Kyle, Kyle H wrote: > > We MUST permit every use of our protocols. We MUST describe the > computational processes and we MUST define the intended semantics, > but we MUST NOT try to sabotage anything that the standards' > implementors or consumers try to do. If we do, we're overstepping > the bounds of what authority we can legitimately claim as standards > designers.
We seem to be talking about completely different protocols. *I* am talking about TLS (any version), which has the clearly stated design goal: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2246 Abstract This document specifies Version 1.0 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. The TLS protocol provides communications privacy over the Internet. The protocol allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery. http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246 Abstract This document specifies Version 1.2 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. The TLS protocol provides communications security over the Internet. The protocol allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery. What these MITM proxies are doing is _completely_and_thoroughly_ subverting the entire purpose of the TLS protocol. They're doing it not by exploiting weaknesses in the TLS protocol itself (at least prior to rfc5746), but instead, by exploiting a long-standing fatal design flaw in the security in the existing TLS X.509 PKI trust model. Those who want a protocol for encrypted communication that can be arbitrarily MITMed should design themselves such a protocol. Expecting the IETF to support continued exploitation of a serious weakness in a security architecture that is the exact opposite of its stated design goal is inappropriate for the IETF. -Martin _______________________________________________ therightkey mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/therightkey
