PRECEPTORS OF ADVAITGHAM BY KR IRS PART 1 /10/ 24 RANGA RAJA[1] <https://www.wisdomlib.org/hinduism/book/preceptors-of-advaita/d/doc62893.html#note-e-32814> *by *S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri MA. (Madras), B.Sc. (Oxon), Bar-at-Law
Nīlakaṇṭha Dīkṣita, the famous litterateur, and minister of Tirumala Nāyak, refers in his *Nala-charitra-nāṭaka*[2] <https://www.wisdomlib.org/hinduism/book/preceptors-of-advaita/d/doc62893.html#note-e-32815> to one of his ancestors, Raṅga Rāja, as the author of several works, such as the *Advaitavidyāmukura* and the *Vivaraṇadarpaṇa.* This Raṅga Rāja is none other than the son of Āchān Dīkṣita and the father of the celebrated Appayya Dīkṣita. From the latter’s acknowledgement of indebtedness to his father’s instruction, it is evident that Raṅga Rāja was a scholar of no mean order; but the only reference to his works seems to be in the *nāṭaka* above-mentioned, and there is little direct knowledge of the works themselves. The Oriental Manuscripts Library at Mysore has the proud distinction of owning a fragmentary copy of the *Mukura,* under the title *Advaitamukura.*[3] <https://www.wisdomlib.org/hinduism/book/preceptors-of-advaita/d/doc62893.html#note-e-32816> The *Vivaraṇadarpaṇa* of which there is a single manuscript in Nandināgari script—again fragmentary—in the Tanjore Palace Library,[4] <https://www.wisdomlib.org/hinduism/book/preceptors-of-advaita/d/doc62893.html#note-e-32817> is probably the work of Raṅga Rāja. It is here sought to give an account of the contents of the manuscript of the *Advaitamukura* as now available to us in the Mysore Library. Like the *Advaitasiddhi* of Madhusūdana, it is an attempt to reestablish Advaita by answering dualist attacks. The topics covered are almost the same as those treated in the *Siddhi* , in the first hundred pages (of the Kumbakonam edition). The arguments met are the same; and the similarity very often extends to the replies too. Such differences as there are belong to the order of treatment. The refutation of the superiority of perception, the application of the *apaccheda-nyāya,* etc., thus occur at the very end of Raṅga Rāja’s exposition, while Madhusūdana finds a place for them early in his discussion. The pūrvapakṣin’s position is stated in one lot by Raṅga Rāja, while Madhusūdana lets it develop gradually in answer to various replies of the Siddhāntin. But the nerve of the argument is the same in both writers. It is impossible to judge conclusively on the material before us, which of these is indebted to the other; while the agreement not merely in the *pūrvapakṣa* but also in the siddhānta precludes the position that each was absolutely independent of the other. It would appear necessary to postulate at least a common source of inspiration for both writers, a source we have so far not discovered. Another tantalising problem set by the manuscript is that of Raṅga Rāja’s identity with the Advaitavidyāchārya mentioned so frequently by Appayya in the *Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha.* The name might have been applied to Raṅga Rāja, either because of his authorship of the *Advaitavidyāmukura* or because Appayya got his Advaitavidyā from his father.[5] <https://www.wisdomlib.org/hinduism/book/preceptors-of-advaita/d/doc62893.html#note-e-32818> The matter could be settled if one could trace to the *Mukura* any of the doctrines attributed distinctively to the Advaitavidyāchārya. But the fragment we have of the *Mukura* does not treat any such topic and we are still left in the region of conjecture What we have of the first *pariccheda* is roughly divided into eleven sections. The first of these deals with the interpretation of scripture as favouring non-dualism. The well-known six marks of purport are mentioned and their consilience shown in respect of non-dualism. Duality though perceived is not ultimate. Scriptural affirmation of what is in the scope of perception would be repetitive and purposeless. It is not as though a new duality is affirmed; for there is no novelty about this duality; and the cognition of duality is fraught with evil besides, as made clear in more than one unambiguous scriptural text. Opponents of non-dualism who indulge in the distortion of patently non-dualist texts like *tat tvam asi* come in for severe criticism by our author. The pluralist seeks to establish the reality of the world on the ground of its being known, on the analogy of Brahman. The difficulty in all such arguments is that the *probans* “being known by a *pramāṇa* that apprehends absolute reality” is not established. Perception which apprehends the here and now cannot apprehend such reality as is unsublatable in all three times. That inference can apprehend it is yet to be proved. Scripture does apprehend it, but not as belonging to the world; further, it sublates any inferred absoluteness of the world. It is not as though Īśvara’s immediate cognition of the world guarantees its reality; for His immediacy need be no more than that experienced by the juggler in respect of his tricks; knowing the illusory as illusory, He is not deluded.[6] <https://www.wisdomlib.org/hinduism/book/preceptors-of-advaita/d/doc62893.html#note-e-32819> The next task attempted is the establishment of illusoriness by inference grounded on cognisability, inertness and finitude. The five definitions of illusoriness are mentioned and explained in much the same way as in the *Advaitasiddhi*.[7] <https://www.wisdomlib.org/hinduism/book/preceptors-of-advaita/d/doc62893.html#note-e-32820> The discussion owes much to the *Tattvapradīpikā* and is much in the same style as the *Siddhi* The illusoriness of illusoriness is treated at some length. The sublator need not always be real, as, in the case of a rope, the snake-delusion is sublatable by a stick-delusion. The self too is the substrate of illusory illusoriness inasmuch as the Bauddhas and others have the delusion that it is illusory. But with this the self is not reduced to the same level as the world, since the reality of the former is due to self-hood and self-manifestation, not to sublated illusoriness. Illusoriness is on a par with knowability, etc., in its capacity to cover both itself and that of which it is predicated.. Illusoriness is part of the world; when the world is shown to be illusory because of cognisability, etc., illusoriness which is a par *t* of the world is also shown to be illusory. The three *probans* — cognisability, inertness, and finitude — are examined in some detail. The discussion is not very different from that of the *Siddhi.