PRECEPTORS OF ADVAITHAM PART KR IRS 3/10/24 CONTD
DHARMARAJADHVARIN by P. Nagaraja Rao M.A., D.LITT.
In the great line of post Śaṅkara Advaita thinkers Dharmarāja has a
definite and important place and his contribution to the aids for rational
understanding of Advaita is considerable and significant. He is assigned to
the 17th century A.D. He belongs to the village Kaṇḍramāṇikkam of the
Tanjore district in South India. Dharmarāja was a great scholar of Nyāya
and Vedānta and enjoyed great reputation as a scholar who wrote a number of
works some of which have not yet been traced. His works include a
commentary on Gaṅgeśa’s *Tattvachintāmaṇi*. His greatest work is the
epistemological manual of Advaita called *Vedāntaparibhāṣā.* His work has
been the gateway for understanding the essentials of Advaita-Vedānta, from
the point of view of epistemology *(pramāṇaśāstra).* His work is an
excellent account of Advaita, under two heads, theory of knowledge and
ontology. He develops the theory of knowledge portion in seven chapters and
in the last two chapters he describes the ontological categories.
Dharmarāja’s work has brought to the forefront the fact ignored by many
that Advaita is not based on mere facile intuition founded on scriptural
declarations. It is a system of thought that can be logically sustained and
interpreted so as to secure, intelligibility to the reader. The
pre-occupation of Indian thinkers with the concept of *mokṣa* has kept away
from the view of many, rich logical material of the system. A study of the
logical treatises of the system is not only capable of regaling the most
ardent lover of metaphysics but also on occasions baffles the expert. The
logical approach does not lead to any other end.
Śrī Śaṅkara raises the question
“whether Advaita can be established only by scriptural evidence or whether
it can be proved by reasoning as well”.
He writes,
‘How it is possible to prove the validity of Advaita by reasoning’
is shown in the chapter on Advaita. The āchārya has always asked us to be
critical and not accept things blindly.
He holds
“that any one who adopts any view without full inquiry will miss his aim of
beatitude and incur grievous loss”
{KR advaitam kiṃ āgamamātrena pratipattavyam āhosvit tarkeṇāpi ity ata
āha śakyate tarkevāpi jñātum..tatra avichārya yat kiñchit pratipadyamāno
niśreyasāt pratihanyeta anartham cha iyāt.}
In this context it becomes clear to us how important epistemology is
for understanding any philosophical system. It is the “portal to
metaphysics”. What the *pramāṇas* cannot teach us is not knowledge in the
normal sense. Scripture becomes authoritative only because its truth gets
affirmed by experience. Dharmarāja makes a detailed study of all the
problems of knowledge in his manual which continues to be the standard
invaluable treatise on the subject.
Dharmarāja explains the following problems: —What is the nature of
knowledge? What is its origin? How does it arise? What are its instruments?
How is the sense-object related to the cognizer? What is the test of the
validity of cognition? What causes illusion? How is non-existence known?
What is the way to the knowledge of ultimate Reality?
Knowledge in the primary sense of the term is pure consciousness beyond the
relativity of the knower and the known. It illuminates all objects. It is
self-luminous and self-existent. It is non-relative and non-dual. All the
instruments of knowledge function because of it. The soul is the
combination of the sākṣī and antahkaraṇa. It is the complex form and it is
the empirical soul which knows and moves in the world.
Knowledge in this system is expressed in the form of *vṛttis* , which is a
blend of internal organ and sākṣin. It is antaḥkaraṇa alone that undergoes
modal transformations and it is termed vṛttijñāna. The vṛtti flows out in
the case of external objects and gets itself determined by the object or it
assumes the form of the object itself. When the vṛtti coincides with the
object we have knowledge. The fact that a single consciousness principle is
delimited as object and as subject and as the knowing process leads to the
avoidance of the problems of dualism.
It is difficult to cover all the important issues raised by the author.
