Preceptors of adcvaitham K RAJARAM IRS 27 9 24 PART 11
------------------------------------------------------
tathāpi anyonyasmin anyonyātmakatām anyonyadharmāṃścha adhyasya
itaretarāvivekena atyantaviviktayoḥ, dharmadharmiṇoḥ mithyājñānimittaḥ
satyānṛte mithunīkṛtya ahamidam mamedamiti naisargiko’yam lokavyavahāraḥ.
[2]: satyam chidātmā, anṛtam buddhīndṛyadehādi, te dve dharmiṇi
mithunīkṛtya yugalīkṛtya ityarthaḥ
[3]: asya anarthahetoḥ prahānāya ātmaikatva-vidyāpratipattaye sarve
vedāntāḥ ārabhyante.
[4]: There is a tradition that the Pañchadaśī is the joint work of
Bhāratītīrtha and Vidyāraṇya. Another view is that it is the work of
Bhāratītīrtha who also bore the title ‘Vidyāraṇya’.
[5]: vedāntavākyamīmāṃsā tadavirodhitarkopakaraṇā niśreyasaprayojani
prastūyate (Sūtrabhāṣya on i, i, 1).
[6]: vedāntamīmāṃsā tāvattarka eva, tadavirodhinaścha ye anyepi tarkāḥ
adhvaramīmāṃsāyām nyāye cha vedapratyakṣādiprāmāṇyapari-śodhanādiṣūktāh te
upakaraṇam yasyāḥ sā tathoktā;
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
ANANDAPURNA-VIDYASAGARA by V. Subrahmania Sastri
Nyāya Śiromaṇi
Śrī Bādarāyaṇa set forth the Vedānta-darśana in his aphorisms by stringing
together the flowers of the Upamshadic texts. And, this darśana is the most
noteworthy among the darśanas. Śrī Śaṅkara enriched it by his commentary on
it. Preceptors of Advaita wrote many commentaries on it; and these
commentaries were supplemented by other commentaries.
In the Advaita literature there are many works which prove the validity of
the import of the Upaniṣads by refuting, on the basis of reasoning, the
objections raised against Advaita by other opposing schools. And these
works are termed Vādaprasthāna.
In the Vādapraathāna the most prominent one is the Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya
by Śrī-Harsha. He proves on the basis of reasoning that the phenomenal
universe is indeterminable either as real or as unreal. All the categories
and their definitions admitted in the Nyāya system are proved to be riddled
with inconsistencies. He says that if one repeats, like a parrot, his
arguments against the Nyāya system then that itself is enough to make the
realists dumb. Whether one who repeats his arguments knows the import of
them or not—it does not matter much.
This work is so complex that it is exceedingly difficult to understand it.
Not only this: the view-points that are set forth in the work are
confusingly interposed. It requires profound scholarship to deal with the
work.
Ānandapūrṇa wrote the commentary Vidyāsāgarī on this work. And this
commentary is superb. It solves all the intricate points deliberately
introduced in the work. Further, it refers to the viewpoints of the Nyāya,
the Prābhākara, the Bhāṭṭa and the Sugata schools and critically examines
them. Thus what was once so complicated and so full of perplexities and
hence so hard to follow, that work has been made much easier to understand
by Ānandapūrṇa.
Varadarāja, the commentator on Udayana’s Kusumāñjalī speaks of Udayana thus:
audayane pathi gahane
videśikaḥ pratipadam skhalati lokaḥ.
This passage means that one who is a foreigner to the Nyāya system falters
at every step in the impenetrable path of Udayana’s philosophy. Ānandapūrṇa
reveals his profound scholarship by explaining the import of the complex
statements of Udayana and the much more complicated points of Śrī-Harsha,
and by making clear the arguments used to refute the definitions of the
categories of the schools opposed to Advaita.
Certain view-points of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system which are not explicitly
referred to and criticized in the Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya are referred to
and criticized by Ānandapūrṇa. The Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya refers to the
intrinsic validity of knowledge and further states that that validity can
be removed only when there arises some counteracting factor— dhiyām svataḥ
prāmāṇyasya bādhakaikāpodyatvāt (p. 145). While commenting on this passage,
Ānandapūrṇa refers to the inferential argument of Udayana that establishes
the validity of knowledge to be extrinsic. And that inferential argument is:
“Validity of knowledge depends upon a cause which is different from the
cause that gives rise to knowledge; because it is a unique kind of effect,
like absence of validity.”
yadapyudayano jagāda—“pramā jñānahetvatirikta hetvadīnā, kāryatve sati tad
viśeṣatvāt, apramāvat” (p. 147).
