Then we are awaiting avatar of nature to turn back KR IRS On Fri, 27 Feb, 2026, 10:20 am Markendeya Yeddanapudi, < [email protected]> wrote:
> Sir, > You can go on scholaring but the economic holocaust and the destruction of > nature is happening.Actually in most Universities the faculties of > Philosophy vanished as there are no students and the cartesian and economic > damage is ravaging. > YMS > > On Fri, Feb 27, 2026 at 10:10 AM Rajaram Krishnamurthy < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> Cartesian dualism is no longer intellectually dominant in cutting-edge >> philosophy or ecological science. >> >> But institutionally and economically, its structures remain powerful. >> >> The revolt is philosophical and pedagogical — not yet structural. >> >> Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx >> >> KR VALIDITY OF THE THEORY OF CARTESIAN AND ITS DUALISM >> >> The validity of Cartesian dualism—the 17th-century theory >> proposed by René Descartes that the mind and body are two distinct, >> interacting substances—is widely considered to be outdated in contemporary >> science and mainstream philosophy. While it historically served as a >> critical foundation for modern science by allowing for the mechanistic >> study of the body, it is now largely replaced by materialist and monist >> views that see the mind as an emergent property of brain activity. >> >> Descartes proposed that existence consists of two >> fundamentally different types of things: >> >> [Res Extensa (Material Substance)]: The physical body, which takes up >> space, is divisible, and governed by mechanical, physical laws. [Res >> Cogitans (Thinking Substance)]: The immaterial mind/soul, which does not >> take up space, is indivisible, and holds the capacity for consciousness, >> thought, and free will. [Interactionism]: Descartes argued that despite >> being separate, the mind and body interact, famously proposing the pineal >> gland as the site of this interaction. >> >> Arguments Against Validity (Modern Critique) >> >> The Interaction Problem: The most significant objection, raised first by >> Elisabeth of Bohemia in Descartes' own time, is that immaterial substances >> cannot physically move material ones. If the mind has no physical >> properties, it cannot cause a physical change (e.g., lifting a hand). >> >> Neuroscience and Brain Damage: Modern neuroscience shows that mental >> processes are heavily dependent on physical brain structures. Damage to the >> brain results in direct, predictable changes to personality, memory, and >> consciousness, >> suggesting that the "mind" cannot exist independently of the body. >> >> Violation of Physical Laws: The interaction of a non-physical mind on the >> physical brain would break the law of conservation of energy/mass. >> >> Scientific Advancement: Darwinian evolution and subsequent advances in >> biology have connected humans to all other living organisms, undermining >> the view that the human mind is fundamentally different from animal >> behavior (which Descartes deemed purely mechanistic). >> >> Contemporary Relevance and Alternative Views >> >> Still Intuitive*: Despite its rejection in academia, Cartesian dualism >> remains a popular intuitive view, often supporting religious, spiritual, or >> near-death experience beliefs.* >> >> Philosophy of Mind: *It is replaced in academia by Physicalism (material >> monism), which states that everything is physical, or Property Dualism, >> which asserts that while there is only one substance, mental properties are >> distinct from physical ones.* >> >> "Ghost in the Machine": *Philosopher Gilbert Ryle notoriously referred >> to Cartesian dualism as the "ghost in the machine," arguing it is a >> category mistake—treating the mind as an independent "thing" rather than a >> description of behavior.* >> >> Psychoneuroimmunology: *Modern health science has moved towards a >> "biopsychosocial" model, which acknowledges the intense interconnection of >> mind and body, reversing the rigid separation Descartes instituted. * >> >> Cartesian dualism is no longer considered a scientifically valid >> explanation of human nature, but it remains historically significant as a >> driver of the scientific method and a catalyst for the ongoing, complex >> debate regarding the "hard problem" of consciousness. >> >> *1 Cartesian Dualism and Gassendi's Objection* >> >> The seventeenth century philosopher and mathematician >> <https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/mathematicians> Rene >> Descartes >> famously held that, while the nature and behavior of nonhuman animals could >> be explained completely by the physical science of his day, various >> features of human beings—including in particular the fact that human >> thought and action are not under direct environmental control—seemed to >> place them beyond the reach of physical science. Descartes therefore >> endorsed *dualism*, the idea that every human being >> <https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/human-being> is a >> complex of a physical body located in space and subject to physical laws >> and an immaterial mind *not* located in space and *not* subject to >> physical laws. *Descartes' contemporary Gassendi famously objected* that >> dualism made a mystery of how bodily actions and movements could be caused >> by immaterial psychological events: ‘How can there be effort directed >> against anything, or motion set up in it, unless there is mutual contact >> between what moves and is moved? And how can there be contact without a >> body?’ (Descartes and Cottingham et al. 1984). Gassendi's objection is an >> example of a problem of causation in multiple domains. It turns on the fact >> that there is causal contact between the mental and physical domains, >> something which is difficult to understand if Cartesian dualism is true. >> However, problems of this sort are by no means unique to the relationship >> between the mental and the physical, nor to Descartes'specific account of >> that relationship, and nor do they arise only from older ideas in science >> and philosophy. On the contrary, they arise from a general picture of the >> world which is very common in contemporary intellectual culture: *the >> causal hierarchy picture*. >> >> The cognitive science of the 20th century, reflecting the focus >> of the individual cognitive sciences, was predominantly interested in >> perception, memory, problem solving, planning, and other “cognitive” >> activities. For the most part, researchers interested in cognition ignored >> those aspects that, as a hangover from Cartesian dualism, were considered >> “subjective”, such as consciousness and affect. This was due to a variety >> of factors, including the inheritance of behaviourist and cognitivist >> psychology. Although cognitivism was a reaction to the behaviourism of the >> early to mid 20th century and thus directly opposed to many of its claims, >> they both shared the assumption that the emotional domain was separate from >> the cognitive domain, and furthermore, that emotion was potentially >> dissociable from cognition. As a result, cognitive scientists have tended >> to consider it unnecessary to understand affect in order to understand the >> other aspects of cognition, and for the most part have left research in >> this area to a handful of “affective” neuroscientists and psychologists. >> >> So we acquire information about mathematical objects by means >> of a faculty of mathematical intuition. Now, other philosophers have >> endorsed the idea that we possess a faculty of mathematical intuition, but >> Gödel's version of this view involves the idea that the mind is >> non-physical in some sense and that we are capable of forging contact with, >> and acquiring information from, non-physical mathematical objects. (Others >> who endorse the idea that we possess a faculty of mathematical intuition >> have a no-contact theory of intuition that is consistent with a materialist >> philosophy of mind. Now, some people might argue that Gödel had such a view >> as well. I have argued elsewhere [1998, chapter 2, section 4.2] that Gödel >> is better interpreted as endorsing an immaterialist, contact-based theory >> of mathematical intuition. But the question of what view Gödel actually >> held is irrelevant here.) This reject-(1) strategy of responding to the >> epistemological argument can be quickly dispensed with. One problem is that >> rejecting (1) doesn't seem to help solve the lack-of-access problem. For >> even if minds are immaterial, it is not as if that puts them into >> informational contact with mathematical objects. Indeed, the idea that an >> immaterial mind could have some sort of information-transferring contact >> with abstract objects seems just as incoherent as the idea that a physical >> brain could. Abstract objects, after all, are causally inert; they cannot >> generate information-carrying signals at all; in short, information can't >> pass from an abstract object to anything, material or immaterial. A second >> problem with the reject-(1) strategy is that (1) is, in fact, true. Now, of >> course, I cannot argue for this here, because it would be entirely >> inappropriate to break out into an argument against Cartesian dualism in >> the middle of an essay on the philosophy of mathematics, but it is worth >> noting that what is required here is a very strong and implausible version >> of dualism. One cannot motivate a rejection of (1) by merely arguing that >> there are real mental states, like beliefs and pains, or by arguing that >> our mentalistic idioms cannot be reduced to physicalistic idioms. One has >> to argue for the thesis that there actually exists immaterial human >> mind-stuff. >> >> The term “biomental” (Ninivaggi, 2013, p. 5) was coined to >> transcend the Cartesian dualism of body-mind separateness. Biomental >> efforts capture the authentic integrity of the person as a biopsychosocial >> organism in flux yet in ongoing integration: >> >> I have coined the innovative phrase biomental child development, in which >> the word “biomental” indicates a specific child development perspective. >> This term refers to the integrity—nonduality and emergent integration—of >> the whole individual at all ages in processes that are both psychological >> and physical. It connotes simultaneity, a responsiveness of the total >> organism, and the dynamic relatedness among its aspects. In states of >> health, this relatedness reflects a synergy that promotes emerging dynamic >> integration. The construct and phenomenon of integration—apparently >> split-off parts understood to be aspects of a primary whole—is axiomatic in >> the biomental perspective, and remains a golden thread running throughout >> this text. p.5. *Eastern perspectives have always* recognized the >> intimate links between body and mind and the energies pervading them. A >> health span that linked wellness to a coupling of body and mind runs >> through that literature. The term “biomental” also illustrates this. >> Formalizing these forces by the terms qi and prana makes tangible the >> intangible. Such paradoxical thought is a quintessential part of Eastern >> worldviews. Thus, in discussing mindfulness, Eastern conceptions center >> attention on subtle psychological processes, often using concepts >> scientifically foreign to Western thought. This contribution aims at >> helping to bridge this gap in understanding, at least as it adds to >> explaining the roots of modern mindfulness. >> >> Radical empiricism, in contrast, proposed an ontology that >> continued his attack on Hegelian absolute idealism but broke sharply with >> the commonsense mind–body dualism of his scientific psychology. To >> transcend this Cartesian dualism, and the cognitive dualism of thought and >> its object or consciousness and its contents, he now proposed pure >> experience as the fundamental reality. Pure experience prior to analysis or >> conceptualization does not distinguish between thing and thought. The >> commonsense categories, he believed, could be recovered from the contexts >> in which ingredients of pure experience are embedded and their various >> relationships. His apparent move toward philosophical idealism was >> qualified by his continuing commitment to pluralism: ‘… there is no general >> stuff of which experience at large is made. If you ask what any one bit of >> pure experience is made of, the answer is always the same: “It is made of >> that, of just what appears, of space, of intensity, of flatness, brownness, >> heaviness, or what not”’ (1912/1976, p. 14–15). >> >> Nature was thereby drained of her inner life, rendered a deaf and blind >> apparatus of indifferent and value-free law, and humankind was faced with a >> world of inanimate, meaningless matter, upon which it projected its psyche >> – its aliveness, meaning and purpose – only in fantasy. It was this >> disenchanted vision of the world, at the dawn of the industrial revolution >> that followed, that the Romantics found so revolting, and feverishly >> revolted against. Although Descartes’s dualism did not win the >> philosophical day, we in the West are still very much the children of the >> disenchanted bifurcation it ushered in. Our experience remains >> characterised by the separation of ‘mind’ and ‘nature’ instantiated by >> Descartes. Its present incarnation – what we might call the >> empiricist-materialist position – not only predominates in academia, but in >> our everyday assumptions about ourselves and the world. This is >> particularly clear in the case of mental disorder. >> >> In order to avoid these difficulties with substance dualism, many >> have argued for “property dualism,” a view that holds there is only one >> real substance, one kind of “stuff” as it were, but it has two distinct >> properties, one material and one mental. Our experience of color, for >> example, can be understood in these two ways. The wavelengths involved are >> physical properties detectable by objective measurement and fully >> implicated in material causal mechanisms. Color, on the other hand, is a >> qualia, an experiential property accessible only to the experiencing >> subject (which is why color blindness can easily go undetected); it is only >> indirectly amenable to qualitative analysis. In other words, physical >> properties are susceptible to objective, public, third-person analyses, >> while experiential properties—qualia—are only accessible through >> subjective, private, first person accounts. It is how we know them that >> differs, not what they are. Notice the underlying structure of this. We >> have shifted from substance dualism, which is ontological, to property >> dualism, which is, in effect, epistemological: “experience” is the private, >> subjectively accessible dimension while neurons, etc., are the public, >> objectively accessible dimension. We have replaced a mind-body dualism with >> a subject-object dualism. But in contrast to Yogācāra Buddhist analyses of >> the interdependence of subject and object, which operate only in >> interaction, these two are typically seen as independent—or even >> incommensurate—epistemologies. Moreover, one or the other of them is >> typically considered paramount. Eliminative or reductive materialism, for >> example, claims that the subjective realm of experience only appears to be >> independent, but even this can be effectively eliminated: once we know >> enough about the brain we will be able to exhaustively explain experience >> in material terms, the only real terms there are. This is a modern >> version of the old appearance reality problem. *Qualia, what* we appear >> to experience, have