* A point of some interest relates to yogic perception. The dualist is fond of exploiting this type of perception to cover cases of impossibility like toe perception of the *tuccha;* our author is willing to concede this; yogins may perceive the *tuccha,* but they would perceive it as *tuccha* ; i.e., as not practically efficient, unlike nacre-silver, etc.; in this there is no detriment of Advaita. It is true Chitsukhāchārya seems to deny yogic perception, but that is only an *abhyupetya-vāda;* for we must admit an omniscient Īśvara to whom everything is immediate. The next section relates to the refutation of the allegation that the Advaitin’s *probans* is affected by an adjunct. The matter covered is the same as that treated by the *Siddhi,* in the two sections on *sopādhikatva-bhaṅgaḥ* and *ābhāsa-sāmyabhaṅgaḥ*.[8] <https://www.wisdomlib.org/hinduism/book/preceptors-of-advaita/d/doc62893.html#note-e-32821> The arguments are almost identical. Are these *probans* themselves illusory or not? If not, there is failure of non-dualism. If they too are illusory, how can they establish anything? This discussion covers the same ground as two sections of the *Siddhi*[9] <https://www.wisdomlib.org/hinduism/book/preceptors-of-advaita/d/doc62893.html#note-e-32822> and employs nearly the same arguments. The Advaitin seeks to strengthen his position by setting forth indirect arguments (*tarka*) in favour of the illusoriness of the world. One such argument is that if the world were independently real there would be no possibility of the cognition thereof, since no real relation is intelligible between knowledge on the one side and an inert reality standing over against it on the other. Our author is never tired of pointing out that Brahman’s reality is self-manifest; it does not depend on the illusoriness or non-illusoriness of relation to anything else; and the illusoriness of the world follows not because its relation to knowledge is illusory, but because it is cognisable, inert, and so on. This is the basic ground. Hence it is that no parity can be made out between Brahman and the world even on the ground of indeterminability. The manifestation of particular objects at stated times and through specific means is held by the opponent to be a difficulty the Advaitin cannot lightly get over. The Advaitin replies that since self-manifest intelligence is beginninglessly obscured by nescience, whose existence is not inconsistent with *svarūpajñāna,* it is necessary for defined intelligence to go forth through sense-channels in the form of a long ray of light as it were, in order to pervade and take on the form of each object so that the ignorance enveloping it may be destroyed. Since the generation, going forth and pervasion of the psychosis is spatially and temporally determined, there may be *pratikarma-vyavasthā.* The position is not free from difficulties, but the *Mukura* successfully answers all the objections like the *Siddhi.* For a fuller discussion the author refers us to his *Vivaraṇaprakāśa* . The pluralist too has recourse to *tarka* to disprove non-dualism. The consideration of the *pratikūla-tarkas* constitutes the next section. The *pūrvapakṣin* also mentions conflict with scriptural texts about creation of the world, etc., by Īśvara. This is met, in the same way as in the Siddhi, by the analogy of the juggler, who resolves on and creates his magic world in a certain order and so on. The author of the *Mukura* brings in here a discussion of the relation of Īśvara and *jīva,* adopting the view of the first section of the *Pañchadaśī,* which treats both as reflections. The final section of the first *pariccheda* is concerned with the refutation of the validity of perception, etc., in regard to absolute reality. Where there is perception of finites as real, it is the reality of Brahman that is manifest therein. Unsublatability in all three times cannot be known by perception which can tell us at best that sublation hag not arisen so far, not that if does not exist. Practical efficiency, as has been often said, is no warrant for absolute reality, as even the rope-snake causes fear and trembling. The difference between the empirically real and the merely apparent consists in sublatability by Brahman-knowledge alone or anything short of that. We do not subscribe to the view that all scripture is superior to perception, but only that purportful scripture is so superior; purportfulness is determined by non-subsidiariness to any other purpose. Though the manuscript is fragmentary and the present account is but a meagre outline, enough has been said, it is hoped, to show the great interest of the work both from the historical and the doctrinal sides. It is not improbable that other fragments at least exist elsewhere. Though much of the dialectic survives in the monumental work of Madhusūdana, Raṅga Rāja's treatment has a directness and charm which make it worthy of being resuscitated and made better known. On the assumption that both derived from a common source of inspiration, the *Mukura* is likely to throw light on points that are obscure in the *Siddhi* despite Brahmānanda’s voluminous comment. For this and other reasons, it is hoped that experts in the collection of manuscripts will bestir themselves to find a complete version of the *Advaitavidyāmukura.