Ānandapūrṇa proves that this inferential argument is not valid. This
inferential argument is again referred to and criticized on a different
ground while commenting on the passage of the Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya which
refutes extrinsic validity to knowledge and which runs as follows:
“prāmāṇyaparatastvavyudasti prastāve.” (p. 445)
Again, in the Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya it is said that a cause has a śakti to
create an object and the characteristic that determines the existence of
such a śakti is the effect that is going to be produced.
“kāraṇa-śakteścha viśeṣakam asadeva kāryam.” (p. 76).
While commenting on this passage, Ānandapūrṇa refers to the passage of the
Nyāyakusumāñjali of Udayana. The Naiyāyikas do not admit śakti to be a
separate category. Udayana holds that if a cause should produce an effect
then what is necessary is only the absence of any factor that would prevent
the origination of the effect and not the existence of śakti. And
Ānandapūṛna refutes the view of Udayana in detail. The
Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya text deals with the nature of the witness-self
(sākṣī). This provides an occasion for Ānandapūṛna to refer to and
criticise the objection of Aparārka raised in his commentary Nyāyamuktāval
ī on Nyāya-sāra of Bhāsarvajñā.
All the above references have been given to show that Ānandapūṛna refers to
and refutes the view-points of the schools opposed to Advaita although they
are not referred to in the text on which he comments.
Apart from his superb commentary on the amazingly logical treatise of the
Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya, Ānandapūrṇa wrote a commentary on Sureśvara’s
Vārtika on the Bṛhadāraṇyako’paniṣadbhāṣya of Śrī Śaṅkara. The
Bṛhadāraṇyako’paniṣad is replete with reasonings, vast in extent and great
in sense. Śrī Śaṅkara wrote his bhāṣya on it, and Sureśvara wrote his
Vārtika which consists of more than eleven thousand verses. Sureśvara was
mainly concerned with refuting the concept of difference, the views of
Bhartṛprapañcha, and the theory of jñāna-karma-samuchchaya, and also with
establishing the indeterminable nature of the universe and oneness of the
self. And on this Vārtika, Ānandapūṛna wrote his commentary which is known
as Nyāya-kalpalatikā. In this work he explains the Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtras in
the order in which the followers of the Prābhākara school have arranged
them into adhi-karaṇas; and this shows his profound knowledge of the
Pūrva-mīmāṃsā school.
Although he criticizes the view-points of both the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika and the
Pūrva-mīmāṃsā, yet his antipathy is more deep-rooted towards the
Pūrvamīmāṃsā school than towards the Nyāyavaiśeṣika. And the chief reason
for this is that the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā school, unlike the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika
school, does not admit the existence of God.
avidyārabānām tārkihāṇām īśvarakāraṇinām aviveko bahutaraḥ mīmāṃsakānām tu
nirīśvarāṇām bahutamo’vivekaḥ (Nyāya-kalpa-latikā).
He is always averse to any digression from the subject on hand. That is why
he does not explain each and every word of the Vārtika which, by itself, is
elegant in style. He interprets only the important words and he gives the
construction of the sentences only wherever necessary. He prefaces a
succeeding Vārtika by the sense of an earlier Vārtika. He does not thrust
upon the original verses the several theories of Advaita if they are not
relevant. He does not cite the passages that set forth the views of the
schools criticized. In the Vārtika the philosophy of Bhartṛprapañcha comes
in for a good deal of criticism. But very rarely he cites the passages of
Bhartṛprapañcha. He is rather indifferent in identifying the authors of the
schools who are referred to either directly or indirectly in the Vārtika.
For example, in his commentary on the Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya he says that
the aphorism “yugapat jñānānutpattiḥ manaso liṅgam” is that of Kaṇāda. In
fact this is the aphorism of Gautama (1.1.16). Kaṇāda’s aphorism runs as
follows:
“ātmendṛyārthasannikarshe jñānasya bhāvo’ bhāvaścha manaso liṅgam” (3.2.1).
But, as the intended sense is the same and both the systems are more or
less similar, he takes the one for the other.