Nothing can replace the study of the manual itself. The system has accepted
six instruments of knowledge.
1. pratyakṣa (perception),
2. anūmāna (inference),
3. śabda (verbal testimony).
4. upamāna (comparison),
5. arthāpatti (presumption),
6. and anupalabdhi (apprehension of non-existence).
Each of the pramaṇas is treated in detail. The chapter on perception is the
most difficult. Brahman-realisation is likened to perceptual knowledge. It
is not the perceptual knowledge which implies the intervention of the sense
organ. It is self-knowledge. The problem whether ‘mind’ is a sense organ is
discussed. The two schools, *Bhāmatī* and *Vivaraṇa,* hold different views
on the subject.
The necessity for regarding upamāna, arthāpatti and anupalabdhi as
independent pramāṇas is discussed along with the arguments to prove that
they cannot be brought under inference or perception. The work of
Dharmarāja has attracted the academic students of Advaita of our
universities and it has been the subject of many English works. The
contribution of Dharmarāja has given us a right royal approach to the study
of Advaita. Among the important works in English that are based on
Dharmarāja’s book are Professor Datta’s *The Six Ways of Knowing* (1932);
Swami Satprakashananda’s *Methods of Knowledge* (according to Advaita) with
an introduction from Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan and foreword from Dr. Huston
Smith (1965); N. K. Devaraja’s *An Introduction to Śaṅkara’s theory of
Knowledge* (1962). Besides these works we have standard English
translations of Dharmarāja’s *Vedāntapavibhāṣā* by Professor S. S.
Suryanarayana Sastri and Swami Madhavananda. Among the great interpreters
of Advaita Dharmarāja occupies an illustrious position; and the study of
his work confirms the rationality of the system and fullness of its
treatment.
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RAMAKRISHNADHVARIN *by *V. Swaminathan M.A., M.LITT.
Rāmakṛṣṇādhvarin the author of the *Vedāntaśikhāmaṇi* hailed from
Kaṇḍaramāṇikkam, a village in the Nannilam taluk of Tanjore district. He
was the son of Dharmarājādhvarin who had established himself as a great
writer on Advaita through his monumental work, *Vedāntaparibhāṣā.* He was a
Kauṇḍinya by descent and a Ṛgvedin by religious discipline.
Unlike in the case of some of the celebrated teachers of Advaita, the
determination of the date of Rāmakṛṣṇa is not beset with much difficulty.
There is some positive evidence on the basis of which a fairly accurate
date may be arrived at. In the *Vedāntaśikhāmaṇi* Rāmakṛṣṇa quotes
Nṛsimhāśrama’s *Bhāvaprakāśikā,* a commentary on the
*Pañchapādikāvivaraṇa* Rāmakṛṣṇa’s
date, therefore, may be taken as settled if evidences are conclusive enough
in settling the date of Nṛsimhāśrama in-as-much as he was the
grand-preceptor of Dharmarāja. Dharmarāja’s mention of his grand-preceptor
Nṛsiṃhāśrama and his disciples’ victory over the upholders of difference in
the opening verses of the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā.* is undoubtedly a reference to
Nṛsiṃhāśrama, author of the *Bhedadhikkāra.* Nṛsiṃhāśrama himself gives Sam.
1604 (A.D. 1547) as the date of completion of his *Tattvavīveka.*
Nṛsiṃhāśrama’s *Advaitadīpikā* has been referred to by Appayya Dīkṣita in
his *Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha* one of the works of his early days. By the time
the *Siddhāntaleśasaṅgmha* was composed Nṛsiṃhāśrama might have attained
celebrity as a great authority and become of ripe old age as to have been
referred to in respectable terms. Appayya Dīkṣita’s date has been settled,
without any fear of controversy, as A.D. 1520—A.D. 1592. Rāmānanda who
flourished in the later half of the sixteenth century quotes Nṛsiṃhāśrama’s
commentary on the *Pañchapādikā* in his *Bhāṣyaratnaprabhā* In view of all
this and allowing a full span of life commensurate with the mass of his
writings Nṛsiṃhāśrama might be placed between A.D. 1470 and A.D. 1550.