* [1] <https://www.wisdomlib.org/hinduism/book/preceptors-of-advaita/d/doc62893.html#note-t-32814>:An adaptation of the paper *The Advaitavidyāmukura*, published in *Collected Papers of Professor S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri*, University of Madras, 1961. [2] <https://www.wisdomlib.org/hinduism/book/preceptors-of-advaita/d/doc62893.html#note-t-32815>:See edition in the Bālamanorama Series, p. 3. [4] <https://www.wisdomlib.org/hinduism/book/preceptors-of-advaita/d/doc62893.html#note-t-32817>:No. 7064, in the Descriptive Catalogue by P. P. S. Sastri. The present paper owes much to the information supplied by this scholar and by Mr. M, Hiriyanna. [5] <https://www.wisdomlib.org/hinduism/book/preceptors-of-advaita/d/doc62893.html#note-t-32818>:the former alternative is more likely because of the use of the appellation “advaitavidyā-kṛṭah” in some places; see *Siddhāntaleśa* (Kumbakonam edition); p. 272. [9] <https://www.wisdomlib.org/hinduism/book/preceptors-of-advaita/d/doc62893.html#note-t-32822> :On *asatas sādhakatvo-’papattiḥ* and *asatas sādhakatvā-’bhāvabādhakam*. Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx II NRISIMHA BHATTOPADHYAYA[1] <https://www.wisdomlib.org/hinduism/book/preceptors-of-advaita/d/doc62894.html#note-e-32823> *by *S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri M.A. (Madras), B.Sc., (Oxon), Bar-at-Law Towards the close of the first chapter of the *Siddhāntaleśa-saṅgraha,* its author, Appayya Dīkṣita, devotes a considerable amount of space to the exposition of the view of a Kavitārkika-chakravarti Nṛsimha Bhaṭṭopādhyāya. Though the author's main purpose in that work is the statement of rival Advaita views and not any appraisal of these, yet he indicates, here and there, at least that amount of criticism of a doctrine, as is immanent in the formulation of a rival view. The exposition of the Chakravarti’s views is remarkable not merely for its length, but also for the absence of any criticism thereof. One feels that the Dīkṣita was probably in great sympathy with the doctrine expounded. This feeling is confirmed when one turns to the *Parimala* on the *adhyāsa-bhāṣya,* especially the position relating to such illusions as the yellowness of the shell and the bitterness of sugar. Here, the Dīkṣita offers an interpretation of Vāchaspati, which, though quite consistent with what he says, is not quite clear from his own words or from those of his commentator, Amalānanda; and the words used by the Dīkṣita, in his exposition, are practically those he puts in the mouth of the Chakravarti, in the *Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha.* Appayya Dīkṣita’s interest would warrant one in holding that the Chakravarti was an Advaitin of some eminence; and even a slight examination of his views, as set forth by the Dīkṣita, confirms our impressions. It is all the more surprising that nothing more has come down to us about this Vedāntin, except the name and a second-hand exposition of his views. We shall now set forth the views of Nṛsimha Bhaṭṭopādhyāya as expounded in the *Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha* . External sense-perception, for the Advaitin, consists in the intelligence that is specified by the internal organ flowing out through the sensory channel and taking on the form of the external object perceived. One of the many questions that arise in this connection is the need for this flowing out *(bahir-nirgamana)* of the psychosis *(vṛtti).* What exactly does it achieve? One answer is that it brings about the identification of the cognising intelligence with the object-intelligence or that it manifests the non-difference between the intelligence that perceives the object and the intelligence that is Brahman. Another answer is that the outgoing psychosis destroys the ignorance that envelops the object, and by thus removing the hindrance to knowledge brings about knowledge. This view has the merit of conforming to the general Advaita position that the function of psychosis is primarily negative, that knowledge is not produced so much as manifested by the removal of obstacles thereto. But it is not without its difficulties. One of these relates to a continuous stream of cognition *(dhārā-vāhikajñāna)* relating to one and the same object. Here, the first psychosis in the stream destroys the ignorance veiling the object. What about succeeding psychoses? What is there for them to destroy? If they do not destroy any ignorance, are they really psychoses at all? The discussion is of some interest and one answer goes so far as to say that the succeeding psychoses are not authoritative, relating as they do to what is already apprehended, and that, hence, the question is of little importance. With this difficulty we are not here directly concerned. The problem of illusion, however, presents more serious trouble, for, it requires the co-operation of knowledge and ignorance. There can be no illusion except on a given substrate and this substrate *(adhiṣṭhāna)* must evidently be known. And the illusion itself is the product of ignorance; ignorance is its material cause *(upādāna).* If the act of cognition which makes us aware of the substrate destroys ignorance relating to the object, then there can be no cause for the illusion at all. If it does not destroy ignorance about the object, what else does it do? It may be possible to say that of the two aspects of an existent, existence and content, existence alone is apprehended by the first psychosis, and that ignorance not being wholly dispelled, there is room for a second mental act which relates the *that* to a wrong *what,* superimposes an unsuitable content of the given substrate. The reply is not very satisfactory, for the question is as to what the ignorance relates to, in such a perception as ‘this is silver’, in the case of nacre. Does it relate to the this-ness of the confronting substance? If so, the psychosis does not dispel any ignorance. If not, and if the ignorance relates only to the content, the *what* of the perceived *that,* then the illusion should be of the form ‘nacre is silver’, *not* ‘this is silver’, as we find in experience. To get over this difficulty, a distinction is resorted to by some writers[2] <https://www.wisdomlib.org/hinduism/book/preceptors-of-advaita/d/doc62894.html#note-e-32824> between the substrate *(adhiṣṭhāna)* and the support *(ādhāra)* of the illusion, the latter appearing in the illusory cognition, not the former; in the cognition of nacre as silver, this-ness is the support and nacreity is the substrate, the latter being that to which the ignorance relates. The distinction is cumbrous and has little to recommend it. And greater plausibility attaches to the view of some others who resort to the well-known distinction between the obscuring and projecting powers of nescience and hold that though the psychosis relating to this does dispel ignorance in its obscuring aspect, ignorance continues to exist and function through its projecting aspect; hence the illusion. Here steps in Nṛsimha Bhaṭṭopādhyāya, saying that the whole question is misconceived, since there are not two psychoses at all, one relating to the *that* and another to the superimposition of an erroneous *what* on the *that.