While commenting on the Bṛhaḍāraṇyaka text
“tameva dhīro vijñāya prajñām kurvīta brāhmaṇaḥ, ”
Sureśvara refers to the view of Maṇḍana.
anye tu paṇḍitam manyāḥ sampradāyānusārataḥ
vijñāyeti vachaḥ śrautam idam vyāchakṣate’nyathā (4.4.796)
While commenting on this verse, Ānandapūrṇa says that the view of
Vāchaspatimiśra is referred to here. Sureśvara who flourished before
Vāchaspati could not refer to him. But since Vāchaspati is considered to be
a close follower of Maṇḍana , Ānandapūrṇa might have identified the two.
This is as it should be, because while commenting on the Vārtika.
nanvatrāpi kṛtaivāsau lyabantenābhidīyate
prajñātaḥ karaṇa tasyāḥ bhūyaḥ kasmānna vidhīyate (4.4.798),
he says that the view referred to herein is that of Maṇḍana,
While commenting on the Bṛhadāraṇyako’paniṣad text “brahmaiva san
brahmāpyeti” (4.4.6) Śrī Śaṅkara says that those who hold that in mokṣa
there is the manifestation of a unique kind of knowledge and bliss must
explain the sense of the word ‘manifestation.’
yepi āchakṣate mokṣe vijñānāntaram ānandāntaram
cha abhivyajyate iti taiḥ vaktavyaḥ abhivyaktiśabdārthah
Here the Vārtika is:
yetu vyāchakṣate mokṣe nityānandaikagochara
jñānābhivyaktirityevam svasiddhāntasarnāśrayāt (4.4.324).
Ānandapūrṇa says that the view-point of Bhāsarvajña is stated here. It is
wrong. The view of Bhāsarvajña who came after Śaṅkara and Sureśvara cannot
be referred to by both. All this shows that Ānandapūrṇa is more concerned
with the view-points than with their authors.
Ānandapūrṇa while refuting the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā school observes that if it is
said that the Upaniṣads are not valid on the ground that they are contrary
to the Śābardbhāṣya, then it can very well be said that the ritualistic
section of the veda is not valid because it is contrary to the import of
the Śānkarabhāṣya. Thus he shows his greatest respect towards Śaṅkara.
Ānandapūrṇa wrote ten works; and they are:
Khaṇḍanāṭīkā (vidyāsāgarī)
Bṛhadāraṇyakavārtikavyākhyā (Nyāya-kalpa-latikā)
Nyāyachandrikā
Brahmasiddhir-vyākhyā (Bhāvaśuddhiḥ)
Samanvaya-sūtra-vṛttiḥ
Pañchapādikā-vyākhyā
Mahāvidyāviḍambanavyākhyā
Nyāyasāravyākhyā
Kāśikā-vyākhyā (Prakṛyāmañjarī)
Mokṣadharmavyākhyā.
By writing commentaries on the works on important schools of Advaita he
provided much material for manana, arguing within oneself about the
validity of the import of the Upaniṣads. Thus he rendered a valuable
service to the cause of Advaita, particularly to those who long for
liberation.
His Vidyāguru was an ascetic by name Śvetagiri. In the beginning of the
Nyāya-kalpa-latikā and the Vidyāsāgarī he salutes him.
Śrīmate gurave śvetagiraye sthānnamaskṛyā (Nyāyakalpalatikā)
vande munīndrān yatibrindavandyān śrīmadgurūn śvētagirin vaṛṣṭhān
(Vidyāsāgarī).
At the end of the Nyāyakalpalatikā also he salutes him.
“śrīmad śvetagirim vande śiṣyadhīpadmabhāskaram.”
At one place he refers to himself as Abhayānanda-pūjyapādaśiṣya. From this
we may take that Abhayānanda was his Dīkṣāguru. Both at the beginning and
at the end of the Nyāyakalpalatikā, he offers his salutations to
Gokarṇeśvara; and from this it is known that he lived in Gokarṇakṣetra.
In the Prakṛyamañjarī he says that he wrote the work when the king Kāmadeva
was ruling over Gokarṇa. This king flourished in 1350 AD. And we may take
that Ānandapūrṇa flourished in 1350 A.D.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
RAMADVAYACHARYA *by *S. SUBRAHMANIA SASTRI M.A.
Rāmādvayāchārya belongs to that galaxy of medieval authors who wrote
independent dialectical works called *prakaraṇas* connected with the *Vedānta,
Sāstra. Vedānta-kaumudī,* published by the Madras University (1955) and an
unpublished commentary on it by himself are the only works available in his
name. A *prakaraṇa* may be smaller or bigger than the *Śāstra* to which it
is connected, but it elaborates a few topics dealt with there.