Dharmarāja who comes two generations later may be assigned to the later
half of the sixteenth century and consequently Rāmakṛṣṇa may be placed in
the last and the first quarters of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
respectively.
Rāmakṛṣṇa belonged to the illustrious line of teachers and pupils who had
expounded Advaita with great zeal and had enriched Advaita literature with
their inestimable contributions. Dharmarāja was a profound scholar in all
the darśanas and in his life time he enjoyed a high reputation throughout
the subcontinent as a versatile writer on Nyāya It seems he held the title
Nyāyābdhi (ocean of logic) and his *Tarkacūḍāmaṇi* a commentary on the
*Tattvachintāmaṇiprakāśa* of Ruchidatta won the appreciation of his
contemporaries as a work of great merit. His other works on Nyāya are: (1)
*Prakāśa,* a commentary on the *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa* of Śaśadhara, and (2)
*Yuktisamgraha,* an independent work on anumāna. His Nyāya works have
almost sunk into oblivion, and he is now remembered only for the
*Vedāntaśikhāmaṇī.* Dharmarāja studied under several preceptors among whom
he mentions only one by name, viz., Venkaṭanātha a resident of the village
of Velāṅguḍi in Kumbhakoṇam taluk. His grand-preceptor was the famous
Nṛsiṃhāśrama the author of several polemical works on Advaita. Rāmakṛṣṇa
had the unique good fortune to study under his own father and to assimilate
and master the entire mass of śāstraic learning from his father alone
Rāmakṛṣṇa was born in an atmosphere charged with living Vedic traditions
and vigorous intellectual activity in the realm of śāstraic learning. The
whole region of the Cauvery delta wherein is situated the village of
Kaṇḍaramāṇikkam was adorned by numerous scholars who had distinguished
themselves by their erudition in various branches of
learning. Kaṇḍaramāṇikkam itself was the home of śrotṛyas who were well
versed in the Vedas, devoted to the perpetual maintenance of the śrauta
fires and the performance of śrauta sacrifices and highly proficient in the
śāstras as to have blown up their opponents in debates. The living śrauta
practices of his time did not fail to impress upon Rāmakṛṣṇa. Realising
fully, the place assigned to the karmakāṇḍa in the scheme of
Brahman-enquiry, Rāmakṛṣṇa substantiated some of the precepts of the
karmakāṇḍa. For purposes of meditation and worship which presumes a
personified God (saguṇa Brahman) he, like his father, chose Śrī Rāma. His
strict adherence to Advaita did not in any way deter his belief in the
efficacy of the karmakāṇḍa or worship of a personified God.
Endowed with a penetrative intellect coupled with critical vision and
tutored by his father, a versatile scholar who inherited the of śāstraic
wisdom from an illustrious line of teachers, R *ā* makṛṣṇa shaped into a
sound scholar of a very high order. Even a cursory reader of his
*Vedāntaśikhāmaṇi* will be struck with his mastery over the subtleties of
navya-nyāya. The *Vedāntaśikhāmaṇi,* particularly its Śabdapariccheda,
bears ample testimony to his versatility in Pūrvamīmāṃsā. His erudition in
other systems of philosophy, orthodox as well as heterodox, is no less than
that of his in Nyāya or Advaita even though his references to them in the
*Vedāntaśikhāmaṇi* are only occasional. As such, it is legitimate to expect
from the facile pen of a many-sided genius as Rāmakṛṣṇa, substantial
contributions to the various schools of philosophical thought.