no truly independent reality and hence require no >> nonmaterial explanation—they are purely epiphenomenal, mere by-products of >> the material processes which alone are real. In effect, all first-person >> accounts are valid only insofar as they directly reflect, or may be wholly >> reduced to, third-person accounts. In this view, we can never truly >> explain our behavior by appeal illiam waldron | 75 ing to direct >> experience—to our desires, feelings, or intentions—since these are merely >> epiphenomenal. Explanations of experience must —in principle—be couched in >> terms of their material substrate. Indeed, not only is our desire to >> understand our minds itself a mere by-product of these exclusively real >> material processes, but so is any desire we might entertain to the >> contrary! We are in effect automatons only imagining we are agents—such is >> the logic of reductive materialism. In part as a response to this >> unappealing (and ultimately incoherent) vision, many posit an intrinsic >> subjectivity, the counterpart to the objective side of the subject-object >> dichotomy. If mind is intrinsically intentional, if it is intrinsically >> “about something,” then it possesses its own nature and properties >> independently of its material substrate. As Feser (2006, 172) succinctly >> explains: brain processes, composed as they are of meaningless chemical >> components, seem as inherently devoid of intentionality as sound-waves or >> ink marks. Any intentionality they do have would have to be derived from >> something else. But if everything that is physical is devoid of >> intentionality, then whatever has intentionality would have to be >> nonphysical. It follows then that since mind does have intrinsic >> intentionality it must be nonphysical. But this too has its problems. If >> our intentional objects, our qualia, were truly independent of any material >> basis, they would not be involved in causal interactions with the body. We >> could neither explain why we seem to experience red when we drive up to a >> stop sign, since the qualia of this seeing should occur independent of our >> retinas and visual faculties; nor could we explain how this seeming >> experience of red is connected to our actually stopping, since, again, the >> seeing is intrinsically nonphysical and hence—by definition—unconnected to >> our nervous system or muscles. The notion of qualia thus resembles a >> Cartesian immaterial essence, which rendered causal interaction between >> body and mind so inexplicable. And insofar as the notion of qualia assumes >> an underlying ontological dualism between body and mind or an >> epistemological dualism between first and third person modes of knowing, it >> has not yet resolved the mind-body problem. Indeed, insofar as subjectivity >> is exclusively defined as first person and private, and science depends on >> what is third person and public, subjectivity in principle remains outside >> the purview 76 | Buddhist Critique of materialist science (Feser 2006, 105). >> >> Thus, to the extent that these three considerations are >> pertinent— that neuroscience is a theory-laden human enterprise, that >> meditators are not innocent informants but acculturated individuals, and >> that all adult brains are radically socialized and linguistified—we cannot >> assume a truly autonomous third-person knowledge set up against an equally >> autonomous first-person knowledge, the correlation of which will give us >> indubitably accurate knowledge about the relation between brain and >> experience. All of these are inescapably intersubjective; that is, they are >> related in their very origins. It is not enough for us to perceive them >> coming together after the fact, as it were; we need to conceive of them as >> together from the beginning. >> >> Cartesian is far away from all of us; Life is running around the >> property dualism; getting rid of dualism and Vishishtadvaita, while living >> with the Karma unattached alone can make all do exist. WITHOUT WINGS >> NOTHING CAN FLY; BUT TO GET THE WINGS WE HVE TO RIGGLE WITH DUALISM. >> K Rajaram IRS 27226 >> >> On Fri, 27 Feb 2026 at 08:18, Markendeya Yeddanapudi < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Revolt in Universities against Cartesianism >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> --Yes — though it rarely appears as an open “revolt against >>> Cartesianism.” >>> >>> Instead, it emerges as intellectual movements that challenge >>> reductionism, mechanistic thinking, and strict subject–object separation. >>> >>> What you are calling “Cartesianism” — the split between mind and matter, >>> observer and observed, human and nature — is being questioned in multiple >>> universities worldwide. The shift is gradual, plural, and often embedded >>> within existing institutions rather than openly revolutionary. >>> >>> Here are some significant currents: >>> ------------------------------ >>> 1. Systems Thinking & Complexity Science >>> >>> Universities influenced by systems theory reject reductionism as >>> sufficient for understanding life. >>> >>> - >>> >>> The *Santa Fe Institute* Santa Fe Institute works on complexity >>> science, studying wholes, emergence, and interconnected