On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 3:40 PM, Rick Andrews <[email protected]> wrote:
> It's going to cost engineering time and money for CAs to implement CT. The > bean counters and execs who control the purse strings are going to ask what > they'll get for their $$$. They'll ask "so if I spend this money, we won't > get hacked, right?" and I would have to say no, it's no guarantee that we > wouldn't get hacked, but if we got hacked we would know about it. And the attackers have much less incentive to hack you. That is a really big win. Obviously the cost is not $0, but the payoff is significant. In a CT world, what does Comodo Hacker gain by causing mis-issuance? It's a looooot less than now. Tell your bean counters that. > CT is *a* solution, but by no means the only possible solution. Is there > another solution that might be less expensive and intrusive to implement? CAA > might get us 80% of the way there for a fraction of the cost. DANE and cert > pinning also help, and might be simpler to implement. Obviously I like key pinning, but I consider CT (or a public log solution generally) as the "true", long-term solution. Pinning would probably continue to be of complementary value, as might DANE/CAA/whatever else. But I consider that CT is where we want to be. And other people are already offering to take on the really big costs. Tell your bean counters that, too: It's a collaborative effort, and other people have already started paying. It might be that all you have to do is implement somebody else's design and talk to somebody else's service (although obviously helping out sooner benefits you too). _______________________________________________ therightkey mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/therightkey