Only four works of Rāmakṛṣṇa have come down to us so far. They are
*Nyāyaśikhāmaṇi
Nyāyadarpaṇa, Vedāntasāraṭīkā,* and *Vedāntaśikhāmaṇi.*
*1. Nyāyaśikhāmaṇi:* This is a commentary on the *Prakāśa* of Ruchidatta
which itself is a commentary on the *Tattvachintāmaṇi.* The available
manuscripts of *Nyāyaśikhāmaṇi* do not extend beyond the pratyakṣakhaṇḍa
and we have sufficient grounds to believe that Rāmakṛṣṇa commented on the
pratyakṣakhaṇḍa alone. Manuscripts of Dharmarāja’s *Tarkachūdāmani* that
have come to light so far, contain only the three sections, anumāna,
upamāna and śabda. The absence of manuscripts of *Tarkachūḍāmaṇi* for the
pratyakṣakhaṇḍa and the existence of manuscripts of *Nyāyaśikhāmaṇi* for
the pratyakṣakhaṇḍa alone establish, beyond doubt, that Dharmarāja
commented upon the last three sections of *Prakāśa* and Rāmakṛṣṇa on the
pratyakṣakhaṇḍa alone with a view to make the work complete. Further, each
of the three sections of the *Tarkachūḍāmaṇi* opens with separate
invocatory verses; but the fact that the anumānakhaṇḍa alone opens with
verses supplying some autobiographical information becomes intelligible
only on the presumption that Dharmaraja commenced the *Tarkachūḍāmaṇi* with
the anumānakhaṇḍa and deliberately excluded the pratyakṣakhaṇḍa from the
preview ot his commentary for reasons unknown. *Nyāyaśikhāmaṇi* is a
voluminous work displaying the author’s skill in argumentation and, command
over the navya-nyāya terminology.
*2. Nyāyadarpaṇa:* This is a gloss on the Pūrvamīmāṃsā-sūtras offering
detailed explanations on the sūtras. Unfortunately, only a fragment
comprising the second pāda of the first adhyāya and a portion of the third
pāda has come to light so far.
*3. Vedāntasāraṭīkā:* This, as its name indicates, is a commentary on the
*Vedāntasāra* of Sadānanda. Manuscripts of this work are extremely rare. We
have not come across any notice of it except the one found in Volume I of
Aufrecht’s catalogus catalogorum. It is premature to say anything on the
authorship and nature of this work without an access to the manuscript or
extracts therefrom.
*4. Vedāntaśikhāmaṇi:* This is a commentary on the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* of
his father and enjoys wide popularity, even today, among those who study
Advaita on traditional lines. In the *Vedāntaśikhāmaṇi* the author sets
himself to interpret and examine the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* on thoroughly
critical lines besides offering comments on the text. He analyses every
issue in a remarkable manner and arrives at the judgement only after wading
through a long chain of arguments and counter-arguments. His approach to
problems is characterised by originality and independence; when occasion
arises he does not hesitate to disagree with the text and offer his own
opinion. On several occasions finding the text, as it were, inadequate to
bring about the desired purport he suggests corrections or interprets the
text in such a way as to yield the expected purport. The accuracy of the
definitions as given in the *Paribhāṣā* is tested by subjecting them to a
severe criticism and when they fail the test he presents them in a revised
form or offers new ones in their stead On occasions when the text
presupposes or passess over matters with a mere mention he takes pains to
present the issue in as complete a manner as possible He has defined
several important terms silently passed over in the text. Whenever there is
demand he supplements the text lest it should fall short of completeness
and clarity. He demonstrates through a long process of reasoning the
untenability of the rival schools when the *Paribhāṣā* dismisses them with
a single stroke of the pen. To establish a philosophical standpoint he
adduces all possible proofs. The *Vedāntasikhāmaṇi* is really a critical
evaluation of the *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā* and while dealing with the text
Rāmakṛṣṇa has taken the attitude of rather a *vārtikakāra* than of a mere
*vivaraṇakāra.*
His chief objective in writing the *Śikhāmaṇi* is to provide a sound
logical basis to the Advaita doctrines as set forth in the
*Paribhāṣā.* Sometimes
he establishes Advaitic doctrines on purely rationalistic grounds. One of
the striking characteristics of the *Śikhāmaṇi* is its employment of
dialectical ways of reasoning and discussion. Rāmakṛṣṇa’s use of dialectics
has a twofold purpose-first, to explode the doctrines of rival systems of
philosophy, and secondly, to establish Advaita on a firm pedestal. To
demonstrate their untenability the doctrines of the opponents are resolved
into so many possible alternatives and by a senes of arguments each one of
the alternatives is shown to involve self-contradiction or absurdity.
