulness, being prepared to grant
shelter, mercy, and calmness.’ Nārāyaṇa puts it vaguely as ‘that to which
learned men are prone.’
‘Self-satisfaction’—This is meant to apply to cases where the
scriptures provide options (Medhātithi, Govindarāja and Kullūka);—or to
cases not covered by any of the aforesaid sources (Nārāyaṇa and Nandana).
In connection with this verse, the student desirous of carrying on
further investigation, is advised to read Kumārila’s Tantravārtika, (Bhattar)
Adhyāya I (Translation—Bibliotheca Indica).
Medhātithi (p. 60, ll. 7-8) ‘Tulye śrautatve’—Though in regarding both the
Śruti-rule and the Smṛti-rule to be equally ‘Śrauta,’ ‘Vedic’—Medhātithi
apparently accepts the view of Kümārila as against Śabara (according to
whom’ the Smṛti-rule is not Śruti, but stands on a distinctly inferior
footing),—ultimately his view comes to be the same as Śabara’s—viz., that
in case of conflict between Śruti and Smṛti, the latter is set aside in
favour of the former; while according to Kumārila, there is option.
Medhātithi (p. 63, l. 1)—‘Viśvajit yodhikāravat’—
See Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 6.7.18—19. In connection with the Viśvajit sacrifice
we have the text—‘one should give away his entire property, sarvasva.’ The
conclusion is that the injunction of the giving away of one’s entire
property having been already found in connection with the Jyotiṣṭoma,—at
which one is bound to pay as fee either 1,200 gold pieces or his entire
property,—what the mention of the giving of entire property at the Viśvajit
means is that at this latter sacrifice, the fee must consist of the entire
property, and not of 1,200 gold pieces; and this has been taken to imply
that the man who seeks to perform the Viśvajit must possess more than 1,200
gold pieces.
Medhātithi (p. 64, 1. 4)—‘Indriyāṇām &c’—The first part of this
quotation occurs in Manu 7. 44; but the second half is from some other work.
This verse has been quoted in the Vidhāna pārijāta (vol. II, p.
511) in support of the authority of Sadāchāra, as bearing upon the
propriety of tasamudrā dhāraṇa;—also in the Smṛti kaumudī (p. 1) which
remarks that the Practice of cultured men is authoritative only when it is
not repugnant to Śruti and Smṛti.
The Aparārka (p. 82) quotes the verse in support of the view that the
Practices of Good Men also, as distinct from the Smṛti, are an
authoritative source of our knowledge of Dharma. It is interesting to note
that it reads Vedavit smṛtiśīlatā in place of ātmana stuṣṭireva ca.
It is quoted in the Smṛti candrikā (Saṃskāra, p. 5), which adds the
following explanation:—
Veda is the means of knowing Dharma; so also are the ‘Smṛti’ and
‘Śīla’—i.e. freedom from love and hate,—of persons learned in the
Veda;—‘āchāra’ such as the tying of the bracelet and so forth;—and
‘ātmatuṣṭi’, i. e., when there are several options open to us, it is our
own satisfaction that should determine the choice of one of them.
This is quoted in the Vīramitrodaya (Paribhāṣa, p. 10), which adds
the following note:—
‘Vedaḥ’ is the collection of Mantra and Brāhmaṇa texts, as defined by
Āpastamba;—‘akhilaḥ’, the actual texts available, as also those presumed on
the strength of ‘transference’ and that of ‘Indicative Power’, ‘Syntactical
Connection’, ‘Contest’, ‘Position’ and ‘Name’ (Jaimini iii);—or ‘akhilaḥ,’
‘entire,’ may be taken as meant to preclude the notion that the said
authority belongs only to the three Vedas, and not to the Atharva’, which
is based upon such assertions of Āpastamba and others as ‘Yajña is enjoined
by the three Vedas’. That the ‘Atharva is an authority for Dharma is due to
the fact that it prescribes the performance of the Tulāpuruṣa and other
propitiatory rites for all castes, even though it does not deal mainly with
the performance of the Agnihotra or other Śrauta rites.