* What comes to us is essentially one cognition, relating to a *that* in conjunction with a *what,* not to the *that* alone or to the *what* alone. This is but reasonable, for we never cognise immediately the bare existence of anything. The knowledge of existence comes to us, if at all, only along with the knowledge, more or less determinate, of some property or properties. If the knowledge is very indeterminate, we have doubt; if it is determinate, but the properties are net really those of the object, there is illusion. The illusory experience is due to the contact of a defective sense with the object before us. What happens in such a case is that, because of the defect, the distinctive features of the object are not perceived and their place is taken by other properties supplied from memory. Thus, in the shell which is seen, but not as white, because of a defect in the sense of sight, yellowness is supplied from memory; so too, when the child finds its mother’s milk to be bitter, the bitterness, though not previously experienced in this life, is supplied from the impressions of a former existence. The sense-element and the memory-element together constitute the object of a single act of cognition. That is why one says ‘I see this to be silver’,—‘this sugar tastes bitter to me’. There is no such experience as that of the bare substrate *(adhiṣṭhāna*), that being impossible in the case of the shell, for example, since the sense of sight which apprehends colour must apprehend the shell as possessing some colour or not at all. Nor is the *what* experienced immediately as such, as will be evident from such experiences as ‘the lump of sugar tastes bitter.’ The lump of sugar in so far as it is not experienced as sweet is the object of the tactile sense; the bitterness is a former taste-experi-ence, which is synthesised with the present actually experienced sugar, in a single act of cognition. Nor does this view become indistinguishable from the view of the Naiyāyikas that what is perceived in error is what exists elsewhere; for, on their view, the illusory silver, being merely existent elsewhere, cannot be an object of immediate experience, whereas we do say that it is so experienced, not, however, as existing elsewhere, but as the content of the single psychosis produced simultaneously with it, by nescience, which is set in motion through the act of cognition. Again, in the experience of the shell as yellow, it is not the yellowness of the bile in the eye that is perceived; for, if that were the object of perception, neither the shell nor its relation would be the object of perception; and such a conclusion conflicts with experience. Nor does the yellowness go forth with the bile through rays from the eyes and envelop the object; for, once this is done, the shell should be perceived by all and sundry as yellow, as if it were gold-covered. The only hypothesis, then, which fits the perceptual nature of the superimposition and the non-perceptual nature of the *what* by itself would seem to be the recognition of a single psychosis embracing the perceived *that* and the remembered *what* Any modem psychologist would recognize this synthesis of sensed and associated elements as characteristic of all perception. The only difference in the case of illusion would be that the functioning of the sense-organ is defective. Illusion is a defective variant of perception, not a correct perception of the *that,* with an incorrect perception of the *that* and the *what* super-added to it. It may be said that at least in those cases of illusion where similarity is the cause, as in nacre being mistaken for silver, the knowledge of the *that* is the cause of the illusion and must come before the illusion; for, knowledge of similarity presupposes knowledge of what are similar. The discussion of the whole question is interesting. The essence of the reply is that recognition of similarity is no part of super-imposition. A blue expanse of water is seen where there is but a sandy waste; water is super-imposed on sand and blueness is super-imposed on the water, which, if present, would be really colourless. There is no similarity which determines either of these super-impositions. Either the sense fails to perceive or the mind fails to attend to those details of the object which would clearly show it to be a sandy waste; and the blueness and wateriness of other experiences are cognized along with the *that* noted defectively by the sense of sight So too, when nacre is mistaken for silver, all its properties except its glitter fail to be noted; and because of the glitter, silveriness is super-imposed thereon. What is called similarity and what determines the association with silveriness is really the partial identity with silver, in the matter of its glitter. Were the identity realized to be but partial, there would be but recognition of similarity, not super-imposition. A bar of steel lying in a treasury is thus mistaken for a bar of silver. Here, again, is a realization of the psychological truths that association is purposive and that association by similarity is in truth bu *t* a case of association by partial identity. Vāchaspati Miśra, in the *Bhāmatī,* seems to waver between two. explanations of the experience of the yellowness in the shell. He mentions the yellowness of