The four pramāṇas are perception, inference, analogical reasoning, and testimony. We will discuss them in order. Then, we will consider Nyāya’s theory of knowledge in general.
a. Perception (pratyakṣa) i. The Characteristics of Perception Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.4 defines perceptual cognition as follows. A perceptual cognition arises by means of the connection between sense faculty and object, is not dependent on words, is non-deviating, and is determinate. This sūtra provides four conditions which must be met for cognition to be perceptual. The first, that cognition arises from the connection between sense faculty and object, evinces Nyāya’s direct realism. It is such connection, the central feature of the causal chain which terminates in perceptual cognition, which fixes the intentionality of a token percept. Uddyotakara enumerates six kinds of connection (sannikarṣa) to account for the fact that that we perceive not only substances, but properties, absences, and so on: (i) conjunction (samyoga), the connection between a sense faculty and an object; (ii) inherence in what is conjoined (saṁyukta-samavāya), the connection between a sense faculty and a property-trope which inheres in an object; (iii) inherence in what inheres in what is conjoined (saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya), the connection between a sense faculty and the universal which is instantiated in a property-trope; (iv) inherence (samavāya), the kind of connection which makes auditory perception possible; (v) inherence in what inheres (samaveta-samavāya), the connection between the auditory faculty and universals which inhere within sounds; (vi) qualifier-qualified relation (viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-bhāva), the connection which allows for the perception of inherence and absence in objects. In all cases, the perceptual cognition is born of connection between a sense faculty and an occurrent fact or object. The second condition, that the cognition produced is not dependent on words, has a somewhat complicated interpretive history. Generally, Nyāya holds that ordinary perception involves concept deployment. Therefore, this restriction does not endorse a view held by the Buddhist Dignāga and his followers, that genuine perception is non-conceptual (kalpanā-apodha). Still, the meaning of avyapadeśya is disputed amongst Naiyāyikas. On one reading, this qualification serves the purpose of distinguishing between perceptually and testimonially generated cognitions. The latter also require information provided by the senses but further require the deployment of semantic and syntactic knowledge. An allied reading suggests that while involving the application of concepts, perception of an object is often causally prior to speech acts involving it. The third, “non-deviating” condition blocks false cognitions, like the misperception that an oyster shell is a piece of silver, from the ranks of pramāṇa-born. This is tied to the Nyāya notion that pramāṇas are by definition inerrant, and that false cognitive presentations are not truly pramāṇas but pseudo-pramāṇas (pramāṇa-ābhāsa). Though we may mistakenly take a pseudo-pramāṇa, like the illusion of a person in the distance, to be the real thing, it is not. “Perception” and similar pramāṇa-terms have success grammar for Nyāya. The fourth, “determinate” condition blocks cognitions which are merely doubtful from the ranks of the pramāṇa-born. Dubious cognitions, like that of a distant person at dusk, do not convey misleadingly false information, but being unclear, they do not properly apprehend the object in question. It could be a person or a post. As such, one neither correctly grasps its character nor falsely takes it to represent accurately a certain object. Later Naiyāyikas, most notably Vācaspati Miśra, read the qualifiers “notdependent on words” and “determinate” disjunctively, in order to say that perception may be non-propositional or propositional. However anachronistic this may be as an interpretation of the Nyāya-sūtra, this division is accepted by later Nyāya. 