Dialectical ways of reasoning in Advaita is as old as Śaṅkara. Rāmakṛṣṇa,
in his dialectics, effects a harmonious blending of the subtlety of
Chitsukha and the force of Nṛsimhāśrama, the reputed dialecticians whose
works have influenced his thought and style to a large extent. A study of
the *Śikhāmaṇi* affords one a good training in Advaita dialectics and
prepares him for a study of the advanced dialectical works of Nṛsiṃhāśrama,
Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, Brahmānanda, and others.
The special feature of Rāmakṛṣṇā’s dialectics is that it is dressed in the
style and language of navya-nyāya. Keeping rāmakṛṣṇādhvarin himself abreast
with the spirit of his times he found it necessary to use the language of
navya-nyāya. The nyāya atmosphere pervades the whole of the *Śikhāmaṇi.* The
definitions furnished by it are strictly in conformity with the navya-nyāya
way of defining things. Rāmakṛṣṇa deems it necessary to restate, in nyāya
terminology, some of the definitions given by the *Paribhāṣā* in ordinary
language. In his opinion a definition has to be formulated in accordance
with the tenets of one’s own school of thought A mere definition can never
bring something into existence; only what is existing already could be
brought within the scope of a definition In argumentation he makes
effective use of the canons of logic. Sometimes he dexterously makes use of
nyāya concepts as apt analogies in establishing his standpoint
Though in general he directs his talents in refuting the nyāya standpoints
still he sometimes shows a sympathetic and accommodative attitude towards
some nyāya concepts. He accepts the definition of Vyapti as enunciated by
the Naiyāyikas also. Dharmarāja rejects the kevalānvavī and kevalavyatirekī
types of inference on the ground that the definition of the former violates
the metaphysical position of Advaita and the latter, in essence, is not
different from arthāpatti. Rāmakṛṣṇa however accepts, after suitably
amending the definition, kevalānvayī without, in any way, affecting the
Advaitic stand-point Kevalavyatirekī he admits as a variety of inference
and draws the boundary of the provinces of kevalavyatirekī and
arthāpatti. Regarding anupalabdhi Rāmakṛṣṇa has taken rather a bold stand
which is opposed to the traditionally accepted Advaitic dictum ‘*vyavahāre
bhattanayaḥ*’ He rejects the claims of anupalabdhi for its status of an
independent pramāna His justification of his father’s acceptance of
prāgabhāva as a variety of abhāva is also against the general Advaitic
position as advocated by Nṛsiṃhāśrama, Appayya Dīkṣita and a host of other
writers In the definitions of ākāṅkṣā and tātparya he effects a synthesis
of the Advaitic and nyāya views after disclosing their inadequacy when
taken individually
The free display of reasoning, frequent recourse to inferential proof,
mastery over the nyāya canons of argumentation and dialectics, adoption of
nyāya style and language and the accommodative attitude towards some of the
nyāya doctrines have made some of the modern scholars brand Rāmakṛṣṇa as
more of a naiyāyika of the controverting type than a true Advaitin.