—When the text says that these are the means of knowing ‘Dharma’
Right, it implies that they are the means of knowing also what is
‘Adharma,’ ‘wrong’ it being necessary for the scriptures to furnish an idea
of all that is wrong and hence a source of impurity of the mind, which
obstructs the acquiring of true knowledge.—‘Mūlam’, ‘Source’, the means of
knowing;—‘Todvidām’, those learned in the Veda; this implies that in the
case of ‘Smṛti’ and the rest, tḥe authority is not inherent in themselves,
but due to their being based upon the Veda—
‘Smṛti’ the Dharmaśāstra compiled by Yājñavalkya and
others.—
‘Śīla’ implies the thirteen qualities enumerated by Hārīta—viz.,
Faith in Brahman, Devotion to Gods and Pitṛs, Gentility, Harmlessness,
Freedom from jealousy, Freedom from harshness, Friendliness, Sweetness of
speech, Gratefulness, Kindness for sufferers, Sympathy, Calmness. This
‘Śīla’(SEELAM IN TAMIL OZHUKKAM) differs from ‘Ācāra’; it stands for the
negative virtues, the avoidance of wrong, while the former stands for the
positive active virtues; the doing of right
.—‘Ācāra’,( ACARAM HAS SEVERAL MEANINGS; ONE IS DISCIPLINE,
OZHUKKAM; ANOTHER, FOMALITIES IN THE CULTURE RESPECTIVELY; HENCE ACHARA
FAMILY MAY MEAN ALSO THAT FOLLOE the tying of the bracelet during marriage
and so forth.—‘SādhūWING THEIR FAMILY VALUES) am atmana stuṣṭiḥ’, whenever
doubt arises regarding what is right, what determines the question is the
‘self-satisfaction’ of those that are ‘Sādhu’ i. e., have their minds
replete with the knowledge of the Veda and the impressions gathered
therefrom; i. e., that course is to be accepted as ‘light’, which commands
the unanimous approval of the said persons;—such is the explanation
suggested by the Kalpataru.
In support of this view we have the following passage from the
Taittirīya, relating to cases of doubt regarding Dharma,—‘Thou shouldst
behave in that manner in which behave those Brāhmaṇas who are impartial,
honest, steady, calm and righteous.’ This implies the authority of the
Pariṣat ‘Assembly’.—Or ‘sādhūnām’ may be construed with ‘āchāraḥ’, which
would imply the authority also of those ‘good men’—men free from all evil
qualities,—who are not ‘learned in the Veda’; so that for superior Śūdras,
the practices of their forefathers would be
authoritative.—‘Self-satisfaction’ is the determining factor in the case of
options; but this is an authority for the man himself, not for others.
Comparative notes by various authors {meaning various family values
explained as aset of examples)
(Verses 6, 10 and 12) Baudhāyana, Dharmasūtra, 1.1.6.—‘Dharma has been
enjoined in each Veda.’ ‘The second source of knowledge consists of the
Smṛtis.’ ‘The third is what proceeds from the cultured, i. e., those
persons who are free from jealousy and selfishness, fairly well off, free
from avarice, haughtiness, greed, delusion, and anger.’ ‘Those persons are
cultured who have studied the Vedas along with their supplements and who
are versed in the art of making deductions from them; those are the persons
from whom the direct knowledge of Śruti can be derived.’
Gautama, Dharmasūtra, 1.1-2.—‘Veda is the source of Dharma’: ‘the Smṛti and
Śīla of persons learned in the Veda.’
Āpastamba, Dharmasūtra, 1.2-3.—‘The convention of persons knowing Dharma is
authoritative’: ‘and also the Vedas.’
Vaśiṣṭha, Smrti, 1.4-6.—‘In the absence of Śruti and Smṛti, the custom of
the cultured is authoritative’: ‘those persons are cultured whose mind is
free from selfish desires’: ‘that is to be regarded as Dharma which is not
prompted by a selfish motive.’
Yajñavalkya, Smṛti, 1-7.—‘Śruti, Smṛti, the practice of good men,
self-satisfaction determination based upon right volition,—these four are
the source of Dharma.’
Āpastamba, Dharmasūtra, 1.4.7.—‘The Śruti is more authoritative than custom
which derives its authority only from assumption (of corroboration of
Śruti).’
Jaimini, the writer of the Mīmāṃsā-sūtra (1.1.2), has emphatically declared
that the Vedic Injunction is the only trustworthy source of our knowledge
of Dharma, i.e., of what is right, i.e., what is conducive to good,
temporal and spiritual (Vaiśeṣika-Sütra 1.1.2); though he knew of the later
‘lawbooks, Smṛtis, and customs,’ yet he had no hesitation in declaring that
these are to be relied upon only so far as they are not repugnant to
anything declared in the Veda.