the bile which goes out through rays from the eyes; he mentions also the yellowness experienced on previous occasions in the heated ball of iron, etc. He leaves us in doubt whether the yellowness of prior experience is superimposed or whether the identical reference *(sāmānādkikaraṇya)* of the former experience of the yellow iron ball is super-imposed on the shell and the yellowness of present experience. The question in that context is whether there is any element of prior experience at all in the illusory cognition of the shell as yellow. So long as the identical reference at least comes from prior experience, the question is answered in the affirmative; and it need not be shown further that the yellowness itself comes from prior experience. But to treat the yellowness as present in the bile and cognized through that would lay the theory open to the criticism urged by the Chakravarti (whose criticism was probably directed against Vāchaspati himself). Appayya Dīkṣita makes out, therefore, that criticism like that of the Chakravarti (whom he does not mention by name in the *Parimala*) may be directed against the Tārkikas (who are *anyathākhyāti-vādins)* and not against Vāchaspati. For Vāchaspati, the yellowness too comes from prior experience, like that of the heated iron ball. The earlier commentator, Amalānanda, appears not to have noticed any such difficulty. Appayya Dīkṣita’s own interpretation of Vāchaspati’s doctrine is not as satisfactory, as it is ingenious; for, if yellowness is not cognized from its presence in the bile, there is no reason for its being mentioned as present in the bile, which goes with the rays from the eyes. Even assuming that this was the view of the Tārkikas, there was no need for Vāchaspati to mention it, except to approve or to condemn; and approval may not unreasonably be assumed, in the absence of condemnation. On the assumption that Nṛsimha Bhaṭṭopādhyāya was criticising Vāchaspati, and that he was not noticed by Amalānanda, he should be assigned to some period between the latter and Appayya of Amalānanda. The present writer’s attention has been drawn by Dīkṣita. At the earliest, he might have been a contemporary his colleague, the Professor of Indian History, to two inscriptions[3] <https://www.wisdomlib.org/hinduism/book/preceptors-of-advaita/d/doc62894.html#note-e-32825> in a Viṣṇu temple at Śrī Kūrmam, Ganjam District. They commemorate the erection of a tower *(prāsāda)* and the gift of money for perpetually feeding a lamp, by the wife of one Nṛsimha Bhaṭṭopādhyāya, a contemporary of King Anaṅga Bhīma and a famous performer of sacrifices *(sarva-kratu-suyājin*). The date of the endowment for the lamp is Śāka 1205 (1283 A.D.). This is not an improbable date for our Kavitārkika-chakravarti. In the absence of further details, it is not possible to be sure of the identification. It is to be hoped, however, that more details will be made available about one who made such significant and valuable contributions to Advaita thought. [1] <https://www.wisdomlib.org/hinduism/book/preceptors-of-advaita/d/doc62894.html#note-t-32823>:An adaptation of the article ‘A Little-known Advaitin’, published in *Collected* Paper *of Professor* S. S. *Suryanarayana Sastri,* University of Madras, 1961. Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx III APPAYYA DIKṢITA *by *Y. Mahalinga Sastri M.A. B.L. Among the three great Draviḍa āchāryas who expounded the Advaita philosophy, the earliest is known only by quotations from his lost commentaries. The second was Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda himself. Śrīmad Appayya Dīkṣita was the third. He also forms another venerable trio along with Śrī Kaṇthāchārya and Haradattāchārya as an expositor of Śaivism. But the real mission of his life was the reconciliation of creeds, cults, and philosophies. He was a peace-maker who pleaded for harmony, tolerance and mutual goodwill and understanding. He was born in a very hot age of bigotry and vigorous proselytism. The fight was all about the Supreme God and the conception of Salvation. In actual life the warring sects were unified by an unquestioned allegiance to the śruti and the smṛti. The sectarian disputes did not stop with the growth of polemical literature. Persecution of one sect by another with political backing was not of rare occurrence. The lives of the great leaders of either Śaivism or Vaiṣṇavism during the ten centuries from the 6th to the 16th, afford ample evidences of stormy times, when either of the creeds had to endure great hardships from the fury of the rival which for the nonce got the upper hand as the oppressor. Though the greatest saints did not discriminate between Śiva and Viṣṇu and declared them identical, the adherents of the creeds were mostly cantankerous and mistook acrimony for devotion. Waves of conversions rose and fell. It was Vaiṣṇavism that was aggressive in its proselytising tendencies, being impatient for universal expansion. South India was seized with one such fervour when Rāmarāya was regent of Sadāśiva, the nominal ruler of the Vijayanagar empire. Rāmarāya was completely under the influence of Śrī Tātāchārya, the Rājaguru. During his times and during the times of the inheritors of the fragment of the empire after the battle of Talikota, mass conversions took place engineered by the Rājaguru under state patronage. Śrī Appayya Dīkṣita in his *Nigrahāṣṭakam* says that the leader of the Vaiṣṇavas had taken a resolute vow to stamp out Śaivism from the land. The *Prapannāmṛtam,* a work of one Anantāchārya, which purports to record the history of Vaiṣṇavism and the lives of the āchāryas, refers to Śrī Appayya Dīkṣita as living at Chidambaram, resplendent with fame and unassailable by controversialists, sectarian or philosophical, and proceeds to state that to refute his great works on Śivādvaita and Advaita Śrī Tātāchārya wrote a work called *Pañchamatabhañjanam* and Mahāchārya wrote a work called *Chaṇḍamārutam* and thus both of them defended the creed of Śrī Ramanuja against his attacks. This *Pañchamatabhañjana* Tātāchārya lived for about 75 years from 1508. He was not