2 Since Guru accepted that his is a foolish question hence there is no Logic or Nyaya; so teaching Vedas to sishya was not possible only because, Guru himself does not know; so logically someone shall first teach Guru after Guru learned Sanskrit. Also there is no deduction whether Sanskrit has anything to do with teaching by a guru as students must learn in which process everything is taught by Guru. And here the Guru is a fraud so student must seek elsewhere. ‘K Rajaram IRS 26226 On Thu, 26 Feb 2026 at 04:57, Dr Sundar <[email protected]> wrote: > > I had found the following story interesting to read .....hope some of you > too.. > ************* > A young man in his mid-twenties knocks on the door of a renowned Guru. He > says: “I’ve come to you because I wish to study Vedas.” > > “Do you know Sanskrit?” the Guru asks. > > “No,” replies the young man. > > “Have you studied any Indian philosophy?” > > “No. But don’t worry. I just finished my doctoral dissertation at Harvard > on logic. So now, I would just like to round up my education with a little > study of the Vedas.” > > “I doubt,” the Guru says, “that you are ready to study Vedas. It is the > deepest knowledge ever known. If you wish, however, I am willing to examine > you in logic, and if you pass that test I will teach you Vedas.” > > The young man agrees. > > Guru holds up two fingers. “Two men come down a chimney. One comes out > with a clean face; the other comes out with a dirty face. Which one washes > his face?” > > The young man stares at the Guru. “Is that really a test in logic?” > > The Guru nods. > > ”The one with the dirty face washes his face“- he answers confidently. > > “Wrong. The one with the clean face washes his face. Examine the logic. > The one with the dirty face looks at the one with the clean face and thinks > his face is clean. The one with the clean face looks at the one with the > dirty face and thinks his face is dirty. So, the one with the clean face > washes his face.” > > “Very clever,” the young man says. “Give me another test.” > > The Guru again holds up two fingers. “Two men come down a chimney. One > comes out with a clean face, the other comes out with a dirty face. Which > one washes his face?” > > “We have already established that. The one with the clean face washes his > face.” > > “Wrong. Each one washes his face. Examine the logic. The one with the > dirty face looks at the one with the clean face and thinks his face is > clean. The one with the clean face looks at the one with the dirty face and > thinks his face is dirty. So, the one with the clean face washes his face. > When the one with the dirty face sees the one with the clean face wash his > face, he also washes his face. So, each one washes his face.” > > “I didn’t think of that,” says the young man. It’s shocking to me that I > could make an error in logic. Test me again.” > > The Guru holds up two fingers. “Two men come down a chimney. One comes out > with a clean face; the other comes out with a dirty face. Which one washes > his face?” > > “Each one washes his face.” > > “Wrong. Neither one washes his face. Examine the logic. The one with the > dirty face looks at the one with the clean face and thinks his face is > clean. The one with the clean face looks at the one with the dirty face and > thinks his face is dirty. But when the one with the clean face sees the one > with the dirty face doesn’t wash his face, he also doesn’t wash his face. > So, neither one washes his face.” > > The young man is desperate. “I am qualified to study Vedas. Please give me > one more test.” > > He groans, though, when the Guru lifts two fingers. “Two men come down a > chimney. One comes out with a clean face; the other comes out with a dirty > face. Which one washes his face?” > > “Neither one washes his face.” > > “Wrong. Do you now see why logic is an insufficient basis for studying > Vedas? Tell me, how is it possible for two men to come down the same > chimney, and for one to come out with a clean face and the other with a > dirty face? Don’t you see? The whole question is nonsense, foolishness, and > if you spend your whole life trying to answer foolish questions, all your > answers will be foolish, too.” > > That's why having wisdom is more important than having logic. > > Infinite love > Infinite wisdom. > > -- Hari Om -- > > *"KNOW THYSELF .* > *SELF KNOWLEDGE IS REAL KNOWLEDGE.* > *ALL OTHER KNOWLEDGE IS IGNORANCE AND THEY ARE NO KNOWLEDGE " * > *~~~ Bhagavan Ramana* > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "societyforservingseniors" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion, visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/society4servingseniors/CAF%3D8Bw1ByN6hQVakMkdt7AE%2BpzDn2-Lxdvf1_7cPQNMBkdNR-Q%40mail.gmail.com > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/society4servingseniors/CAF%3D8Bw1ByN6hQVakMkdt7AE%2BpzDn2-Lxdvf1_7cPQNMBkdNR-Q%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Thatha_Patty" group. 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