On Sat, 17 Nov 2012, Carl Wallace wrote:
OK, so maybe you haven't been following the mailing list or reading the
draft. In the CT-for-PKIX proposal, individuals can submit their own
certificate.
Under this approach, how does the log come to have certificates that a
legitimate owner would like to be made aware of? I understand the utility
of including the CT in the certificate and having an individual submit
their certificate (or the CA on their behalf) but locking down a log to
these sorts of inputs would seem to limit their usefulness for detecting
rogue certs.
But allowing anyone to submit "new" certificates, allows hackers to do
the same. How is this authenticated?
For the TLS cert, the "out of band" was via DNS its the MX record. Which
has in fact reduced the security of the CA vouching system. With DNSSEC,
and compromise there, it means even less.
From my remote participation, I understood the CT audits were
restricted, and that only CAs could submit entries for the audit log,
which is why when this was mentioned I channeled via jabber about
"security through money", and that I thought this was an invalid approach.
(especially for CT-DNSSEC, as publishing DS records is free, unlike
getting a "recognised" PKIX certificate)
On the lists I now hear anyone can submit, which also raises issues.
Perhaps there are very different thoughts for CT-PKIX-CA versus
CT-PKIX-selfsigned that I'm not aware of.
CT-PKIX addresses an issue where there are 600 roots and you can't
trust all of them (although TLSA solves that too). I'm still unsure
what CT-DNSSEC would solve, as just pulling history from DNS does not
add anything, and I have no idea how to authenticate to the CT-DNSSEC
audit log to start an alternative path of trust, especially if you are
defendining against a rogue root or rogue .com key being used secretly
to sign alternative records, or a compromised DNSSEC private key.
Paul
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