*Vedānta-kaumudī* fully answers to this definition.
*His Date*
Appaya Dīkṣita of the 16th Century quotes from *Vedānta-kaumudī* thrice,
once by the name of the author and twice by mentioning his work.
Brahmānanda (17th century) the author of *Laghuchandrikā* discussed his
*anumāna* in the establishment of *mithyātva* (illusoriness) of the
universe. Moreover Dr. Dasgupta who was the first to notice the importance
of *Vedānta-kaumudī* refers to two manuscripts of the commentary of the
work, one in Asiatic Society of Bengal and the other in the Bhandarkar
Oriental Research Institute. In both these manuscripts the copying date
given is 1515 A.D. We can therefore take it that the upper limit of the
date of *Vedāwtarkaumud* ī and its commentary (which are by the same
author) is 1500 A.D. His reference to Janārdana who later became Ānandagiri
and his reference to later authors show that he probably lived about 1515
A.D.
Rāmādvaya in his discussions mostly follows the Siddhāntas of the Vivaraṇa
school, but whenever he finds any difficulty he adopts the views of
*Vāchaspati.* Following the *Siddhānta* of the *Vivaraṇa* school he adopts
*:*
i. *niyamavidhi* in respect of injunctions regarding *śravaṇa;*
ii. rise of Brahman-realization directly from the Vedāntas;
iii. *jīvas* as reflections of *Brahman.*
Following Vāchaspati he accepts nescience as many and its location in
*jīvas.*
*Contents of Vedānta-Kaumudī*
The work is divided into four chapters. Brahman-inquiry, the subject-matter
of the first *Brahma-sūtra}* is elaborated in the first chapter. Following
the *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya* of Śrī-Harsha, the author establishes the
eligibility of the Advaitin who views the world as unreal, for taking part
in philosophical discussions. He says that what is required in the
discussions is only the acceptance of categories as they are and not their
absolute reality. Explaining the self-validity of the pramāṇas he *t* hinks
that though the absence of defects is useful it does not conduce to
validity being extrinsic. After an elaborate discussion he supports
Vāchaspatiś view that mind is the means of Brahman-knowledge; but finally
he approves the position taken by the author of the *Vivaraṇa* that
Vedāntas directly give rise to the intu *i* tive knowledge. Taking up the
Advaitin’s stand in respect of illusion, the author condemns all other
*khyātis* and supports *anirvachanīyakhyāti. Māyā* as a positive entity is
established by perception, inference, and scripture. Among the qualities
necessary for eligibility for Brahman-inquiry the author lays stress on
*vairāgya* (freedom from desires). This he says is to be attained not only
by performing the obligatory rites prescribed in the Vedas but also by
voluntary charity of food and clothing beyond one’s means. Interpreting the
agelong saying that by death in Vārāṇasī one gets final release, he says
that death there leads to final release through different phases and not
directly. After an extensive discussion, the author establishes that
sannyāsa āśrama is essential for Brahman-knowledge and is so taught in the
scriptures. But once taken, there is no going back. Taking up the
subject-matter of the *Brahma-śūtra* the author states that the identity of
*jīva* with Brahman is the subject and the whole inanimate world with the
multiplicity of the *jīvas* is unreal. The unreality of the universe is
established on the ground that it is inexplicable either as different or as
non-different from Brahman, its cause. In chapter II the author takes up
the second *Brahma-sutra* for discussion. He declares that the fact that
Brahman is the cause of creation, sustentation, and dissolution of the
world is to be established only by scripture and not by inference as held by
the Naiyāyikas.
The author condemns the inferences of the Naiyāyikas estabhshing *Īśvara* as
the cause as fallacious. Elaborating causality, the author rejects the views
i. that karma is the cause,
ii. that time is the cause,
iii. that nature is the cause,
iv. that *prāṇa* (vital air) is the cause,
v. and that *pradhāna* is the cause.
Incidentally he criticises the views of the Buddhists, the Jainas and the
Pāśupatas in respect of causation.
After thus explaining the *taṭasthalakṣaṇa* he takes up the
*svarūpalakṣaṇa* and
establishes on the basis of scripture and reasoning that Brahman is of the
nature of reality, intelligence, and bliss. He also establishes the
Vedāntic theory that the *mahā-vākyas* give rise to an impartite sense
*(akhaṇḍārtha*).
