I would not get too hung up on the precise technology, there are mechanisms that might well work better than Merkle trees.
One thing to beware of is that there was quite a bit of work in this area in the mid 90s, some of which is just coming out of patent rights, others have some more years to go. So it might well turn out to be necessary to tak a sub optimal approach. I don't think it at all likely that one proposal will be adopted in its entirety without modification. On Mon, Jan 16, 2012 at 12:14 PM, Ralph Holz <[email protected]> wrote: > Hi, > > The list sounds about right. CA transparency and Sovereign Keys have a lot > in common. One thing that I was wondering is why Sovereign Keys does not > use Merkle hash chains; my guess so far was performance. > > > And there's some partially-connected things in the works: >> >> - Key Pinning in HTTP working it's way through the websec working >> group: >> http://tools.ietf.org/html/**draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning-**01<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning-01> >> - Key Pinning in TLS by moxie: https://github.com/moxie0/** >> Convergence/wiki/TACK <https://github.com/moxie0/Convergence/wiki/TACK> >> - DANE for cert assertions via DNSSEC >> > > Not quite the same as it has a different purpose, but may I also add our > own Crossbear: > https://pki.net.in.tum.de/**node/4<https://pki.net.in.tum.de/node/4>. > The purpose of the tool is to trace the MitM. It has its own tracking > infrastructure, but also makes use of Convergence. > > Ralph > > ______________________________**_________________ > therightkey mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/**listinfo/therightkey<https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/therightkey> > -- Website: http://hallambaker.com/
_______________________________________________ therightkey mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/therightkey