A closer perusal of the *Śikhāmaṇi* will make one realise how unsound and
superficial this charge is. Our author is aware of the limitation of logic
in transcendental matters; he never fails to cite the relevant śruti and
point out the inconclusiveness of reasoning when his father bases his
conclusions on mere reasoning. His accommodative spirit in regard to the
pramāṇas is not militant against the spirit of Advaita as the Advaitin
admits the validity of the pramāṇas, other than śruti, only at the
empirical level and is not much bothered about the empirical world and the
pramāṇas that generate knowledge of it. The Upaniṣads enjoin *śravaṇa*
(determination
of the purport of śruti), *manana* (verification of the purport of śruti
with the aid of reasoning) and *nididhyāsana* (concentration on the truth
arrived at through *śravaṇa* and *manana)* as means of Brahman realisation.
Whether *manana* and *nididhyāsana* stand on a par with *śravaṇa* or are
subservient to śravaṇa, it has to be admitted that *manana,* except in the
case of a few personalities like Vāmadeva or Śuka, has a vital part to play
towards Brahman-realisation. It will be of much interest to note what
Śaṅkara has said on the role of logic in Advaita. Knowledge of the oneness
of Brahman and jīva obtained by means of *śravaṇa* becomes unassailable by
the exercise of reasoning and meditation; *śravaṇa* by itself cannot
produce conviction. In Śaṅkara’s view not only does śruti ordain *manana* but
it actually demonstrates the application of reasoning. The *madhukāṇḍa* of
the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* embodies an exposition of Advaita and the
*Yājñavalkyakāṇḍa* is a critical examination of the *madhukāṇḍa* in the
light of reasoning. Sureśvara observes that the two chapters of the
*Yājñavalkyakāṇḍa* employ the two types of argumentation, jalpa
(controversy) and vāda (disquisition). The function of reason does not stop
here; it has to play an effective part in *śravaṇa* also. Of the six canons
of interpretation (*upakramopasaṃhāraikya, abhyāsa, apūrvatā, phala,
arthavāda,* and *upapatti*) that determine the purport of śruti, upapatti
(intelligibility of the purport in the light of reasoning) though mentioned
last is not the least in importance. Śaṅkara has stated in unambiguous
terms the extent to which he relies upon reasoning in interpreting the
Brahmasūtras.
It must be noted here that Rāmakṛṣṇa borrows only the methodology of nyāya
and the Advaitic standpoint is not in the least affected by the nyāya
elements found in his exposition. It will be worthwhile to note in this
connection what he himself has said regarding the nature of his work.
Advaita regards śruti as the pramāna par excellence since it alone gives
rise to the knowledge of what is supersensuous such as the oneness of jīva
and Brahman. As such it excludes from its jurisdiction all that fall within
the scone of other pramāṇas. Only those śrutis which are concerned with
supersensuous matters are to be taken as pramāna and those that relate to
things known by other pramāṇas are to be dismissed as mere matter of fact
statements A mere definition cannot sublate that which has been settled by
śruti once for all. The knowledge resulting from the *tattvamasi* vākya is
pramā, since the vākyārtha is something new and different from the
padārtha. A śruti supported by inference is more powerful than the one
devoid of such a support and conversely an inference corroborated by śruti
is more powerful than one which lacks such corroboration. When anumānas of
equal force neutralise each other, one has to surrender at the altar of
śruti. Anumāna can establish the cause of the universe as only a cause and
not as a sentient being possessing omniscience and omnipotence. As the
ultimate goal is Brahman-realisation śruti alone which is competent to
generate it deserves full treatment. A detailed treatment of the other
pramāṇas is relevant in a treatise on Advaita only in so far as they have
an indirect bearing on Brahman-realisation. Anumāna is useful in
ascertaining the illusory character of all that is other than Brahman
implying thereby that Brahman alone is the ultimate reality. Other pramāṇas
are reliable only in so far as they are sources of valid knowledge relating
to the empirical sphere. Avidyā is the material cause of the objects
present in dream-cognition and the internal organ is the efficient
cause. The acceptance of the *avidyāvṛtti* in erroneous cognitions such as
‘this is silver’ is to make intelligible the remembrance of ‘silver’ at a
later time.