In the third chapter, the author discusses the proofs for the existence of
Brahman. He holds that *Vedāntas* alone are the proofs. Incidentally he
takes up other *pramāṇas* and discusses their definitions and scope. He
rejects the *anumānas* given by Udayana in his *Kusumāñjalī* as fallacious.
As regards verbal knowledge resulting from Vedic and non-Vedic texts the
author favours *abhihitānvayavāda* of Kumārila in preference to
*anvitābhidhānavāda* of Prabhākara. Taking up the subject of authorship of
the *Vedas* the author declares that the *Vedas* are not of human origin;
even God cannot interfere in their subject-matter or sequence. They are
beginningless. Though they perish in the deluge, there is God who remembers
the *Vedas* of the previous creation and teaches them to Brahmā at the time
of the first creation after the deluge.
In chapter IV the author takes up the fourth *Sūtra* for discussion. In
reply to the contention of the *Mīmāṃsakas* that Vedic injunctions which
tend to human activity (towards good) or abstention (from bad) alone are
valid, and the Upaniṣads which reveal the ever-existent Brahman are not
valid, the *Sūtrakāra* says that the Upaniṣads which are not connected with
any *karma* and which do not set forth any activity are also valid since
they also reveal Brahman whose knowledge gives the final *puruṣārtha.* The
author incidentally defines the sixteen categories enumerated by Gautama.
As regards the nature of Īśvara he accepts the *Vivaraṇa* theory that he is
the *pratibiṃba* (reflection) of Brahman in *māyā*; he is all-pervasive.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
PRATYAGSVARUPA *by *S. R. Krishnamurti Sastri Nyāya, Vedānta Śiromaṇi
In order to keep alive the Advaitic tradition for the benefit of posterity,
many Advaitic preceptors wrote treatises on Advaita; and among them
Pratyagsvarūpa is prominent. His preceptor is Pratyak-prakāśapūjyapāda and
Pratyagsvarūpa praises him as the source of the sacred river *vidyā* that
removes *ajñāna.*
‘*vidyānadīmūlam vidyāgurum*’
Pratyagsvarūpa wrote only one work and that too is a commentary by name
*Nayanaprasādinī* on the *Pratyaktattvapradīpikā* or *Tattvapradīpikā* of
Chitsukhāchārya. The title *Nayanaprasūdmī* is significant, as the study of
this work leads to dear perception by removing blindness in the form of
*ajñāna* and brings forth delectation to the heart.
*ajñānatimirajetrī mānasanayanaprasādinī ṭīkā*
The *Tattvapradīpikā* of Chitsukha closely follows the method of
*Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya* of Śrī-Harsha. To appreciate the place occupied by
Śrī-Harsha, Chitsukha and Pratyagsvarūpa in the history of Advaita in the
post-Śaṅkara period, it is necessary to consider some of the authors who
preceded them in the immediate past—authors who were active in opposing the
new philosophy of Śaṅkara. The latter opponents of Śaṅkara and his school
fall into two main groups—the Buddhists and the Naiyāyikas. These two
formed the main targets of the criticisms of the Advaitins in the five or
six centuries immediately following Śaṅkara. In the field of Nyāya there
was a revival of activity which was directed mainly against the concept of
*jagan-mithyātva.* In the times before the 13th or 14th century, if we may
draw a rough demarcation like that, the orthodox *darśanas* and
particularly the Nyāya were concerned with opposing the Buddhist schools.
After this period when the influence of Buddhism waned, the attention of
the orthodox schools turned in a more pronounced manner against each other.
Different schools of Vedānta developed and the controversies in the field
of philosophy were concerned with these differing stand-points within the
fold of Vedānta. The renewed activity in the field of Nyāya may be said to
have received a fresh impetus from the new technique developed by one
Kulārka-paṇḍita in his *mahāvidyānumāna.* Śrī-Harsha, Chitsukha,
Ānandapūṛna, and Pratyagsvarūpa appeared on the scene at this stage and
opposed the Buddhistic and Nyāya schools. At the end of the 14th century,
Advaita definitely triumphed over the other schools and reached its highest
point
While the *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya* following the *vitaṇḍa* type of
discussion only refutes the view-points of other schools, the
*Tattvapradīpikā* explains and establishes the Advaitic concepts also. It
critically examines the view-points of the orthodox and heterodox schools.