alive in 1585, for the ceremony of coronation of Venkatapati in 1585 was performed by his adopted son Lakṣmīkumāra Tātāchārya who was at that time only fourteen years old. The elder Tātāchārya wielded influence in the court as Rājaguru during the reigns of Sadāśiva (1542—1567), Tirumala (1567—1574), and Śrī Raṅga (1574-1585). Śrī Appayya Dīkṣita lived from 1520 to 1593 as will be shown below. He was younger to Tātāchārya by twelve years and outlived him by about ten years. Their lives ran together during the major part of the 16th century. During all the years of Śrī Tātāchārya’s supremacy Śrī Appayya Dīkṣita is not known to have had anything to do with the Vijayanagar Court. After 1585, when Venkatapati was reestablishing the glory of Vijayanagar and the younger Tātāchārya was the Rājaguru, Śrī Dīkṣita was invited to the court and was held in great honour, During the thirty years after the middle of the 16th century, when the controversies raged high, Śrī Appayya Dīkṣita enjoyed the patronage of Chinna Bomma Naik of Vellore, who soon after the battle of Talikota established himself as an independent monarch with considerably enhanced power and glory. Śrī Appayya Dīkṣita lived the longest period under the patronage of Chinna Bomma, as his own literary references show. Śrī Dīkṣita wrote not less than a dozen works on Śaivism during the period, of which the *Śivārkamaṇi-dīpikā* is his magnum opus, comparable in bulk and importance with his *Parimala.* Both are commentaries interpreting the *Brahmasūtra* of Vyāsa. *Parimala* aligns itself to the Advaitic interpretation and the *Śivārkamaṇi-dīpikā* expounds the Śivādvaita philosophy of Śrīkaṇṭhāchārya. On the completion of this monumental work Śrī Appayya Dīkṣita was bathed in gold by King Chinna Bomma. This significant event is referred to in the works of some contemporary poets and also in the Adayapalam inscription dated 1582 A.D. >From the inscription we learn that Chinna Bomma made endowments for the maintenance of a college of 500 scholars who studied *Śivārkamaṇi-dīpika* under Śrī Dīkṣita himself thus equipping themselves for the Śaivite propaganda work which had been organised with a view to stemming the tide of Vaiṣṇavite attacks and encroachments. Śrī Appayya Dīkṣita was thus the guiding spirit of a great movement in which he banked upon the services of a large band of trained volunteers who could disseminate among the masses the philosophy and worship which gave supremacy to Śiva, in the face of Vaiṣnavite onslaughts against it. He threw himself heart and soul into the mission for several years together in the prime of his life often facing occasions of grave personal danger, with undaunted courage and faith He preached, organised and wrote incessantly, enlisted the cooperation of enlightened monarchs, undertook frequent travels and challenged his adversaries to stand their ground in open disputation. He brought to bear on his wide-spread activities his resourceful and versatile personality and tried his best to constitute an atmosphere of spiritual tolerance and goodwill in the place of the prevailing antipathies and narrow-mindedness. The *Nigrahāṣṭaka* is a thrilling piece of passionate poetry gushing out of his heart charged with desperate courage and faith, in an extremely critical situation of belligerency with his religious adversary. Śrī Dīkṣita thoroughly investigated the Vedas, Āgamas and the Purāṇas and brought together authoritative statements which dealt with Śiva’s supremacy in the trinity. He composed very charming works dealing with the glories of Śiva and his worship and wrote his own commentaries on them. His *Śikhaṛṇimālā* and *Śivatattvaviveka, *his *Śivakarṇāmṛta, *his *Rāmāyaṇa-tātparya-saṃgraha, Bhārata-tatparya-saṃgraha* and *Brahmatarkastava. *his *Śivamahimakalikāstuti* and *Śivādvaitanirṇaya,* belonged to this category. Śrī Dīkṣita relied to a large extent on the Purāṇic lore for supporting his conclusions conducing to the harmony of the sects and consolidation of a synthesis. He linked the Purāṇic teachings with the Upaniṣadic thought and proved them identical. He did all this without resorting to strained subtleties of argument and without displaying the heat of controversial temper, but in a spirit of calm and dispassionate search for truth. The *Śivarahasya* refers to Śrī Dīkṣita’s historic mission as the resuscitator of *Śaivaśāstra* when it shall become practically extinct on earth, in these words *“śaivaśāstram tadā bhūmau luptam vistarayiṣyati”.* It is no wonder that Śrī Dīkṣita is known as *Śrīkaṇthamatapratiṣṭhāpanāchārya.* After writing all these works which are partial to Śiva, Śrī Appayya Dīkṣita declared with a ring of genuine regret that he was obliged by the circumstances of the times to plunge into prolonged sectarian controversies with the Vaiṣṇavas, while, left to himself, he would have been quite happy to have remained a steady exponent of Advaitic philosophy all through. His verse uttered in this mood can thus be translated— “whether it is Viṣṇu or Śiva who is the supreme deity spoken of by the Upaniṣads, etc., we are not very much worried about, because we are definitely committed to Advaitism. But it is impossible for one like me to keep quiet when men with perverted minds proclaim in abusive language their hatred toward Śiva—a hatred which consumes their hearts like a conflagration. To refute their offensive presumptions, I had to take up cudgels against them. But this does not in the least mean that I am not a devotee of Viṣṇu”. Śrī Dīkṣita’s impartiality is borne out by many facts. He was a great admirer of Śrī Vedānta Deśika. He wrote a commentary on the *Yādavābhyudaya* —the only commentary so far known and published. He is said to have written a commentary on *Pudukāsahasra* also. His hymn in praise of Varadarāja is well known. In the *Kuvalayānanda* he invokes the blessings of Mukunda at the commencement of the work. When Rāmarāya at the instance of Doddāchārya restored the worship of Govindarāja in the Chidambaram temple of Naṭarāja, Śrī Dīkṣita welcomed with all his heart the event and wrote his *Hari-hara-stuti* in commemoration of it. The verses, by the alternating epithets definitely manipulated, suggest *Hari-hara-abheda.