Ātman is the only absolute reality, and it is identical with Brahman, the
cause of the worlds of name and form in diverse kinds. Ātman can be known
(though not in its purest form), in some measure, as it is present in the
notion of ‘I’. Brahman, on the other hand, cannot be known as it never
figures as the object of any cognition. Jīvas are many; the view that
maintains the oneness of jīva is open to serious objections *Avidyā* is the
material cause of the universe and Brahman is its material cause in that it
is the substratum on which *avidyā* is superimposed. *Avidyā* is synonymous
with *māyā* and the two words signify one and the same entity. It is a
logically indeterminable positive entity and is sublated by the immediate
cognition of the oneness of Brahman and jīva. It possesses three distinct
potencies which are responsible for projecting the universe as absolutely
real to the lay man, empirically real to a philosopher, and phenomenally
real to a jīvanmuktaThe cognitions arising out of the mahāvākyas like
*tattvamasi* are immediate. The śruti which prescribes *śravaṇa* as a means
of Brahman-realisation does not purport any injunction with reference to
*śravaṇ* Renunciation is not a necessary prerequisite for one who aspires
for absolute liberation.
These verses are from his book wrt the above:
*tatra kandaramānikkagrāmaratnanivāsina. Tarkachūdāmani,* Tanjore Saraswati
Mahal library, No. 6217.
*dharmarājādhvarīndrena kaundinyena vipaśchitā. dharmarājādhvarīndrena
bahvrichena vipaśchitā. Tarkachūdāmaṇi,* Tanjore Sarasvatī Mahal library,
No. 6218.
*Vedāntaśikhāmani* with *Vedāntaparibhāṣā *and *Maniprabhā*, p. 295,
Venkatsware Steam Press, Bombay, Saka 1850. Vide Madras Government Oriental
Series, No. CLV, part II, p. 395.
*Vedāntaparibhāṣā* with *Śikhāmani* and *Maniprabhā* , p. 11, Venkateswara
Steam Press, Bombay, Saka 1850.
*Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* with *Ratnaprabhā, Bhāmatī* and *Nyāyanirnaya,* p. 7.
Venkateswara Steam Press, Bombay, Saka, 1835.
*viśadāśeṣatantrārthasārah. Tarkachūdāmani.*
*Vedāntaśikhāmaṇi,* p. 3.
*nyāyābdhiḥ tarkachūdāmanimiha kurute, Tarkachūḍāmani. tarkachūḍāmanirnāma
kṛtā viāvanmanoramā. Vedāntaparibhāṣā* , p. 11.
Some modem scholars are inclined to think that the *Tarkachūdāmani* referred
to in the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* is a direct commentary on the
*Tattvachintāmani:* but the statement *‘yena chintāmaṇau tīkā
daśatīkāvibhanjinī’* when read together with the opening verse of
*Tarkachūdāmanī
daśānāmapiṭikānam bhangam kurvan kvachit kvachit anumānaprakāśasya vivṛtim
karavāṇyahaṃ* will dispel any doubt regarding its being a commentary on the
*Prakāśa* of Ruchidatta.
cf. *prāchīnaih vyavahārasiddhaviṣayeṣvātmaikya siddhau paraṃ
sannahyadbhiranādarāt saranayo nānāvidhāḥ darśitāḥ.
Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha,* Kumbakonam
Edition, p. 3.
cf. Śrī Śaṅkara’s bhāṣya on the *Bṛhadāranyako’paniṣad,* ii, iv, v.
*Bṛhadāranyakavārtika,* iii, i, xv; iv, i, ii.
*vedāntavākyamīmāṃsā tadavirodhitarkopakaranā niśreyasaprayojanā
prastūyate. Brahmasūtrabhāṣya,* i. i. i.
*anena matprabandhena vedāntārthāvalaṃbinā, Vedāntaśikhāmani, *p.383.
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