And, the Nyāya school comes in for a good deal of criticism. The
*prāchīna-nyāya* works are replete with the discussions regarding the
nature of the soul. The *Tattvapradīpikā* critically reviews them. While
commenting on these portions, Pratyagsvarūpa refers to the works, and the
authors, and he cites the relevant passages. One Nyāya writer
Vādivāgīśvara, the author of the work *Mānamanohara* is severely criticised
by Chitsukha and Pratyagsvarūpa. The *Tattvapradīpikā* examines the views
of the Nyāya works that are not examined by the *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya.* And,
Pratyagsvarūpa while commenting on these sections, gives the names of the
works and authors. While the *Tattvapradīpikā* refers to a particular
view-point and criticises it, Pratyagsvarūpa in his commentary gives all
the possible arguments in favour of the opponent’s view-point and later
proves them to be unsound. The greatest contribution of Pratyagsvarūpa to
Advaita lies in this that all the objections that are raised later by the
dualistic schools have already been anticipated and answered by him.
Like the commentator Ānandapūrṇa-Vidyāsāgara, Pratyagsvarūpa also is
indifferent to the identity of the authors of the views he examines. For
example, while examining the Nyāya conception of liberation in the fourth
section of the *Tattvapradīpikā,* Pratyagsvarūpa refers to a passage from
the *Yogasūtra*-*bhāṣya* and says that Patañjali is the author of that
passage,[1]
<https://www.wisdomlib.org/hinduism/book/preceptors-of-advaita/d/doc62880.html#note-e-32768>
which
he is not. At the end of each *pariccheda,* Pratyagsvarūpa gives a verse
summarizing the subject-matter of the entire chapter. Later Brahmānanda in
his commentary on the *Advaitasiddhi* adopts this method.
The *Tattvapradīpikā* freely uses the ma *hā-vidyānumāna.* And
Pratyagsvarūpa employs this type of syllogism while discussing not only the
Nyāya school but also the view-points of the other schools. As has been
stated already, the *Tattvapradīpikā* deals with the views of the
*prācliina-nyāya* . And this provides an occasion for Pratyagsvarūpa to
explain the theories of *prāchīna-nyāya.* While dealing with the theory of
error and the concept of liberation of the Buddhistic school,
Pratyagsvarūpa cites passages from the works of the Buddhistic school. A
careful study of this work undoubtedly yields profound knowledge of both
the orthodox and heterodox schools of thought. This author closely follows
the *Vivaraṇa* school. The *Tattvapradīpikā* establishes that *tamas* is an
object of visual perception. Pratyagsvarūpa raises the objection that this
view is against the conclusive view of Advaita that *tamas* is an object of
the witness-self (*sākṣī*), and holds that the author Chitsukha shows his
power of reasoning *(yuktivaibhava)* here.
Of all the concepts of Advaita, the concept of *avidyānivṛtti* is the most
difficult one to understand. The *Tattvapradīpikā* deals with this. Three
theories are prevalent in Advaita, and they are:
(i) *avidyānivṛtti* is identical with Brahman,
(ii) It is different from Brahman; but it is not real in the sense in which
Brahman is, nor unreal in the sense of an absolute nothing, nor real and
unreal at once. It is also not *anirvachanīya* because *avidyā* is
*anirvachanīya* and so its removal must be something other than
*anirvachanīya.* So *avidyānivṛtti* is a fifth kind,
(iii) It is of the nature of the intuitive knowledge of Brahman that
annihilates *avidyā.* All these three theories are advocated by
Vimuktātman. Maṇḍana prefers the last view.
‘*vidyaiva vādvayā śāntā tadastamaya uchyate.*’[2]
<https://www.wisdomlib.org/hinduism/book/preceptors-of-advaita/d/doc62880.html#note-e-32769>
Pratyagsvarūpa while commenting on this section sets forth an argument to
prove the soundness of the last view. He says that annihilation of a
particular thing as a separate category is neither seen nor intelligible
except the rise of the annihilating factor. Knowledge of *Brahman* is the
annihilating factor of *avidyā* and *avidyānivṛtti* is identical with
knowledge of *Brahman.*
*na hi virodhyudayam antareṇa virodhinivṛttirnāmānyā dṛśyate yujyate vā*.
Pratyagsvarūpa wrote only one work and that too a commentary. But this
commentary can be considered to be an independent treatise on Advaita. And
thus he occupies a unique place in the history of Advaita.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx K Rajaram IRS 27924
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Thatha_Patty" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To view this discussion on the web visit
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/thatha_patty/CAL5XZoo%3DsHvww1FnPf6sOy%2BJTPQv42DUjs84STHta6w3O%3DJkGw%40mail.gmail.com.