* In his *Ratnatrayaparīkṣā,* he conceded Brahmatva to Viṣṇu also along with Īśvara and Ambikā, while it is well known that the other sects place Śiva only in the jīvakoti. In this work, he supports his stand by ample quotations from the Purāṇas—the *Kūrmapurāṇa* being not the least of them. His Viṣṇu-Gaurī synthesis was not an ingenious invention of his. He claims for it the undoubted authority of antiquity and the sanction of all the sacred lore. Even in philosophical speculations he did not think that the rival interpretations were entirely in the wrong, for he declares— *na sūtrāṇāmarthāntaramapi bhavadvaryamuchitam*. —(who can prevent different interpretations when the Sūtras are capable of yielding different meanings). Such was his tolerance in religious beliefs and such his ardent desire for the reconciliation of philosophic thoughts. He wrote the *Chaturmatasāra* to elucidate the philosophical thought respectively of the four prominent schools of interpreters of the Vyāsa-sūtras. The *Nayamañjarī* deals with Advaita; the *Nayamaṇimālā* with Śrīkaṇṭhamata, the *Nayamayūkhamālikā* with Rāmānuja’s philosophy and the *Nyāyamuktāvalī* with Madhva’s philosophy. His remarkable catholicity of outlook and thoroughness of method, his impartiality and absence of prejudice, his unerring sense of values and not the least of all, his earnest search for the truth, shorn of all bias or petty-fogging, are all evident in these writings—so much so, the Vaiṣṇavas have adopted the *Nayamayūkhamālikā* as a manual for their reverent study, and the Mādhvas, the *Nyāyamuktāvalī.* From the heights of his philosophic enlightenment, Śrī Dīkṣita saw in the different methods of approach elements lending themselves to a reconciliation and not to mutual exclusiveness and hostility. After he had done his best to settle the sectarian disputes, Śrī Appayya Dīkṣita turned to writing works for the elucidation and uplift of Advaita philosophy. His greatest and most memorable work in this line is the *Parimala,* commentary on the *Kalpataru* of Amalānanda. *Kalpataru* is itself a commentary on Vāchaspati-miśra’s *Bhāmatī* . *Bhāmatī* is a gloss on the Bhāṣya of Śrī Śaṅkara. These four commentaries along with the original *Brahmasūtra* constitute the *Vedānta Pañchagranthi,* a formidable fortress of Advaita philosophy. Śrī Dīkṣita was induced to write this commentary by Śrī Nṛsiṃhāśrama an esteemed elderly contemporary, himself an author of several works on Advaita. This celebrated work earned for Śrī Dīkṣita the title of *Advaitasthāparvāchārya.* His *Nyāyarakṣāmaṇi* and *Siddhāntaleśasaṃgraha* are very popular Vedāntic texts studied by students of Vedānta invariably. He enshrines in them rare concepts and comments in Advaita which he had learnt from his revered father. Śrī Dīkṣita’s name and fame can rest for ever on any one of his works, but his writings are innumerable. He had been described as the author of one hundred and four works— *Chaturadhika-śataprabandhakartā.* Though many of his writings have not been recovered, the more important of them have been preserved to us and the majority of the survivors have been brought out in print, in grantha, Nāgari and Telugu characters. Special mention must be made of Śrī Dīkṣita’s contribution to the growth of the Mīmāṃsā Śāstra. Khaṇḍadeva the founder of the modern school of Mīmāṃsā wrote his *Kaustubha* a few decades after the life of Śrī Appayya Dīkṣita. He reverentially refers to Śrī Dīkṣita as Mīmāṃsakamūrdhanya, the most authoritative among the writers on Mīmāṃsā. The *Vidhirasāyana* and the *Kuvalayānanda* take us to the last patron of Śrī Appayya Dīkṣita, Venkaṭapati-devarāya of Penukonda who ascended the throne of the Vijayanagar empire in 1585. Śrī Dīkṣita wrote both these works at the instance of Venkaṭapati whom he refers to in highly eulogical terms. In the *Vidhirasāyana* Śrī Dīkṣita clearly indicates that his life’s work has been done and nothing more remains for him to be desired and that still he kept contact with courts of kings not for any benefit for himself, but for promoting the interests of others deserving his help. The chief among those whom he introduced to Venkaṭapati for patronage was Śrī Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita. Bhaṭṭoji, the author of *Siddhāntakaumudī,* came to the south to study Vedānta and Mīmāṃsā under Śrī Dīkṣita whose immortal works had already spread his fame in the north. A very interesting story is told about the first meeting of Bhaṭṭoji with Śrī Dīkṣita. Śrī Dīkṣita was in musty clothes, looked very poor, and lived in an unostentatious house in his village. Bhaṭṭoji could not believe that he was the far famed Appayya Dīkṣita before whom mighty monarchs bowed, who was the teacher of thousands of pupils and an author of a hundred works. But when the conversation proceeded he found that he was before the great man who was not, only the unrivalled master of all the Śāstras but the maker of new pathways in all the Śāstras. This anecdote shows that Śrī Appayya Dīkṣita remained practically poor in the midst of competing royal patronage. Bhaṭṭoji remained for some years in the south. He wrote *Tattvakaustubha* at the instance of Venkatapati and as a commemoration of his discipleship under Śrī Appayya Dīkṣita. There was no branch of knowledge including literary criticism and lexicon to which Śrī Dīkṣita did not make valuable contributions. His *Kuvalayānanda* and *Chitramīmāṃsā* are the favourite texts of the students of *Alaṃkāra Śāsra.* Not less than fifty of his works are current, and it is a good fortune that almost all of his magnificent writings are not only in print but are ardently studied even today by pandits aspiring for eminence. Śrī Dīkṣita was not only a great śāstraic scholar, but also a poet of a very high order. His poetic style is elegant and charming, and his mastery of the verse form is wonderful. His expression is simple, natural and flowing. Great mystic efficacy is attached to his *Durgā-chandra-kalā-stuti* and *Ādityastavaratna.