Coming to the strictly legal writers we find—1. Baudhāyana, (1.1.1-6)
naming—(a) Veda, (b) the Smṛti, and (2) ‘Śiṣṭāgama,’—the ‘Āgama,’ teaching,
of the ‘Śiṣṭas’ ‘cultured’ men;—i. e., ‘those who are free from
ill-feeling, devoid of vanity, possessed of sufficient grain, not greedy,
devoid of hypocrisy, haughtiness, avarice, stupidity and anger;—those who
have studied, in the right manner, the Veda along with its supplements and
are well versed in making deductions out of them.’
There is no mention of ‘custom’ here at all. It is ‘scripture’ pure and
simple; but no longer the Veda only, but also the Smṛtis, and the
deductions therefrom and teachings based thereupon by persons with very
special qualifications.]
Parāśara, 1.20.—‘At the beginning of each Kalpa, there appear Brahmā, Viṣṇu
and Śiva......... the propounders of (1) Śruti, (2) Smṛti and (3)
Sadāchāra.’
kalpe kalpe kṣayotyattau brahmaviṣṇumaheśvarāḥ |
śrutismṛtisadācāranirṇetāraśva sarvadā ||
To the same end we have Āpastamba (1.1.2-3) declaring that the ‘convention
or opinion of those versed in Dharma’ and ‘also the Veda,’ are the
authority. It only means that when those learned in Dharma are agreed in
regard to the righteousness of a certain course of action, that is to be
accepted as authoritative.
This is made clear by Vaśiṣṭha (1.4-6)—‘In the event of the aforesaid’
(i.e., Śruti and Smṛti) not being available, the practice of cultured men
is the authority,—the cultured man being defined as one who is entirely
unselfish, having no desires of his own.
utama (1.1. 1-2)—‘Veda is the source of Dharma, also the Smṛti
(Recollection) and Śīla of those learned in the Veda.’
*[In all this ‘custom’ begins to be admitted; but only that of the
‘cultured.’]*
The next step in advance is taken by Manu (2.6)—
vido'khilo dharmamūlaṃ smṛtiśīle ca tadvidām |
ācāraśvaica sādhūnāmātmanastuṣṭireva ca ||
Also Vyāsa—
dharmamūlaṃ vedamāhuḥ grantharāśimakṛtrimam |
tadvidāṃ smṛtiśīle ca sādhvācāraṃ manaḥpriyam ||
By this the sources of Dharma are (1) Veda, (2) Smṛti, (3) Sadāchāra and
(4) ‘Svasya priyam.’
[What is exactly meant by these terms we shall see later on.]
The same is recapitulated in Manu (2.12)—
vedaḥ smṛtiḥ sadācāraḥ svasya ca priyamātmanaḥ |
etaccaturvidhaṃ prāhuḥ sākṣāddharmasya lakṣaṇam ||
This is slightly improved upon by Yājñavalkya (1.7)—
śrutiḥ smṛtiḥ sadācāraḥ svasya ca priyamātmanaḥ |
samyaksaṅkalpajaḥ kāmo dharmamūlamidaṃ smṛtam ||
By which the sources of law are fivefold:—(1) Veda, (2) Smṛti, (3)
Sadāchāra, (1) Svasya priyam and (5) Samyak-saṅkalpaja Kāma. [For the exact
signification of these, see below.]
*Thus the sources of Law are: (1) ‘Śruti,’ (2) ‘Smrti’ (3)
‘Sadāchāra’—‘practices of the good’ (with regard to these there is
unanimity among all old authorities), (4) ‘Svasya priyam’ or ‘ātmana
stuṣṭiḥ,’ ‘self-satisfaction.’ In regard to the fourth also Manu and
Yājñavalkya are agreed. In Manu however we find one thing more, which is
not found in Yājñavalkya—viz., ‘Sīla’; and Yājñavalkya speaks of ‘Samyaksaṅ
kalpajaḥ kāmaḥ,’ which is not found in Manu. Vīramitrodaya on Yājña has
identified these two.*
END OF PART 7 KR IRS 14724 15724
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