Kyle Hamilton wrote: > > Phillip Hallam-Baker <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > So now we see why security policy driven by MUA published security > > policy is going to fail: there is no consistency in the MUA loop. I > > read mail on four separate devices. They have no way to communicate > > between themselves to negotiate a common security policy and I > > certainly would not want them to. > > 'Certainly'? You wouldn't want your systems to work together to > seamlessly and transparently add protections to all of your personal > intellectual property, permitting secure access from devices which you > enrolled or otherwise authorized, with potentially a completely > transparent and automatic secure authorization process? You wouldn't > want your systems to automatically and securely manage your utility > and ceremonial keys so that your command is the only one which can > permit their application? You wouldn't want your systems to implement > key expiration and rollover, or automatically enroll new keys into > new PKIs as such would become useful? > > I'm sorry, but I would. And I do.
I certainly would NEVER want that. What you're calling for is a "single break-in" system, where breaking into one of your devices enables the attacker to immediately take posession of all your other devices for free. -Martin _______________________________________________ therightkey mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/therightkey