* His *Varada-rājastava* scintillates with gems of Alaṃkāras and his gloss over it deserves to be classed as Alaṃkāraśāstra. There is an interesting story about his *Ātmārpaṇastuti.* It bears the alternative name of *Unmattapañchāśat,* which means, “Fifty verses composed during a state of madness”. It is said that Śrī Dīkṣita wanted to make self-examination of his sincerity and depth of devotion to God. He contrived to enter into an inebriate state by drinking a cup of the dhattūra juice, after instructing his disciples to observe his behaviour and write down his utterances under the influence of intoxication. His utterances took the form of a devotional outpouring in which he made self-surrender to God Almighty, describing his woes as one subject to the ills of mundane life and praying for the final release from the bonds of Saṃsāra. His *Apīta-kuchāmbā-stava* is hallowed by a tradition. It relieved him of a fever which he caught during a tour to Tiruvaṇṇamalai. The *Hariharastuti* has a historical significance as already stated. The *Śivamahimakalikāstuti* incorporates Mīmāṃsānyāyas in a string of devotional verses. Mannargudi Raju Sastrigal has provided it with an erudite commentary explaining the Mīmāṃsānyāyas. The *Mānasollāsa* is a caution addressed in dejection and despair to one’s own mind importuning it to make the best use of the birth as human being for the realisation of the true goal of life. His *Mārgabandhustotra* is a popular prayer for safety during journeys as his *Ādityastavaratna* is for health. Śrī Dīkṣita spent his last days at Chidambaram. Living at some suburban village, he came every day for Naṭarāja’s darśana. He was running his seventy third year when he left the mortal coil. A story is current handed over by tradition among the Dīkṣitas of the temple of Naṭarāja, that one day Śrī Appayya Dīkṣita was seen to pass over the Pañchākṣara steps rather unusually and to the wonder of the spectators, to vanish into the image of Śrī Naṭarāja; and lo! the news was soon abroad that Śrī Dīkṣita had passed away at his residence. Śrī Dīkṣita’s birth was due to the grace of Naṭarāja; and he, when leaving the earth, became one with Naṭarāja. The last words of Śrī Dīkṣita are remembered in the form of a verse. “I am happy to die at Chidambaram which is a most holy place. My sons are learned and cultured. They have done some scholarly work. I am full of years and have no desires to be fulfilled. My only wish is to reach the lotus feet of Śiva.” Immediately the vision of the ruddy light of the raised foot of Naṭarāja dancing in the golden hall rose before his mental eye and while he described the wonder with gushing joy in a half verse his eyes closed. His sons completed the unfinished verse declaring that the great soul reached the final beatitude at the conclusion of the teeming darkness of the night of Saṃsāra infested with frightful nightmares. Śrī Dīkṣita was held in high esteem and reverential awe even by his religious adversaries. There are contemporary references to him in the writings and utterances of Śrī Nīlakaṇṭha Dīkṣita, Chinna Appayya Dīkṣita, Samarapuṅgava Dīkṣita, Guru Rāma Kavi, Bālakavi, Rājanātha Ḍiṇḍima Sārvabhaumakavi and others, and in the Adayapalam inscription. He was regarded even in his times as an Avatārapuruṣa. Legends grew around his life and they are preserved in Śrī Śivānandayati’s *Dīkṣitendra-vijayam,* a Champu Kāvya written in the later half of the 19th century. Mannargudi Raju Sastrigal’s *Chatuśślokī-vyākhyā* has preserved a quotation from a lost biography of Śrī Dīkṣita, giving the clue to his date. It is a tag of a verse and runs thus: *vikrame bhūtalam prāpya vijaye svargamāyayuḥ.* Vikrama to Vijaya in the 16th century is 1520 A.D. to 1593 A.D. That Śrī Dīkṣita lived full 72 years is clearly declared by Śrī Nīlakaṇṭha Dīkṣita. *dvāsapatatiṃ prāpya samāḥ prabandhān śataṃ vyadhād appayya dikṣitendrāḥ.* If we take his royal patrons chronologically they cover the same period of the 16th century A.D. His first patron(?) Chinna Timma was the Viceroy of the Vijayanagara Empire in the south having sway over Tanjore, Madura, and Travancore, with his head-quarters at Trichinopoly, till about 1550. Śrī Dīkṣita according to his own statement wrote the commentary on the *Yādavābhyudaya* at Chinna Timma’s instance. The second patron of his, Chinna Bomma, ruled at Vellore from about 1549 to about 1578. He is mentioned by Śrī Dīkṣita in more than one of his writings. The third and the last patron of his was Veṅkaṭapati of Pennugonda who began to rule from 1585. Śrī Dīkṣita refers to Venkaṭapati in his *Vidhirasāyana* and *Kuvalayānanda.* The Adayapalam inscription of 1582 refers to him as an author of a hundred works. Of his contemporary religious adversaries Tātāchārya lived from 1508 to about 1583. Vijayīndra Bhikṣu entered Samādhi in 1595 after a long life. His first patron was Chevvappa of Tanjore and the last patron(?) Veṅkaṭapati of Pennugonda. Vijayīndra wrote one hundred and four works to rival Śrī Appayya Dīkṣita’s one hundred and four works. He should have been an younger contemporary of Śrī Dīkṣita. Vijayīndra was one of the greatest religious personalities of the age. It is said that he and Śrī Appayya Dīkṣita were intimate friends in spite of their academic rivalries, Śrī Vādirāja a co-pupil of Vijayīndra and head of one of the Udipi mutts who lived from 1480 to 1600 also wrote works defending Dvaita against the attack of Śrī Appayya Dīkṣita. Bhaṭṭoji the disciple of Śeṣa Kṛṣṇa was a very much younger contemporary and disciple of Śrī Dīkṣita. The story about Śrī Dīkṣita meeting poet Jagannātha at Banares is untrue and unhistorical. Jagannātha came a century after Śrī Dīkṣita. Śrī Śivānanda unconsciously gives us a clue to the true date of Śrī Dīkṣita. He says that Śrī Kṛṣṇadevarāya and Āchārya Dīkṣita died in the same year 1529 and that when his grandfather died Śrī Dīkṣita was nine years old. He was evidently quoting these dates from a lost biography or a tradition based upon it, but the historical significance of the date escaped his notice. 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