systems rather >>> than >>> isolated parts. >>> - >>> >>> Programs in systems ecology, network science, and earth systems >>> science emphasize interdependence. >>> >>> These approaches argue that the whole cannot be understood merely by >>> dissecting parts — a direct challenge to Cartesian fragmentation. >>> ------------------------------ >>> 2. Ecological Economics >>> >>> Some institutions are challenging growth-based economic orthodoxy. >>> >>> - >>> >>> The *Stockholm Resilience Centre* Stockholm Resilience Centre >>> integrates planetary boundaries with economics. >>> - >>> >>> Scholars influenced by thinkers like *Herman Daly* Herman Daly >>> promote steady-state economics rather than perpetual growth. >>> >>> This reframes economics as embedded within ecology, not above it. >>> ------------------------------ >>> 3. Deep Ecology & Environmental Humanities >>> >>> Certain universities host programs in environmental philosophy and >>> humanities that question anthropocentrism and mechanistic worldviews. >>> >>> - >>> >>> Inspired by *Arne Næss* Arne Naess and deep ecology. >>> - >>> >>> The *Schumacher College* Schumacher College (though not a >>> traditional university) explicitly promotes holistic, non-dual ecological >>> education. >>> >>> Environmental humanities departments increasingly critique the >>> nature–culture divide. >>> ------------------------------ >>> 4. Process Philosophy & Post-Cartesian Thought >>> >>> Philosophy departments influenced by *Alfred North Whitehead* Alfred >>> North Whitehead emphasize process, relation, and becoming rather than >>> static substance. >>> >>> Process philosophy rejects strict subject–object dualism and views >>> reality as relational events. >>> ------------------------------ >>> 5. Indigenous Knowledge Integration >>> >>> Many universities in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand are >>> incorporating Indigenous epistemologies, which tend to be relational and >>> non-dual. >>> >>> For example: >>> >>> - >>> >>> The *University of British Columbia* University of British Columbia >>> integrates Indigenous land-based learning programs. >>> >>> These approaches emphasize reciprocity with land rather than detached >>> observation. >>> ------------------------------ >>> 6. Contemplative Education Movements >>> >>> Some institutions integrate mindfulness and contemplative pedagogy into >>> curricula. >>> >>> - >>> >>> The *Naropa University* Naropa University explicitly blends >>> contemplative practice with academic study. >>> >>> This challenges the purely analytic model of knowing. >>> ------------------------------ >>> Important Clarification >>> >>> There is no coordinated “anti-Cartesian revolution” sweeping >>> universities. >>> >>> Instead, what exists is: >>> >>> - >>> >>> Fragmented reform >>> - >>> >>> Parallel movements >>> - >>> >>> Interdisciplinary experimentation >>> - >>> >>> Growing dissatisfaction with hyper-reductionism >>> >>> Ironically, the critique of Cartesianism often happens within the very >>> institutions shaped by it. >>> ------------------------------ >>> Why There Is No Full Revolt >>> >>> 1. >>> >>> Universities are financially embedded in economic systems. >>> 2. >>> >>> Research funding favors technological and market-oriented outcomes. >>> 3. >>> >>> Ranking systems reward measurable output, not holistic >>> transformation. >>> 4. >>> >>> Students seek economic security, reinforcing the cycle. >>> >>> So change tends to be evolutionary, not revolutionary. >>> ------------------------------ >>> The Present Moment >>> >>> However, there *is* increasing unrest: >>> >>> - >>> >>> Climate activism among students >>> - >>> >>> Degrowth scholarship >>> - >>> >>> Critique of neoliberal university models >>> - >>> >>> Rising ecological anxiety among youth >>> >>> The dissatisfaction you express is not isolated. >>> ------------------------------ >>> A Realistic Assessment >>> >>> Cartesian dualism is no longer intellectually dominant in cutting-edge >>> philosophy or ecological science. >>> >>> But institutionally and economically, its structures remain powerful. >>> >>> The revolt is philosophical and pedagogical — not yet structural. >>> ------------------------------ >>> >>> If you would like, I can next: >>> >>> - >>> >>> Map out where a genuine structural transformation might >>> realistically begin >>> - >>> >>> Identify universities most aligned with holistic ecological education >>> - >>> >>> Or analyze whether a complete break from Cartesianism is even >>> possible in modern scientific civilization >>> >>> *Mar* >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "societyforservingseniors" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To view this discussion, visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/society4servingseniors/CACDCHCKLG%3DJXxJOrz3SV6VCyKae7DLSHaD%3DjBt%3DjbT7rkT8Tww%40mail.gmail.com >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/society4servingseniors/CACDCHCKLG%3DJXxJOrz3SV6VCyKae7DLSHaD%3DjBt%3DjbT7rkT8Tww%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> >>> . >>> >> > > -- > *Mar* > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Thatha_Patty" group. 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